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In this study I investigate how populism can be understood and explained from a 
communication perspective. Most literature constructs a dichotomy between populist 
ideology and style. A communication perspective instead emphasises that ideological 
content and stylistic form are inseparable in populist performances of political 
representation. For this purpose I compare two populist parties: the Economic 
Freedom Fighters (EFF) – a radical-left, explosive phenomenon in South African politics 
– and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which paved the way for Brexit. These two 
cases have emerged from contrasting democratic contexts, yet both respond to fault 
lines in representative democracy and engage in similar practices of symbolic 
communication. 
My approach offers a reconceptualization of populism as a communicative process. I 
achieve this by conducting an in-depth analysis of populist disruptive performances as 
exemplary manifestations of populist ideology and identifying their key features. A 
series of disruptive performances – live and virtual – initiated by UKIP and the EFF 
between 2014 and 2017 provide the inspiration. I approach the analysis through the 
theoretical concepts of ideology, performance and mediation and enquire into their 
interrelation in populist communicative processes. These processes are interrogated 
through a primarily interpretive analysis, supplemented by quantitative analysis, of a 
broad range of communicative resources sparked by the disruptive performances, 
including YouTube videos, press releases, legacy media and social media posts. 
Through this perspective I am able to enrich and deepen our understanding of current 
debates in the literature, explain populism’s appeal in the hybrid media environment 
and explicate its characteristic mode of representation.  
The thesis demonstrates that such a communication perspective explains the thinness 
of populist ideology, its harmony with processes of mediation and its varied forms 
around the globe. In combination with the comparative approach it reveals insights 
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Many populists would agree that the story of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and 
the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in South Africa is one of martyrdom and courage 
in the face of betrayal and deceit. The odds are stacked against these small opposition 
parties taking on the players of big and dirty politics in a universal battle between good 
and evil. This is a struggle that is playing out across the world. Through a visceral 
enactment of ordinary people’s discontents and perceptions of politics, populists 
challenge the foundations of representative democracy. We have recently seen UKIP 
successfully campaign for the UK’s extraction from the European Union. In the US 
Donald Trump has crossed to the other side of the television screen and is governing 
via tweets – a situation that some commentators see as proof that the US is in a crisis 
of democracy (Lanktree, 2018). Elections across Europe, from France and Germany to 
Poland and Italy, have witnessed populist parties threatening the national and 
international order. Examples are too many to mention. The Freedom Party of 
Austria’s (FPÖ) Norbert Hofer nearly won the presidency after a second round re-run, 
and the results of Hungary’s parliamentary election in April 2018 were largely hailed as 
a victory for not only Fidesz leader Viktor Orbán but for right-wing populism in Europe 
more generally. 
Yet as a new buzzword, ‘populism’ has also become overused. Tony Blair decries 
Jeremy Corbyn as a populist (Payton, 2016) and Vatican clerics make similar 
accusations against the reformist Pope Francis (Pepinster, 2018). This politicised and 
inflationary use of the term risks losing its analytical focus. While the recent rise of the 
phenomenon has triggered scholarly interest, uncertainty remains about what 
populism actually is due to its many forms and varied contents; and that prevents us 
from engaging with it in a rigorous manner. We are thereby also hampered in both 
acknowledging the points it makes and addressing the dangers it poses to 
representative democracy.  
Populism’s global rise highlights a fault line in representative democracy. Its success 
speaks of its resonance with ordinary people but also of populism’s communicative 
abilities. When populists around the globe, in established as well as transitional 





not pure figments of the imagination. They are highlighting otherwise unvoiced – or 
unheard – calls for responsiveness, sincerity and morality in representative politics 
from a large part of the electorate that feels left behind. Yet, while they reflect very 
real disaffection, in re-presenting the voice of this “silent majority” (Canovan, 1999, p. 
5), they also bring it into being. They give it presence and in doing so, configure its 
identity, however vaguely. They have an effect upon reality. This is a communicative 
process; and it is a captivating one that grabs the attention of those who feel 
otherwise alienated by formal politics. For the populist drama enacts democratic 
politics as many ordinary people perceive it: not as grand clashes of complex political 
ideologies but as a visceral struggle for rights, voice and legitimacy in relation to a 
distant political elite.  
This communicative process often takes the form of disruptive acts that at once 
forcefully secure a voice in restrictive institutional contexts, engage the disengaged, 
and speak to a new media environment that reflects changes in the relationship 
between politics and the media. In very different contexts of established and 
transitional democracies, the changing terms of mediation in many ways place similar 
demands, opportunities and risks on the performance of political representation. 
Populists in both contexts take the opportunity to access power through new and 
more direct tools of communication and mediation. They take advantage of the 
vulnerability of elite representatives to the ubiquitous visibility that characterises the 
new media environment. This situation renders the elite’s armour of authenticity 
dangerously fragile, which in turn nourishes a public sense of being inefficaciously 
represented. It is this climate in which populism currently flourishes. Populists engage 
with this process of political communication so fundamental to democratic 
representation in an ambiguous, unique and powerful way. The ways in which they do 
so is the subject of this research. 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The field of populism scholarship has for some time been grappling with both 
conceptual and empirical issues. It has proven difficult to define the slippery concept 
of populism in a way that acknowledges the many global varieties of the phenomenon 





this fundamental definitional issue has also led to neglect of the essential connection 
between conceptual development and the empirical manifestation of the 
phenomenon. Where theorising has been tied to empirical research (which is not often 
enough), an assumption has been made that populist ideology can be identified in 
pure unadulterated form in, for instance, election manifestoes or, more recently, social 
media posts. The transformational processes of communication and mediation that 
populist ideology goes through – and through which, I suggest, populism at once 
exposes and deepens the fault lines of representative democracy – have not been 
addressed in sufficient detail.  
To do so is my primary aim in this study. I therefore set out to answer the question,  
1) How can populism be understood and explained from a communication 
perspective? 
I posit that engaging with the processes of meaning-making inherent in 
communication resolves many of the initial conceptual issues of the definition and 
comparability of populism. In scholarship on populism (and often on political 
communication more generally) the concepts of ideology and style (or performance3) 
are usually portrayed as binaries. Ideology tends to be associated with substantive 
content and style with inconsequential and shallow form. I approach the question by 
dissolving this binary and integrating ideology and performance in a communication 
perspective that sees their influences upon each other as mutually constitutive, as 
ideology manifests itself through performance. To develop this perspective I draw an 
analogy between the process of meaning-making inherent in the relationship between 
populist ideology and performance on the one hand and the more abstract notions of 
form and content on the other. I thereby approach populist communication from a 
perspective on meaning-making that goes beyond the low-level definitions usually 
used in scholarship on populism. This enables me to approach populism as a process 
and to overcome the problems usually encountered in applying a coherent conceptual 
framework to empirical instances of populist communication. Yet I keep the two 
concepts of populist ideology and performance analytically distinct and therefore 
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break down the above research question into the following two subquestions relating 
to each of these concepts: 
2) How is populist ideology constructed through communicative processes? 
3) How does disruptive performance communicatively manifest a populist mode 
of representation? 
I conceive of populist ideology as having a relational nature, where the relations 
between its core concepts of the people, the elite, the populist and sovereignty are 
established communicatively. I then approach the notion of disruptive performance as 
a paradigmatic manifestation of populist ideology. Moreover, I posit that the nature of 
the relations between populism’s constituent components take the form of a 
particular mode of representation, which populists perform most explicitly through 
disruptive performance. 
An aim of this research is therefore to identify a populist mode of representation. Such 
a project involves a recognition of how populists envision representation, and 
therefore also of how they conceive of the roles of ideology and performance in 
politics. I allow the populists to speak. But I then move on to interrogate how they do 
so and what the implications are for democratic politics. In approaching this task, I 
draw upon Ankersmit’s astute observation that “one of the peculiarities of the reality 
we are living in is that apparently style sometimes generates content, and vice versa” 
(2002, p. 135). Ankersmit suggests that in our concern with political style we should 
focus on the interaction between political actors, rather than on the actors themselves 
(ibid., p. 134). From this perspective, engagement with style as well as ideological 
content is therefore essential to address the issues we face in processes of political 
representation today as these concern the nature of the interaction between political 
representatives and citizens. The current dichotomy between ideology and style in the 
populism literature is unhelpful for this purpose. As Ankersmit posits, on the one hand,  
…conceptually the distinction between content and form can be 
maintained with all the clarity desired. On the other hand, we can truly 





merge into each other when we apply these two notions to certain 
aspects of reality (ibid., p. 135).  
Although I keep style (or performance) conceptually distinct from content (or ideology) 
for analytical reasons, I therefore empirically investigate how they interact in populist 
modes of representation. 
In representative democracies such a mode of representation is necessarily mediated. 
The process of mediation forms an integral part of the meaning-making process of 
communicating populism. In breaking down my research question I therefore also 
consider how populist communication anticipates and harmonises with such processes 
of mediation: 
4) How does populist communication harmonise with the demands on mediated 
representation in the new media environment? 
Studies of populism’s relationship to the media tend to argue for a congruity between 
populist styles of communication and the characteristics of both social media and 
legacy media, especially tabloid formats. The exact nature of this harmony has not yet 
been explicated in the literature. Neither has it been explored across different media 
types in the hybrid media system. Most empirical study tends to be undertaken in silos 
of new versus legacy media with little recognition of the processes of mediation within 
and across the media ecology. Yet the media is an essential element in understanding 
the modern nature of representative democracy and populism’s role in it. I therefore 
seek to deepen our understanding of this relationship between the media, populism 
and representative democracy and to do so in a manner that recognises the hybrid 
nature of the media ecology. 
In this respect a comparative angle is important. Populism is often explained as a 
product of the current media environment in Western democracies (see, for example, 
Aalberg et al., 2016), but it is also argued to emerge through the process of 
democratisation in transitional democracies. In South Africa, for instance, Vincent 
(2011) explains it as a product of a period of elitism coupled with a lack of democratic 
education of the people in the consolidation process. In both cases populism is 





these states are entirely different, and we are witnessing parallel developments in 
populist responses to their given democratic environments. Comparing the two must 
tell us something important, missing from extant research, about populism's 
relationship to democracy, both in terms of the way populism comes about in a given 
context and the ways in which it influences that context and its future democratic 
trajectory. I therefore also aim to explore the role of context in the ways in which 
populism plays out. 
Populism adopts many different forms and contents around the world. While this 
indeed suggests that context is important to the ways in which it is constituted and 
manifests itself, these contextual differences raise the question of how to compare. I 
suggest that a communication perspective on populism that considers populism as a 
process resolves this issue. Where both populist content and the form it adopts may 
differ across cases, the processes of manifesting that content in communicative and 
representational practices are comparable. Such comparisons in turn enable me to 
consider the implications of a populist mode of representation for representative 
democracy in different democratic environments. I therefore ask a final question that 
cuts across the specific lenses upon populist communication informed by the concepts 
of ideology, performance and mediation: 
5) How does the comparison across different democratic contexts add to our 
understanding of populist communication? 
While this comparative perspective fills a gap in the literature on populism where very 
limited work has been done, its focus on process also gets to the heart of populist 
political communication. 
Finally, many of the questions outlined above are challenging to study empirically 
within existing methodological frameworks. An essential assumption underpinning this 
study is that the conceptual framework that forms its starting point must inform the 
methods of study and that the empirical results will deepen existing theory. A further 
aim is therefore to develop a method that enables this dialogue between theory and 
empirical study. In order to address the above questions, such a method must be able 





they engage in. It needs to recognise the meaning communicated by populist actors 
but also the ways in which they communicate. It should address mixed forms of data 
resulting from a variety of modes of mediation as well as their interrelation in the 
media ecology. And it must be able to systematically account for a variety of 
contextual factors and to recognise the contextuality of concepts in order to allow 
comparison of cases of populism across different democratic contexts. 
1.2 DEFINITION OF POPULISM 
Having established the research questions and aims of the study, I move on to consider 
the definition of populism. This is an as yet unresolved and disputed matter in the 
literature. At this point I do not immerse myself in details of definitions but rather aim 
to establish a basic understanding that can form the foundation for further conceptual 
insights as the study progresses. We will see in chapter two that we can approach 
populism as an ideology from a communication perspective. Let us for now consider 
the essential elements of a definition of populism around which there is broad 
consensus in the literature: 
 The people as an empty signifier (Blassnig, forthcoming; Laclau, 2005a), but 
usually in the senses of the common people, peoples as nations, and, 
especially, the people as sovereign (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Mudde 
and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 501; Wirth et al., 2016). 
 The elite as immoral and opposed to the people (Aalberg et al., 2016; Albertazzi 
and McDonnell, 2008; Mudde, 2007; Stanley, 2008) and as defined on the basis 
of political power, economic power, supranational rather than national 
interests, and/or ethnicity (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, pp. 502–4). 
 The populist as one of the people (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Canovan, 
2005; Taggart, 2000) and as able to restore sovereignty to the people (Abts and 
Rummens, 2007; Wirth et al., 2016) and divine the general will (Canovan, 2005; 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). 
 The sovereignty of the people (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Norris and Inglehart, 
2018; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014; Wirth et al., 2016) as a normative goal of politics 
and obtainable through the enlightenment of the populist actor (Canovan, 
2005). 
 ‘The others’ as a threat to the people’s sovereignty (Wirth et al., 2016), 
although this feature is often regarded as optional in the literature (see for 






Bar the last optional component, these are all essential features of populism. I first 
address this final optional element. Is ‘the other’, in addition to the elite, essential to 
populism? Perspectives that answer yes to this question tend to be informed by chiefly 
European and other cases of right-wing populism (for example, Akkerman, 2011; 
Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn, 2014; Wodak et al., 2013). Given populism’s frequent 
appearance in combination with nationalism and nativism in these cases, the elements 
of populism easily become entangled with those of its host ideologies and with 
regional geopolitical concerns. In perspectives based on, for instance, the left-wing 
Latin American cases (for example, De la Torre, 2010; Waisbord, 2013), in contrast, 
‘the other’ tends to be excluded from the definition of populism. The difficulty of 
definition is clearly exacerbated by the fact that most empirical studies are confined to 
such regional pockets and subtypes of populism. This specific focus of much recent 
scholarship, while enlightening as to certain types of populism, has to some extent 
entangled the concept with local cultural and political factors and with specific ‘host 
ideologies’. I therefore follow De Cleen’s (2017) view (see also e.g. Albertazzi and 
McDonnell, 2008; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Norris and Inglehart, 2018) that 
horizontal antagonism towards ‘the other’ can usefully be seen as a quality of 
nationalism, whereas populism is restricted to vertical antagonism between the elite 
and the people. While I therefore do not conceive of horizontal forms of othering as 
essential to the definition of populism, I recognise that they are frequent devices for a 
more effective manifestation of populist ideology. Moreover, by approaching populism 
from a broad, comparative perspective that seeks to encompass types of populism 
situated in different geographical regions, as responding to different democratic 
contexts, and in combination with different host ideologies, I hope to overcome some 
of these definitional complications empirically. I therefore also adopt a minimal 
definition of populism that is able to encompass such different cases. 
Despite the focus on vertical antagonism, populism distinguishes itself from the 
broader notions of anti-elitism and anti-establishmentarianism by its homogenisation 
of the two antagonistic groups, the people and the elite, and by establishing the 
dichotomy on the basis of a moral claim (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 502). 
With core elements of populist ideology being a homogenous representation of the 





definition of populism as anti-pluralist and illiberal (see also Pappas, 2014 for a 
definition of populism as “illiberal democracy”). To understand how this illiberalism 
plays out, an investigation into the ways in which the nature of the relationship 
between the elite and the people are configured in populist communication is 
essential. Such a relationship manifests itself in a claim to political representation that 
proposes a closer relationship between representatives and represented based on 
identification and disintermediation. Yet the literature largely glosses over this aspect 
of populism. This despite general agreement that populism is a response to a (real or 
constructed) crisis of representation (for example, Moffitt, 2016; Taggart, 2000). 
Indeed, the relevance of political representation has only very recently started gaining 
traction in studies of populism (Andreadis and Stavrakakis, 2017; Arditi, 2003; 
Caramani, 2015; Kriesi, 2014; Moffitt, 2016; Roberts, 2017, 2014) and remains 
insufficiently theorised and hardly linked to empirical analysis. In this research I 
suggest that populism offers a revision of the terms of political representation through 
the ways in which the key elements of populist ideology relate to each other and 
manifest themselves communicatively. 
In the following, I adopt Wirth et al.’s (2016, p. 15) definition of populism as: 
…a thin ideology that considers – through a Manichean outlook – 
society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and 
antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and it 
postulates unrestricted sovereignty of the people. 
In addition, based on the above core features identified in the literature, I consider 
populists’ identification with the people as an essential aspect of populism. This 
explicit inclusion of the populist actor in the definition highlights the importance of 
self-representation in the manifestation of populist ideology. The use of a minimal 
definition such as this enables the analytical separation of populism from its ‘host 
ideology’ and opens up the possibilities for ‘most different’ comparative studies of 
which there are few so far in the populism literature. Indeed, only a handful of 
interregional, comparative studies have been undertaken (De la Torre, 2014; Hadiz and 
Chryssogelos, 2017; Hawkins, 2010; Mazzoleni et al., 2003; Moffitt, 2016, 2012; Mudde 





1.3 CHOICE OF CASES AND THEIR CONTEXTS 
The role of context has long since been identified as one of the main challenges in the 
conceptualisation of populism and understanding of how it plays out (Allcock et al., 
1968; Ionescu and Gellner, 1969). Taggart (2000) famously coined the adjective 
“chameleonic” to denote the difficulties of pinning down a phenomenon that adapts 
so smoothly to its environment. Up until now scholarship on populism has been largely 
undertaken in regional silos. Studies on Latin American left-wing forms of populism in 
transitional democracies and Europe-centric right-wing forms in established 
democracies rarely exchange ideas or develop shared conceptual frameworks that can 
help us theorise the overall phenomenon or the differences in how it plays out in 
different contexts. In the past year the first two handbooks on populism have been 
published, and in their combined 58 chapter-length entries, not a single one addresses 
the issue of the comparative study of populism. There is at once a real dearth of 
comparative study and a real need for it to extricate local factors in the manifestation 
of populism worldwide and to explore the role that context plays in the process of 
populist communication.  
There are a couple of exceptions in the literature. Two studies (Huber and Schimpf, 
2015; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012) suggest that populism has different effects upon 
democracy in different conditions of democratic consolidation and depending on 
whether they are in government or opposition. None of these studies are concerned 
with communication but they give an indication that there are important differences 
to be explored. My choice of case studies is therefore first and foremost based on a 
curiosity about the similarities and differences as to the role of populist 
communication in established and transitional democracies. The scholarship on 
democratisation and political communication very rarely intersect. Yet the importance 
of populism in their respective contexts of study leads both bodies of literature to 
assume that it is a problem primarily peculiar to them. Are we in the West avoiding the 
recognition of the many similarities in case they should indicate a backwards trajectory 
towards a less consolidated liberal democracy? The results of the British EU 
referendum and the many electoral victories for populist parties across Europe in 





transitions to democracy can therefore also teach us something about Western society 
and forms of representative democracy and not only the other way around. 
The two contexts I selected for comparison are the established democracy of the UK 
and the transitional democracy of South Africa. The United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) in the UK and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in South Africa are 
both influential opposition parties that have run long-term and ultimately successful 
campaigns to respectively extricate the UK from the European Union and unseat 
President Jacob Zuma. In these campaigns both parties claimed to work towards a goal 
of more responsive and responsible democratic representation; and both parties 
appealed to large constituencies who felt left behind the democratic process by elites. 
My selection of case studies was moreover inspired by the Media, Conflict and 
Democratisation (MeCoDEM) project, which looked at one of the events the EFF were 
involved in as a case study of a democratisation conflict in a transitional democracy. As 
I argue in more detail in chapter five, public perceptions of democracy and feelings of 
efficacy are essential to the role of populism in a given context, and I therefore briefly 
consider these in relation to each of the two cases. 
South Africa’s democratic institutions, while relatively stable, sit alongside a high level 
of popular disillusionment and elite cynicism (Herbert, 2012, p. 246). As a result, 
Freedom House's democracy rating is far higher than the equivalent perception by 
citizens (Afrobarometer, 2009, p. 10). This discrepancy between expert and citizen 
views of the state of democracy in South Africa constitutes an important fault line in its 
representative democracy. Citizen perceptions are closely connected to the meaning 
they attribute to democracy. Zuern (2012) argues that in South Africa, democracy in 
the minds of many is associated with liberation from colonial (and, in some cases, post-
colonial) regimes. This argument sees democracy and socio-economic rights as 
mutually dependent and includes a psychological process of decolonisation and 
bringing African knowledge, initiative and authenticity to the forefront whilst getting 
rid of foreign domination. Bratton and Mattes (2001, p. 455) further demonstrate that 
the equation of democracy and socio-economic status is markedly determined by race. 
Given many South Africans’ desire for “economic goods” over “political goods” (ibid.), 





instrumental – that is, a means to economic development and poverty alleviation – 
rather than an intrinsic appreciation of democracy as an end in and of itself. As Zuern 
(2012) also states, economic inequalities threaten to undermine the promises of 
political equality. 
Though the ANC continues to win elections based on its image as the party of 
liberation, the popular protests that were instrumental in overthrowing the previous 
Apartheid regime have resumed. They are triggered by dissatisfaction with 
unresponsive local government, a perceived higher level of corruption than before the 
advent of democracy, and widespread problems with basic public service provision in a 
system with a dominant party that gives citizens no other real democratic choice. If 
there is a gulf between elite and citizen perceptions of the quality of democracy, and 
between the institutions that have been put in place and the desires of the public as to 
the role of those institutions, the EFF express a notion of democracy that sides clearly 
with that of the people. Their name in itself – Economic Freedom Fighters – gives an 
unequivocal signal that economic freedom is a moral necessity in a just society. It also 
suggests that they challenge the ANC’s ownership of the liberation narrative. The word 
'fighters' positions the EFF amidst the throng of public protests that brought about the 
regime change that ended Apartheid and are now sweeping the country once again, 
contributing to the interpretation of democracy as liberation. 
The EFF have been surrounded by controversy from their inception, which resulted 
from Commander-in-Chief Julius Malema being expelled from the ANC’s youth wing on 
the grounds of “sowing divisions” (Bosch, 2011). He was later convicted of hate speech 
(against white South Africans). Since their establishment in 2013, the EFF have become 
the second-largest opposition party, winning 6.4 percent (Electoral Commission South 
Africa, 2014) of the vote in the 2014 national elections and 8.2 percent in the 
municipal elections in 2016 (Electoral Commission South Africa, 2016). Malema has at 
times been hailed by the media as the next president of South Africa (BBC Newsnight, 
2013), at others as its next dictator (News24, 2015a). The EFF’s positioning in the 
South African transitional landscape reflects their populist ideology. They side clearly 
with the people and establish a strong sense of identification with the black majority 





to the formal apparel of the elite. They call for a ‘second liberation’ from the economic 
inequality that the new black elite has engendered through corruption and 
mismanagement. They thus draw legitimacy from a portrayal of the elite as immoral 
and unrepresentative of the people, comparing them to the Apartheid regime. This 
evocation of the elite simultaneously conflates black and white elites into a 
homogenous totality and pitches them in opposition to an equally homogenous black 
population who are being deprived of their sovereign rights and of proper 
representation. The EFF’s populism and their accompanying disruptive performance 
have enabled them to gain a voice in the South African political system where other 
opposition parties have failed. It also comes with a less palatable side dish of racially 
based othering of the white minority in South Africa. 
In the UK, UKIP’s campaign to leave the European Union also called for accountability 
of public representatives. British public attitudes to membership of the European 
Union have waxed and waned since the UK joined the EEC in 1973 (Mortimore, 2016). 
However, the results of the EU referendum on 23 June 2016 came as a shock to most. 
Pressure exerted by the UK Independence Party (UKIP) is widely regarded as a key 
factor in the referendum coming about. The party’s increased media coverage, a result 
of electoral success (Deacon and Wring, 2016), allowed it to put pressure on the 
Conservative government. While the British first-past-the-post electoral system 
disadvantages small parties like UKIP, elections for the European Parliament use 
proportional representation and allowed UKIP an unprecedented victory with 27.5 
percent of the popular vote in 2014 (BBC News, 2014). UKIP’s electoral success is in 
turn closely tied to Nigel Farage’s leadership as he converted UKIP from a single-issue 
party focused on leaving the EU to a broader policy platform that included immigration 
as a key issue. 
In the referendum campaign, Farage combined these issues in an argument centred on 
the notion of sovereignty, where control of Britain’s borders should be determined 
nationally and not by a distant EU elite. Rowena Mason, political correspondent for 
The Guardian, identified these two very issues as chief factors in determining the 
outcome of the referendum in her analysis of the result: immigration and the loss of 





Arron Banks were instrumental in the Leave campaign in the lead-up to the 
referendum. The Leave.eu campaign controversially ran alongside the official Vote 
Leave campaign with the two supposedly being irreconcilable but enabling Leave.eu to 
self-style as “the Bad Boys of Brexit” (Banks, 2016) and voice less palatable views that 
tapped into public prejudices on immigration and ultimately strengthened the joint 
cause of Leave. As Arron Banks (Banks, 2016, pp. xxvi–xxvii) himself put it, 
Knowing that the Conservatives would avoid talking about immigration, 
he [Nigel Farage] wanted us to put the issue at the forefront of our 
efforts. Our brief was to do what even he could not: be as provocative 
as required to put immigration at the top of our agenda… We were 
undoubtedly the ‘bad boys’ of the referendum campaign.  
UKIP’s populism played a significant role in the referendum campaign. The self-
representation as political outsiders was one side of this, where they identified with 
ordinary people rather than the political elite. They portrayed the British political elite 
as a cartel that was in cahoots with Brussels and ignored the wishes of ordinary British 
people. The notion of the UK’s independence from the EU was a quest for sovereignty 
for the British people in the form of national self-determination. Nigel Farage’s speech 
to the European Parliament after the UK’s EU referendum arguably constitutes the 
climax of his career so far. Indeed, he performed it in his last days as leader of UKIP, 
resigning a week later after supposedly having achieved his political ambitions. UKIP’s 
vote share immediately witnessed a sharp drop. 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis takes these two case studies as its point of departure to investigate how 
populism can be understood and explained from a communication perspective. It 
proceeds as follows. In chapter two I outline the conceptual framework of the study. 
This chapter serves to connect and integrate the core concepts of ideology, 
performance and mediation into a coherent communication perspective that goes 
beyond low-level definitions. I first provide a brief literature review of populism and 
the mostly dichotomous debate on its classification as style or ideology, where I focus 





form and content as a mutually constitutive relationship in the process of 
representation. I draw a parallel between this link and the relationship between 
ideology and performance and thereby also between communicative and political 
processes of representation, which I conceive of as sharing a creative and constitutive 
function. A key argument running through this chapter is that context – both in terms 
of the particular democratic environment and the media setting – plays a significant 
role in this process of meaning-making as both constituted by and constitutive of 
populist representation. 
In chapter three I detail the comparative research design and develop the mixed 
methods used in the empirical parts of the study. I give priority to an interpretive 
approach that I supplement with quantitative analysis. Through a broad range of 
communications by UKIP and the EFF – such as YouTube videos, press releases, 
newspaper columns and social media posts – I map a total of six hybrid mediated 
performances between July 2014 and April 2017. These populist performances are my 
main objects of analysis. I supplement my analysis of populists’ communications with 
media coverage of the events and public conversations on Twitter about the events. I 
thereby seek to paint a rich picture of the contexts, meanings and means of 
construction of populist communication. In chapter four I describe the specific events 
that the EFF and UKIP engage in and that are the objects of analysis of this study. 
The next six chapters (chapters five to ten) are structured around the three core 
concepts that together form my conceptual framework. Pairs of theoretical and 
empirical chapters are dedicated to each of the concepts of ideology, performance and 
mediation in turn. This structure progressively peels off layers of the populist process 
of communication, focusing first on its ideological function, then on how its ideological 
claim is performed and finally on how it is designed with the process of mediation in 
mind. Within each pair of chapters, I moreover distinguish between two aspects of the 
populist representative claim. I explore the two populist parties’ claims at face value 
on, respectively, ideology, performance and mediation and their roles in 
representative democracy. The purpose of this part of the exercise is to allow the 
populists to speak and to explore how populists themselves envision the process of 





the communicative processes that underlie them: the performance of ideology aimed 
at mediation. In each pair of chapters I therefore also engage in an analysis of how the 
populist claims are constructed based on a gradual development of these concepts. 
With respect to ideology, I analyse the populist parties’ claims about ideology as 
ideological. I approach their claims about performance as performances. And I 
consider their claims about the role of the media in politics in the context of their own 
practices in relation to processes of mediation. In the course of this analysis, I tease 
out a populist epistemology and discuss how it changes the foundation of 
representative politics. In more detail, my argument in these six theoretical and 
empirical chapters is as follows: 
Chapters five and six are centred on populist ideology. In chapter five I conceptualise 
ideology in communicative terms from a constructivist perspective. I develop populist 
ideology as rooted in mass conceptions of democracy in a given local context, which 
helps to explain the diversity of populism. Yet I also conceive of ideology as 
constituting (an alternative) reality. In this respect I do not follow critical definitions of 
ideology but retain a neutral, non-pejorative understanding of the concept as a 
ubiquitous and necessary process of representation. Unlike an entirely structural 
notion of ideology, such as that employed by the canon that defines populism as an 
ideology, conceiving of populist ideology as constructed and as constitutive allows 
commonalities to emerge between very different types of populism. In chapter six I 
demonstrate these similarities in my case studies and draw out the different forms and 
contents that populist ideology adopts in different democratic contexts. I outline the 
two populist parties’ conceptions of the concept of ideology and its role in 
representative democracy but also analyse these claims as ideological based on the 
conception of ideology in the preceding theoretical chapter. From this analysis I 
develop a model of the ideological cleavage that populism constructs in the political 
spectrum. 
Chapters seven and eight query how populist ideology manifests itself empirically by 
shifting the conceptual focus onto the notion of political performance. In chapter 
seven I define performance according to a cultural pragmatics perspective that is 





political performance as closely related to its given context: its communicative 
practices are confined by context-specific forms of social power; they build on 
resources of existing background symbols fluctuating in collective memory; and they 
use these to constitute a given representation that in turn influences its democratic 
context. Such portrayals of political reality are based on the relational nature of 
populist ideology, which configures relations between representatives and the people. 
I therefore conceive them in aesthetic terms as a performance of a populist mode of 
representation. In this respect I argue that disruptive performance is a particularly 
paradigmatic manifestation of populist ideology due to its oppositional nature. In 
chapter eight I engage in an empirical analysis of populist disruptions of elite political 
rituals and norms. I explore populists’ conceptions of political performance by elites 
and their role in democratic representation in the two different democratic contexts, 
and I analyse these claims as performances of representation in and of themselves.  
In modern representative democracy, such performances of representation are aimed 
at a process of mediation. This in turn implies that populist disruptive performance 
involves a process and motive not entirely transparent to populist constituents. 
Chapters nine and ten introduce the concept of mediation. In chapter nine I suggest 
that a key ulterior motive is to negotiate the demands that the new media 
environment places upon political representatives. This requires a careful balancing act 
by the populist communicator. For the populist representative claim relies on 
imparting populist ideology through a communicative relationship with the people, yet 
anti-media populism is an inherent part of this claim. As we shall see, disruptive 
performance provides the solution to this dilemma in the form of a symbolic 
manifestation of populist ideology that simultaneously provides first-class camera 
fodder. In chapter ten I apply this argument to an empirical analysis of the two cases. 
Where the previous chapters were concerned with the populist representative claim as 
it is aimed at constituents, this chapter recognises that the performance of the claim is 
also aimed at a second audience: the media. It therefore queries how the performance 
of the populist representative claim anticipates the process of mediation so essential 
to establish and maintain the representative relationship. It also analyses the hybrid 





particular the role that social media plays in disruptive performance and the influence 
of processes of mediation upon the communication of populist ideology. 
In the conclusion I return to the research questions that I outlined at the start of this 
introduction and address each in turn. I then draw on the preceding analysis to engage 
in a normative argument about the implications of populist communication for 






2. A COMMUNICATION APPROACH TO POLITICAL POPULISM: 
REPRESENTATION AND THE UNITY OF FORM AND CONTENT 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Let us first consider populism as a set of mental constructs or concepts: disembodied 
thought bubbles. Imagine the inside of Nigel Farage’s head. The bubbles float around 
in there; one is an idea of ordinary people, another of the immoral elite, a third of 
himself as normal. How do these ideas play out? First, they are relational (Wirth et al., 
2016, p. 8). Each value or concept is shaped by its relationship to other values within 
Farage’s head. Second, they take material form through processes of representation. 
As the concepts emerge from Farage’s brain, back into the world that inspired them, 
they take the form of a word, ‘us’, a pointed finger, a pint of bitter held in his hand. In 
the course of this process of becoming associated with signifiers and embodied in 
symbols, they adopt form and adapt their meaning to the norms and conditions of the 
world they enter into. They are shaped by recipients’ conceptual maps and assume 
meaning in their heads. They are also mediated. Words, gestures and other symbolic 
actions are captured in video clips and print, posted on Twitter, retweeted in modified 
or original form, cited in the press and contextualised, recirculated, or perhaps 
ignored. They are accepted, rejected or remoulded by a variety of audiences and 
constituents. This often problematic process of meaning-making occurs in a non-linear 
and rather messy fashion that involves encroaching agency and influences by media 
institutions, audiences, competing political representatives, even technologies, making 
it near-impossible to control. 
When populism is conceived as an ideology in extant scholarship, it is always in the 
sense of a value system – the thought bubbles in Farage’s head. Not everyone 
subscribes to this classification. Especially scholars whose focus is on populist political 
communication and its relationship to the media find it difficult to establish the link 
between thought bubbles and tangible objects of study such as media broadcasts, 
news ink and Twitter posts. Their alternative is to define populism according to its 
communicative outputs by classifying it as a style, performance or discourse. Yet many 





its actual claims and their significant appeal to voters who are not mere victims of the 
guileful machinations of populist communication practices. In other words, such 
definitions often ignore that populism has a point. 
To resolve this quandary, in this chapter I outline a broad conceptual framework for 
approaching populism from a communication perspective. I start by engaging with the 
concept of populism and its classification. I outline the foundations of an approach 
that considers populism from an ideological perspective but takes account of how 
ideological thought bubbles materialise in embodied symbolic action. I then go on to 
draw a parallel between the mutually constitutive relationship between populist 
ideology and performance on the one hand and form and content on the other. I 
consider the relationship between concepts and their signifiers and how the two come 
together through the process of representation. In this approach I argue that 
communicative representation is closely related to political representation. I outline an 
aesthetic perspective on political representation, whereby the making of 
representative claims is a creative process that, like language, involves meaning-
making through a system of concepts and material forms. I then introduce the notion 
of representative claim-making as the performance of populist ideology. In particular, I 
consider the notion of disruptive performance as an emblematic manifestation of 
populist ideology since it establishes an antagonistic relationship between the elite and 
populist actors who embody the people. Yet I posit that we need to approach 
disruption not only as imparting meaning to an ideological claim but also as 
strategically addressing a variety of audiences. In other words, I argue that the analysis 
of populist communication should go beyond the identification of the ideological 
meaning that populists intend to signify to their constituents and should also consider 
how this meaning is constructed through symbolic action. I finally consider the 
external influences of the democratic and media settings upon the meaning-making 
process inherent in performing the populist representative claim in order to set the 
scene for the comparative study. 
2.2. POPULISM AS FORM VERSUS POPULISM AS CONTENT 
In the field of political communication we often encounter an approach where notions 





meaning that do not, in and of themselves, contribute to the meaning-making process. 
This view has contributed to the dualism between stylistic and ideological definitions 
of populism that dominates the field. In the following I attempt to overcome this 
dichotomous view of meaning-making. I consider how a communication approach that 
conceives of populist ideology and performance as interconnected and sees ideology 
materialise through performance might inform the classification of populism. I briefly 
review the ongoing debate in the literature on whether populism should be classified 
as an ideology or as a style or performance. I side with an ideological classification in 
order to account for populism’s ideational content – the source of its performative 
‘script’ (Alexander, 2004b, p. 530). But I also argue that we need to consider the 
process of communicating ideology by slightly refocusing the conceptualisation of that 
concept itself. 
Despite a robust theoretical debate over recent years, the definitional issue 
surrounding populism remains disputed. Having said that, the debate now revolves 
chiefly around the choice of classifier – ideology (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Albertazzi 
and McDonnell, 2008; Canovan, 1999; Fieschi and Heywood, 2006; Krämer, 2014; 
Mudde, 2007, 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Reinemann et al., 2016a; 
Stanley, 2008; Taggart, 2000), style (Block and Negrine, 2017; Bossetta, 2017; Ekström 
et al., forthcoming; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt, 2016; Norris and Inglehart, 
2018), discourse or discursive frame (Aslanidis, 2016; e.g. Hawkins, 2010; Heinisch and 
Mazzoleni, 2017; Laclau, 2005a; Panizza, 2005; Stavrakakis, 2017), and so on – rather 
than the constituent elements of populism and their characteristics. For, as we saw in 
the introduction, most approaches largely hone in on the same core elements: 
populists portray the people as homogenous, identify themselves with the people, and 
pitch both in opposition to an unrepresentative elite and, in some cases, to a 
threatening ‘other’.  
The chief outstanding question in the literature therefore is one of whether our chief 
concern ought to be the mindset of populism (its values and claims) or the way this 
meaning manifests itself (its style and form of discourse). However, does the focus of 
our enquiry really necessitate and justify this dichotomy between ideology and style? 





and equally significant in processes of meaning-making. Acknowledging this complexity 
has recently led some scholars to conclude that populism is both an ideology and a 
style (Bracciale and Martella, 2017; Ekström et al., forthcoming; Engesser et al., 2017; 
Reinemann et al., 2016a; Wirth et al., 2016). They have begun the task of explicating 
the relationship between the ideological claim and the ways in which it manifests itself 
in communicative forms; yet the nature of the classifier has not as yet been explicated. 
In the course of furthering the work of teasing out these dimensions of populism and 
their interconnections, I keep ideology and style analytically distinct, even if they 
interact and interfere with one another in political reality (Ankersmit, 2002, p. 135), for 
the purpose of addressing some of the as yet unresolved definitional issues. 
First, most studies with a focus on the political communication of populism naturally 
tend towards classifiers such as style, discourse or performance. Their object of study 
is the process or form of communication rather than the values and political concepts 
of its content. Yet the lack of conceptual clarity around the notion of style in these 
studies creates its own issues. Moffitt (2016, pp. 28–9) has gone a long way towards 
resolving this by engaging with the question of style in relation to populism. He defines 
political style as “the repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance 
made to audiences that are used to create and navigate the fields of power that 
comprise the political, stretching from the domain of government through to everyday 
life”. However, there are still some unresolved issues in this debate. These include how 
to connect Moffitt’s focus on the constitutive properties of the performance of 
populism to the canon on populist ideas. I also suggest the importance of 
acknowledging not only these constitutive properties but also the value of the populist 
claim as a response to actual democratic conditions. Finally, the question remains of 
how to operationalise a study of populist performance since Moffitt’s approach is 
entirely developed on the basis of secondary literature. 
A further issue hinted at above with adopting the classification of style in analyses of 
populist political communication, is that such definitions often mix in ideational 
elements. The chief aspects, for instance, of Jӓgers and Walgrave’s stylistic definition 
relate to the “guise” of populist claims – “using casual or colloquial language or 





of these claims under the same umbrella: populists’ identification with the people, 
anti-establishment positions and exclusion of parts of the population. Likewise, Ostiguy 
(2009) and Norris and Inglehart (2018) adopt a stylistic definition of populism but 
establish this as an alternative cleavage in the ideological spectrum. Norris and 
Inglehart, for instance, oppose the style of populism to the value-based notion of 
pluralism. The difficulty here is marrying the politics of populism with studying 
communication. 
Once again distinguishing between populist claims at face value – what is populists’ 
ideological proposition? – and the ways in which such claims are performed becomes 
useful. Ernst el al. (2018) acknowledge this analytical division when they identify 
populist political communication as a mental construct that gives rise to key messages. 
They analyse the content of statements alongside the form or style of these 
statements. Their conceptual framework, however, suggests that ideology manifests 
itself in content alone. An additional difficulty, then, is to analytically distinguish 
between populist content and form but to acknowledge their interplay in the 
formation of meaning. Moffitt’s stylistic definition solves this issue by focusing 
exclusively on performance. When he includes “appeals to the people versus the elite” 
in his stylistic definition, for instance, he is concerned not with the antagonistic 
relationship between the people and the elite as an ideological value but with the 
process through which the subject is constituted in populist discourse (Moffitt, 2016, 
pp. 43–4).  
However, by bypassing the claim itself, Moffitt’s exclusive focus on performance 
neglects consideration of the value of populist claims. While populists’ engagement 
with the current problems of democratic representation may leave much to be 
desired, their claims do strike a nerve. They have also, in some contexts, been 
demonstrated to have positive effects on democracy (at least when retained in the 
form of claims rather than when transformed into behaviour by populists in power) 
(Huber and Schimpf, 2015; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). I therefore propose that a 
communication perspective does not preclude a definition of populism based on the 
classifier of ideology (see also Reinemann et al., 2016a; Wirth et al., 2016), for it is 





of this claim is evident both in its identification of substantive issues in representative 
democracy and in its potentially severe long-term consequences for democratic 
politics. However, I also posit that an ideological classification requires recognition of 
the ways in which ideology manifests itself empirically in communicative practices and 
forms, including in discourse and political performance. This goes to the heart of a 
communication perspective on populism. It retains recognition of both the ideational 
content of populism and the “emotional bond between populist players and significant 
segments of the population” (Block and Negrine, 2017, p. 183). 
Wirth et al.’s (2016) ideology-based definition of populism that I put forward in the 
introduction is, like other ideology-based definitions, based on the concept of ideology 
in its ‘thin’ sense (see Freeden, 1998a, 1998b). Rather than constituting a full or 
coherent set of ideas that form a complete worldview, a thin ideology is “a loose 
complex of attitudes” (Krämer, 2014, p. 44). It can attach itself to a range of peripheral 
elements or ‘host ideologies’ that serve to fill in the ideology and give it situational 
form and coherence. This helps to explain the contextual nature of populism, its 
historical and situational contingency, as well as the enduring strength of its core 
concepts. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013, pp. 498–9) put it, the thin ideology 
of populism is “a kind of mental map through which individuals analyze and 
comprehend political reality”.  
Some challenges have been raised against the notion of populism as a thin ideology 
based on this conception of ideology (see in particular Aslanidis, 2016). To overcome 
these, I develop the concept of ideology in some detail in chapter five in a way that 
explicates the relationship between ideology and performance in a communication 
approach. Briefly, I conceive of ideology from a neutral perspective as a mindset or 
value system, yet as constructed; and I shift the focus from ideology’s conceptual 
structure onto its process of meaning-making for it is not only constructed, it is also 
constitutive. I argue that the starting point for the construction of populist ideology is 
not a logical system of beliefs and convictions but is ordinary people’s perception of 
politics and political ideologies (Converse, 1964a; Saward, 2010). Yet people do not 
have a given, transparent and stable set of interests (Saward, 2010). Therefore, 





populist construction) but on how they perceive politics. This inverse starting point to 
most established ‘elite’ ideologies explains, first, populism’s many different faces in 
time and space; second, its lack of positions on some key political concepts that most 
full ideologies cover; third, how it grips people. It results in a different cleavage in the 
ideological spectrum that is essentialist and that disrupts party competition.  
Populism is a phenomenon that clearly has an ability to tap into the discontents of its 
followers. It creates an emotional bond with, lends a sense of identity to, and engages 
the politically disaffected in ways that must be considered beyond the power of 
‘empty’ rhetoric or strategic political manoeuvre. Indeed, these are arguably the very 
sources of such disaffection in the first place. In the face of public alienation from the 
political mainstream’s dearth of authenticity and genuineness, how do populists 
manage to represent themselves as ‘the real thing’? I suggest that their successful 
mediation of authenticity relies on more than the cult of personality and political style, 
although these are not without significance. It is grounded in a consistency between 
their values and the ways in which they are communicated. This perspective therefore 
also lends itself to an enquiry into the performance of ideology – that is, ideology as an 
intentional construction that seeks identification with a given audience. Moreover, 
such construction, which I will argue later in this chapter takes the form of 
representative claims, can be conceived as “constitutive activity” that involves offering 
constructions or images of constituents to constituents and audiences (Saward, 2010, 
p. 14). Finally, populist ideology’s grounding in people’s understanding of politics sets 
it up for effective communication. As a value system, it anticipates communication and 
a closer relationship between representatives and represented. Indeed, as we shall 
see, the communication of its ideology is an inherent part of its claim itself.  
Put briefly, the ideology of populism manifests itself in a claim to representation. A 
communication perspective enables consideration of the claim in and of itself as well 
as of what lies behind the apparent (given) meaning of this claim. It allows us to 
question the ways in which the performance of populist ideology seeks to meet the 
challenges of the new media environment in its attempt to establish a representative 
relationship. By looking at how populist ideology is performed, it also queries how such 





populism’s “chameleonism” (Taggart, 2000). The many local colours of populism 
through time and space have made comparative study difficult (but also necessary) 
and have been the cause of the ongoing disputes over definition. Moreover, a 
communication perspective breaks down the dichotomy that dominates the literature 
between populism’s supply and demand mechanisms (respectively the appearance of 
populist parties and the platform they offer, and constituency support for populist 
parties). For representational processes occur in the space in between representatives 
and the represented (Ankersmit, 2002); they involve not only articulation but also 
agency on the part of the subject. 
A perspective on populism as an ideology that can be studied in its communicated 
form then overcomes the charge of essentialism that has been put to ideological 
definitions (Aslanidis, 2016, pp. 92–3). Aslanidis puts it that the “take it or leave it” 
dichotomous nature of populism as an ideology is betrayed by the gradational 
manifestation of populism found in empirical data. For instance, it is well known that 
we find more and stronger manifestations of populism across the political spectrum 
during election campaigns: political actors can ‘act populist’ to different degrees at 
different times. Yet you can be populist or not, in an ideological sense, even if you 
communicate using populist performative strategies to a greater or lesser extent for 
strategic purposes (Wirth et al., 2016, p. 39; see also van Kessel, 2014 for a related 
argument; Bossetta, 2017). I therefore consider the populist claim to be essentialist. It 
constructs an Us-Them dichotomy, and you either take it or leave it. But the way in 
which it is performed is gradational. Analytically separating claim and performance is 
therefore also helpful to resolve this long-standing issue in the literature. 
I posit that such an analytical division between populist ideology and performance 
enables understanding, explanation and theorising. Yet the recognition of the 
intertwined nature of content and form in political reality is necessary for empirical 
study. Content and form, ideology and performance, engage in a mutually constitutive 
relationship of meaning-making. The content element of this approach addresses the 
canon on populist ideological values and concepts while the performance element 





2.3 THE MEANING OF REPRESENTATION 
Let us now consider in more detail this analogy between the processes of meaning-
making inherent in the relationship between ideology and performance and in that of 
content and form. I start by considering content and form at a more abstract level. I 
then draw a parallel between communicative processes of representation that involve 
the interaction between form and content and political processes of representation. 
This requires the adoption of an aesthetic and constructivist perspective on political 
representation in which the two uses of ‘representation’ come together. I then move 
on to consider the influence of context upon representational processes of meaning-
making. 
2.3.1 THE INTERCONNECTION OF FORM AND CONTENT 
Chandler (1995, p. 104) reflects that Marshall McLuhan’s assertion that “the medium is 
the message” suggests several simultaneous perspectives: “that the ‘form’ is the 
(primary) ‘content’; that the ‘form’ of a text is itself meaningful; and that the 
separation of ‘form’ and ‘content’ is problematic.” As we find most pertinently in 
poetry, in which expression is particularly self-consciously achieved through linguistic 
style, form and content are closely interdependent and both contribute to the making 
of meaning (ibid., p. 105). Stuart Hall extricates this relationship in his seminal work on 
representation ([1997]2013), where he outlines two systems of meaning-making: first, 
real-world phenomena correlate with a set of concepts that help us interpret the 
world; second, signs and symbols represent the concepts and conceptual relations 
between them. Hall follows Saussurean semiotics in which the concept (signified) and 
the form it is communicated through (signifier) together constitute a meaningful sign 
that bears relation to real-world objects, people and events. The process of 
representation is thereby in constant dialogue with a given audience and cultural 
context; yet it also produces culture; representation enters “into the very constitution 
of things” (Hall, [1997]2013, p. xxi).  
We see this interplay between form and content in representational processes and 
practices not only in language and art but in all fields of communication to varying 
degrees. In his aesthetic approach to representation, Ankersmit (2013, 2002) brings 





politics. He outlines two theories of representation: representation as resemblance or 
mimesis (a representation, such as a painting, should resemble what it represents) and 
as substitution (a representation is a replacement of something that is absent; for 
instance, a hobby horse does not look like, or have the form of, a real horse but has 
the same function and stands in for a real horse to the playing child) (2013, p. 458). 
Representation has different functions in these two perspectives: to re-present and to 
stand (in) for. When combining these two senses into one, representation comes to 
mean to make conceptually present (Boehm, 2012, p. 16) and stand in for, for 
instance, a marginalised group (Frosh, 2016). 
We now have a notion of political representation in which a representative acts on 
behalf of a constituency and in the process of doing so “renders-present” (Arditi, 2003) 
that constituency. Though the concept of representation is used in different senses in 
the literatures of political science and cultural studies, certain perspectives share this 
common core of rendering-present. Arditi describes this as “summoning a presence in 
another place, bringing into presence through a substitute or, more in tone with 
political representation, an ‘acting for others’, for absent others, in a way that is 
responsive to their demands”. Yet “that which ‘returns’ [is re-presented] cannot be 
reduced to an unaltered sameness” for “the task of ‘rendering-present’ introduces a 
differential element that modifies the absent presence of ‘the people’” (2003, pp. 21-
2). Conceiving of representation as a creative process, Saward’s notion of the 
representative claim as an ongoing performance builds on this core aesthetic function. 
From this perspective, in the course of communicating populist ideology, populist 
representatives constitute their audience and their constituents through 
representative claim making (Saward, 2010). The notion of political representation as 
an aesthetic process is then both ideological and performative. 
First, it is ideological because in this social constructivist approach to representation, 
things do not have meaning outside of how they are represented. Meaning is 
produced or constructed rather than discovered (Hall, [1997]2013, p. 11). Discourse is 
therefore shaped by power, by socially shared systems of ideas – that is, by ideology 
and ideological struggle – and it is a medium for exercising power through the practice 





that resists pitting “‘misrecognition’ or ‘false-consciousness’ against a ‘true objective 
knowledge’—a knowledge that can be grasped by means of a seemingly transparent 
linguistic medium” (Glynos, 2001, p. 193), yet still sees ideology as a form of necessary 
and ubiquitous distortion. The task of analysis is therefore to explain how some 
articulations come to be accepted as ‘true’ or naturalised and to identify the social 
consequences of different discursive representations of reality (Phillips and Jørgensen, 
2002, p. 21). 
Second, this notion of representation is performative in its ability to construct reality. 
Representations manifest concepts in concrete form and through this process the 
physical forms and objects constitute the ideas in question (Lievrouw, 2014, p. 31). In 
keeping with her general approach, I apply the following words by Butler (who in turn 
builds on Austin’s notion of Doing Things with Words (1975)) to not only language but 
to the multiple modes of discursive articulation or performance: 
We do things with language, produce effects with language, and we do 
things to language, but language is also the thing that we do. Language 
is a name for our doing: both “what” we do (the name for the action 
that we characteristically perform) and that which we effect, the act 
and its consequences. (Butler, 1997, p. 8) 
One such socio-political consequence of the practice of representation is the 
constitution of the subject in discourses (Butler, 1997, p. 16; Phillips and Jørgensen, 
2002, p. 17). The ways in which populists constitute ‘the people’ and their 
interpellation of a given construction has consequences for the democratic agency of 
the people and therefore becomes a key normative concern. However so constrained, 
the constituted subject does have a degree of agency, for representation does not 
equate to articulation; processes of representation undertake meaning-making work 
that cannot be separated from their viewing. In political terms, I am therefore 
concerned with a communicative relationship between representatives and publics 
where representation involves an ongoing mutual process of interpretation and 
negotiation. The process of meaning-making is intersubjective. In this research, I use 





world through language and symbolic action and the political process of acting on 
behalf of a constituency and, in doing so, constituting that constituency. 
2.3.2 THE ROLE OF CONTEXT 
People function as agents of discursive and cultural change as they produce meanings 
and frameworks that influence social practices. They realise even the most regimented 
or ritualistic discursive act with new characteristics (Butler, 1997, p. 16; Charmaz, 
2006, p. 10). While discourse is socially constituted, it is therefore also socially 
constitutive (Wodak, 2015, p. 51) as practices of representation are in constant 
dialogue with their context. Context can be understood as broader societal 
developments in the form of norms and conditions for action (Alexander, 1987, p. 
289), which themselves are mutually constitutive. With respect to populist political 
communication I consider two dimensions of context in particular. First, the 
democratic context and its conditions in the form of, for instance, institutional rules 
and their implementation by power holders. These confine populist communication. 
Democratic norms become subject to challenge by populists but can also be turned 
into resources for populist representational practices. Second, in the media setting of 
populist communication, conditions for action take the form of technical affordances, 
ownership and legal and institutionalised frameworks. Norms include news values, 
relations between media and political actors, and the norms of use and imaginaries 
surrounding specific media and platforms. These latter constitute objects of challenge 
and resources for populist communicators within processes of mediation. Therefore, 
when we ask how populist ideology is performed – how ideas manifest themselves in 
the world and assume meaning – the answer is, as Tilly and Goodin (2006) suggest, “it 
depends”. For meaning-making activity is at once confined by, and appropriates 
resources for creative expression from, its context. 
Change then happens through discursive struggle to obtain the status of ‘objectivity’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001), where the winning hegemonic articulation has 
consequences for the socio-political context. Such discursive practices are imbued with 
a degree of indeterminacy and contingency: Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory 
stresses that “unity of meaning [of a discourse] is in danger of being disrupted by other 





performance can be disrupted by other actors. It is such disruption – by oppositional 
populists against what they perceive as the hegemonic discourse of liberal 
representative democracy – that is the object of analysis of this study. Populist 
disruption engages in discursive struggle to fixate the populist projection of reality. 
Populists thereby not only act within but also change their context. In the case of the 
particular mode of discourse of disruptive performance, the indeterminacy highlighted 
by Laclau and Mouffe is maximised.  
Given the context-dependent nature of discourse, how does the mutual influence 
between context and such discursive struggles play out? Or rather, how does context 
shape populist communication, and how is context shaped by populist 
communication? Looking at populist communication as performance – an intentional, 
embodied activity that displays meaning that the actor(s) wish to have their audience 
believe (Alexander, 2004a, p. 530; Goffman, 1959) – allows me to answer the first part 
of the question. The notion of performativity, which considers how the performance 
realises its own claim in the process of claim-making, relates to the second. Given that 
an effective performance must be plausible and lead “those to whom their actions and 
gestures are directed to accept their motives and explanations as a reasonable 
account” (Alexander, 2004a, p. 530), performance can be a means of enabling the 
naturalisation of ideology. Investigating populism where it adopts the form of 
specifically disruptive performances makes performativity particularly relevant as such 
performances, by definition, involve a disruption of the context in which they take 
place and thereby seek to reconstitute it in new form. 
Let us for a moment revisit the thought bubbles in Farage’s head. As they escape, are 
performed and manifest themselves in material form, a representational process is 
underway. In the course of this process, something happens. The world changes. 
Reality is (re-)constituted through a process constrained by external conditions yet 
building on existing symbolic resources. Constituents are not only given voice but 
come into being. It is a beautiful thing. If the performance is successful – for of course 
it is intersubjective and, as I have already hinted, its journey within processes of 






2.4 POPULIST REPRESENTATION IN CONTEXT 
Integrating communicative and political processes of representation allows us to 
consider the populist mode of political representation from a communication 
perspective. In order to apply the above perspective on meaning-making to populism, I 
now introduce in more detail Saward’s notion of representative claim-making. I move 
on to suggest that, in the case of populism, disruptive performance is a particularly 
emblematic form of this claim that offers a number of useful analytical applications. I 
then end this section by considering the role of context as both constituted by and 
constitutive of the populist representative claim. In this respect I consider the claim in 
relation to both its democratic and media settings.  
2.4.1 THE POPULIST REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM 
For the purpose of approaching the communicative manifestation of populist ideology 
in the process of representation, Saward’s representative claim is a useful way of 
conceiving of the relationship between populist ideology and its performance. He 
argues for “seeing representation in terms of claims to be representative” (2006, p. 
298): 
Makers of representative claims suggest to the potential audience: (1) 
you are/are part of this audience, (2) you should accept this view, this 
construction — this representation — of yourself, and (3) you should 
accept me as speaking and acting for you. (ibid., p. 303) 
This approach sees representation as a process of claim-making with both the 
representative (the claim-maker) and the represented (the people) as aesthetically 
constructed entities. In this sense Saward turns the concept of representation around: 
the representative is not representing the people by being someone but by creating 
someone, both himself and the people. Further, according to this logic, the process of 
claim-making is a constitutive and ongoing process, not a settled affair at the 
completion of an election.  
On the basis of this account of representation I consider the relational quality of 
populist ideology – the ways in which its constituent concepts shape each other – as a 





grounded in populist ideology constructs a relationship between constituted notions of 
the populist, the people and the elite. In the populist version of this claim, the people 
are then constructed as moral, homogenous and in opposition to the immoral elite 
who are depriving the people of their sovereignty, and the populist representative 
symbolically identifies with the people. The constitutive nature of this claim is 
encompassed in the notion of performance. The performance of the representative 
claim brings into being both constituents and claim-maker and enables me to query 
how the claim is constructed and the nature of the mode of representation that 
results. Further, while the populist representative claim pitches a homogenous people 
against the elite in an antagonistic relationship on the basis of populist ideology, such 
claims are performed to an active audience. 
The limited extant literature on populism and representation (Arditi, 2003; Caramani, 
2015; De Cleen and Jamin, 2016; De la Torre, 2014; Mastropaolo, 2017; Roberts, 2017; 
Vittori, 2015) focuses on this populist claim at face value (Moffitt, 2016 excluded, who 
focuses on the constitutional character of the claim at the expense of its face-value 
content): populists claim to be like the people. On the surface, this claim corresponds 
to Ankersmit’s resemblance theory: populists offer symbolic means of identification 
with the people through physical resemblance. It is worth noting at this point that the 
notion of aesthetic representation (Ankersmit, 2002) neither presupposes a 
preoccupation with the aesthetisation of politics, nor an aesthetic (or stylistic) 
definition of populism. Rather, it concerns itself with the creative construction and 
representation of power relations between representatives and the represented: with 
the ways in which populist ideology manifests itself communicatively and through this 
process constitutes reality, the represented and the representative. Just as meaning-
making in aesthetic processes of representation involve an interconnection between 
form and content, so does the process of representative claim-making take its meaning 
from an interrelation between the claim itself and its performance. 
When the act of claim-making becomes the subject of analysis, in addition to the claim 
itself, that more problematic – and interesting – aspect of communication emerges 
that views the claim-maker as a political actor with an interest in constituting a 





the claim and the means through which it constitutes the representative relationship. I 
therefore concern myself both with what the populist claim posits and with how it is 
constructed through symbolic action. This dual perspective on claims and claim-making 
is also necessary to consider the inevitable mediation of the populist claim. Mediation 
is in itself a problematic process, and the new media environment places significant 
challenges upon public representatives. It is therefore natural that populists and other 
representatives anticipate such challenges whilst seeking to make the most of the 
opportunities that go with them. To investigate the ways in which they do so, I again 
look beyond the claim in ideological terms and consider its performance. I do not 
propose that populist ideology manifests itself in one style or type of performance 
(indeed, it is highly contextual, as Ekstrӧm et al. argue, forthcoming). Rather, I 
approach political performance as a means of communicating core populist ideas and 
concepts through symbolic action. Through this communicative process, performance 
conveys, shapes and contributes to the meaning of political ideology. It is shaped and 
inspired by its cultural, historical and socio-political context, and is oriented towards an 
audience, often with mediation in mind. Political, like social, actors, “embedded in 
collective representations and working through symbolic and material means, 
implicitly orient towards others as if they were actors on a stage seeking identification 
with their experiences and understandings from their audiences” (Alexander et al., 
2006, p. 2). I argue that populists do this particularly effectively through disruptive 
performance. 
2.4.2 DISRUPTIVE PERFORMANCE AS PARADIGMATIC POPULIST CLAIM-MAKING 
I approach disruption as an emblematic symbolic manifestation of populist ideology 
that is geared towards processes of mediation. I adopt it here as a multi-faceted and 
significant analytical concept. I define disruptive performances in parliamentary 
institutional contexts “literally as a disruption of parliamentary business and 
procedure, and figuratively as a disruption of the norms embedded within the ritual of 
parliamentary debate” (Spary, 2010, p. 338). Disruptive performance helps explain and 
analyse populists’ most central signifying practices as they use it in a variety of 
different forms and functions that together constitute an expression of populist 
ideology. It challenges mainstream politics by pitching the elite against the people 





Populist disruption in particular also involves a symbolic identification between the 
populist and the people as it performs the representative relationship suggested by 
populist ideology. Populists embody the people, for instance by dressing like the 
people, using ordinary language or “bad manners” (Moffitt, 2016, p. 44) which in 
themselves are forms of disruption of ordinary institutional behaviour and political 
speech. They engage in symbolic action that disrupts institutional norms and 
procedures and thereby antagonises the elite. As they themselves identify with the 
people, this disruptive action serves to pitch the people against the elite in a 
Manichaean relationship. Their disruptive behaviour is then legitimised by reference to 
the sovereignty of the people. Simultaneously disruption transforms institutional 
spaces into effective sites for the mediation of populist representative claims. In doing 
so, it speaks – loudly and unabashedly – to the conditions of the new media 
environment. Disruptive performances are therefore a rich source of data on populist 
meaning-making processes. 
Populist disruptive performance has four core analytical facets. First, as we have just 
seen, it is a manifestation of populist ideology. The symbolic action of disruption 
functions as a communicative manifestation of the populist representative claim and 
seeks to impart a message to its audience. Second, the moral dimension of populist 
ideology disrupts party competition (Norris and Inglehart, 2018) as it dismantles the 
left-right ideological cleavage in the political spectrum and resurrects a new cleavage 
based on morality. Third, the populist representative claim is performed and thereby 
intentionally constructs the relationship between populists and the people. Fourth, 
building on the notion of populist disruption as a strategic performance, I consider it as 
simultaneously aimed at constituents and the media, where its inherently attention-
grabbing qualities meet the challenges of the new media environment. As populist 
representative claims are mediated, they harmonise with processes of mediation in 
relation to mainstream media institutions and new media technologies, imaginaries 
and norms of use. 
2.4.3 THE CLAIM IN CONTEXT 
As we saw above, both concepts and their form are shaped by, and themselves shape, 





aesthetic performance. Based on a philosophical approach that conceives of 
performance as socially constructed and as socially constitutive, I conceive of meaning 
as historically and culturally contingent. Context is therefore of utmost importance in 
the constitution and interpretation of meaning. I focus on two broad aspects of 
context – the political institutional setting and the media setting of the populist 
representative claim – and briefly review what the literature tells us about their role in 
populist meaning-making.  
Much has been made in the literature of populism’s relationship to democracy. While I 
do not cover the substantial literature on populism and democracy here, I briefly note 
the role (or lack of it) that is attributed to context in these studies, in order to arrive at 
an argument concerning populism’s inherent responsiveness to its democratic 
environment. Of the extensive scholarship on populism and democracy, little concerns 
itself with the ways in which populism adjusts to different institutional and democratic 
contexts. The dearth of empirical, comparative studies is to blame. Most of the 
literature on populism and democracy argues that there is tension between populist 
democracy and liberal democracy (for example, Canovan, 1999; Meny and Surel, 
2002a; Mudde, 2007; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014; Taggart, 2000) or that populism is 
opposed to liberal democracy (for example, Abts and Rummens, 2007; Pappas, 2014). 
When defining populist democracy, most of these scholars focus on plebiscitary 
elements and their discord with pluralism (Akkerman, 2005; Mudde, 2007, among 
others). Most, if not all, of these studies, however, are based on Western Europe, and 
many even narrow their focus to radical-right forms of populism. Analyses and 
theoretical conjectures on populist democracy are thus highly context specific and 
potentially entangled with regional political culture as well as dominant host ideologies 
of populism, such as nationalism. Moreover, most studies also consider populist 
democracy as a more or less static concept. This is at odds with populism's contextual 
nature and over-simplifies its relationship to liberal democracy. While we see populist 
attempts to reduce disintermediation in processes of political representation around 
the world, we find, for instance, this aim taking the form of plebiscitary democracy in 
some contexts and delegative democracy in others (see O’Donnell, 1994) where direct 
representation is interpreted as a president embodying the will of the people. 





adjust and justify itself democratically in response to certain factors in that 
environment. 
Let us now consider a couple of key texts that do point out this ideological flexibility of 
populism. In his discussion of European radical-right types of populist democracy, 
Mudde (2007, p. 156) notes in passing the contextual nature of populism in its 
response to the system in question: the more liberal a democracy is, the more anti-
system the populist (radical right) will be. This incidental point deserves further 
comparative attention, especially inter-regionally and beyond Mudde’s radical-right 
focus, as it highlights the contextual nature of populism’s normative idea of 
democracy. As an ideology based on anti-elitism, the populist representative claim 
necessarily takes its shape in response to the given elite and dominant paradigm that it 
opposes. 
In a theoretical paper Rovira Kaltwasser (2014) picks up on this point. He argues that 
populism offers responses to two of Dahl’s dilemmas, which are inherent in liberal 
democracy: the boundary problem (how to define the people) and the limits of self-
government (where the liberal response in the form of constitutionalism is in tension 
with the democratic response of popular sovereignty). The balance of these elements 
of liberal democracy is contingent on the given historical and political context (ibid., p. 
477). I would therefore also expect populism's response to the dilemmas – in the form 
of their representative claims – to be relative to such context. Indeed, Rovira 
Kaltwasser outlines three alternative scenarios where populism’s response to the 
dilemma of the limits to self-government differs and results in different conceptions of 
sovereignty. First, when populist forces do not have major complaints about the 
underlying constitutional order, their focus is on the performance of the 
establishment. Second, populist forces may claim that the existing constitution has 
been made to protect the interests of the establishment. Third, populists rigidly defend 
the constitution against any form of judicial interpretation or progressive 'living 
constitutionalism'. Rovira Kaltwasser does not hypothesise on any external contextual 
reasons behind these different manifestations of populist ideology. However, his 
chosen examples indicate a certain trend that points to the regime type in question, 





of public support of institutions such as the constitution. Based on these studies, I 
therefore expect both the content of the populist claim and its normative goal to differ 
according to its democratic institutional context. 
As to populism’s influence on its democratic environment, a few studies (Arditi, 2003; 
Huber and Schimpf, 2015; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012) consider the effects on 
democracy across states of democratisation. These studies identify the populist party's 
position of power as a key independent variable. They find that populism has a 
negative effect on liberal democracy when in power and a positive effect when in 
opposition and that this effect is moderated by the level of consolidation (Huber and 
Schimpf, 2015). In the present study, only the consolidation variable is relevant as I 
have isolated the variable of the parties’ position of power and look only at opposition 
parties (see chapter three). The above-mentioned studies focus on populist ideology 
and do not consider populist communication as such. Discourse and performance-
focused conceptualisations of populism (such as Laclau, 2005a; Moffitt, 2016) suggest 
that populist communication performatively constitutes both the subject and the crisis 
that necessitates swift action on behalf of the populist, often through utilitarian and 
instrumentalised politics (Moffitt, 2016, p. 45). Taken together, these studies suggest 
that populist communication performatively influences its democratic environment 
most forcefully in contexts of lower levels of consolidation. 
Context also matters to meaning-making in terms of the media setting. Conceiving of 
the populist representative claim in aesthetic terms as performed shifts the focus from 
questions of forms of representation to the mechanisms of representation (Moffitt, 
2016, p. 49). Within processes of mediation, such mechanisms include the 
institutional, material (technical as well as behavioural) and imaginary properties of 
communication media and platforms. Meaning is not only created in a process of 
mutual influence between performance and claim but is also shaped in anticipation of 
and within processes of mediation. Given that the performance of the populist claim 
contributes to its meaning, and that it is also dependent on the media setting, 
mediation is central to the communicated meaning of the populist representative 
claim. Cranmer (2011), Boss and Brants (2014) and Ernst and colleagues (2018) all 





consider the use of social media imaginaries a means of symbolic communication 
(Couldry, 2015a; De Blasio and Sorice, 2018; Gerbaudo, 2014), while populist 
performance is also adapted to and given meaning by material affordances and norms 
of use of different media technologies (Lievrouw, 2014). For this reason, I follow Bode 
& Vraga’s (2018) call for the importance of multichannel studies of political 
communication in hybrid media systems. Restricting the study to one medium not only 
misses the nature of modern political communication and the way it plays out in the 
hybrid media system. It also risks the assumption that populist political performance 
associated with one medium or platform can be generalised to others; and it fails to 
consider how a populist communication style harmonises with different media. 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
The journey that populist concepts undertake from conception to mediation and the 
various influences they encounter on their way through different media and political 
settings demonstrates the importance and interconnection of three concepts to a 
communication perspective on populism: ideology, performance and mediation 
(Figure 2.1). To understand and explain populism from a communication perspective I 
suggest that we need to break down existing dichotomies between form and content, 
ideology and performance and to recognise their interrelated and mutually 
constitutive nature in empirical reality. In processes of representation – 
communicative as well as political – they are intimately connected.  
I posit that it remains useful to classify populism as an ideology to retain focus on the 
populist claim and the problems it responds to in representative democracy, for we 
ignore these at our peril. Yet such a classification does not condemn us to neglect 
populism’s communicative properties or a concern with the constructed and 
constitutive nature of such a claim. Rather, it necessitates a shift in focus from the 
exclusive concern with the concepts and values that compose populist ideology onto 
the processes through which they come about and play out in empirical reality. This in 
turn suggests it is necessary to revisit the morphological basis of conceptualising 





In the preceding discussion I have argued for an analogy between, and integration of, 
communicative and political processes of representation. I have suggested that the 
interaction between form and content in communicative processes of representation 
is mirrored in the interaction between ideology and performance in political processes 
of representation. This analogy forms the foundation of a conceptual framework for 
the analysis of populist political representation. Such a framework conceives of the 
performance of populist ideology as symbolically enacting the populist representative 
claim while anticipating processes of mediation. I contend that this approach resolves 
many of the problems in the literature related to the classification of populism. 
Recognising the intertwined and mutually constitutive nature of ideology and 
performance in empirical processes of meaning-making, instead of discarding one 
concept in favour of the other, simultaneously enables us to analytically separate 
them. This artificial separation explains the essentialist nature of populist ideology and 
the gradational nature of populist performance as a device that can be used 
strategically by a variety of actors in different circumstances. 
 
FIGURE 2.1: The process of representation 
Using this framework I analyse the populist representative claim at three levels of 
meaning-making. First, I consider the populist representative claim at face value. This 








recognise its foundation in real democratic problems within a given context. I also 
allows me to pinpoint its differences across populist parties in different contexts and 
thereby engage with the role that context plays in communicating populist ideology. 
Second, I have suggested that the performance of the claim plays into its intended 
meaning as performance symbolically communicates populist ideas. I therefore also 
approach the claim as a performance aimed at (potential) constituents. As I have 
argued above, the typical performance of the populist claim takes place through 
disruption. I therefore focus in particular on how populist ideology is constituted 
through disruptive performance as well as on how this performance is shaped by its 
democratic conditions and in turn has consequences for those conditions. Third, I 
explore the populist representative claim as a performance aimed at the media and as 
taking place within processes of mediation. In the remainder of this study I address 
these three dimensions in turn. 
In this chapter I have established the interrelated nature of populist ideology, 
performance and mediation in the communication of populism and its resultant mode 
of representation. I have argued that all three of these concepts are socially 
constructed through means that anchor them in their given context but that they also 
have constitutive properties that in turn have implications for that context. We are 
now in a position to consider the methodological connection between a 
communication perspective on populism and its empirical manifestation, which we 






3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
My aim in this study is to deepen our understanding of populist communication and 
mediated populist representation, and to explore how these processes play out in 
different democratic contexts. In order to achieve this, I seek to understand and 
explain the socio-political processes underlying populist communication, investigate 
the mechanisms through which these processes come about, and reflect on their 
implications for politics and the social world. The research questions explore three 
distinct but overlapping concepts in relation to populist communication – ideology, 
performance and mediation – that connect the conceptual framework of the preceding 
chapter to the method outlined in this chapter. 
My main research question is, 
How can populism be understood and explained from a communication 
perspective? 
This question can be further broken down along the main theoretical concepts that 
inform this study: 
Ideology: 
 How is populist ideology constructed through communicative processes? 
Performance: 
 How does disruptive performance communicatively manifest a populist mode 
of representation? 
Mediation: 
 How does populist communication harmonise with the demands on mediated 
representation in the new media environment? 





 How does the comparison across different democratic contexts add to our 
understanding of populist communication? 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design is a comparative case study, comparing two populist parties 
situated in liberal-democratic contexts, yet displaying clear contrasts in the more 
specific elements of their historical and socio-political conditions. The case study 
approach allows for a thick description of the cases as situated in their respective 
contexts, while the comparative design enables the drawing of parallels and contrasts 
between the two distinctive, multidimensional contexts. Given this nuanced approach, 
I refrain from identifying specific aspects of political conditions as independent 
variables in a strict cause-effect relationship and comparing on this basis. As Downey 
and Stanyer (2010) also point out in their recommendations for comparative research, 
media and communication phenomena can rarely be adequately explained by 
straightjacketing them into one simple causal relationship. Yet I have selected the 
cases with a set of assumptions in mind about broader aspects of conditions that can 
be expected to play a part in practices of populist communication and representation. 
These include democratic pathway and current status, dominant mode of political 
representation, party position and party ‘host’ ideology. Selecting cases on this basis 
allows reflection on both the impact of context on populist communication and on the 
implications of populist communication on its political environment. For while such 
conditions simultaneously inspire and confine populist performances, they are also 
subject to change as a result of them. These material conditions then constitute the 
framework of the research design; yet my concern is with how populists portray this 
reality, and change it in the process of doing so. 
3.2.1 CASES 
My two case studies are the parties UKIP and the EFF. I investigate UKIP’s 
communications in the period leading up to, during and immediately following the 
UK’s EU referendum on 23 June, 2016. I look at the EFF’s communications in the period 






3.2.2 COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK 
I have selected the two cases of UKIP and the EFF to investigate the phenomena of 
populist communication and representation based on the conditions outlined in Table 
3.1 (grey shaded cells indicate similarities between cases; white cells indicate 
differences). 
CONDITIONS UKIP, UK EFF, SOUTH AFRICA 
Overall democratic 
context 
Liberal democracy enduring 
populist challenges 
Regionally powerful with 
strong economy 
Liberal democracy enduring 
populist challenges 
Regionally powerful with strong 
economy 
Democratic pathway 




Strong delivery mechanisms 
Liberal media system4 




Weak delivery mechanisms 
Hybrid media system (similar to 
polarised pluralist model)6 
Dominant mode of 
representation 
Focus on action on behalf of 
citizens at the cost of 
identification between 
citizens and representatives 
Focus on identity and similarity 
between representatives and 
citizens at the cost of 
responsiveness and action on 
behalf of citizens7 
Party position Opposition Opposition 
Party ‘host’ ideology Right-wing (‘libertarian’8)  Socialist 
TABLE 3.1: Selected democratic conditions in the UK and South Africa  
Although I aim to provide a thick description of two different and rich democratic 
contexts with the case study approach, a number of similarities between the cases 
reduces the complexity and enable clearer generalisation of findings. With my focus on 
populist representation, the two parties are both situated in liberal representative 
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 (Voltmer, 2011) 
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 Based on Pitkin’s (1967) typology of modes of representation. See also Caramani (2015). 
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democracies9. This constant enables a more sensitive and nuanced comparison of how 
different dominant modes of political representation in the two countries encourage 
different populist responses in the form of oppositional representative claims. Such 
different modes of representation have grown out of historical trajectories of both 
populist politics and transition to, or development of, liberal democracy. While 
established norms and social myths in the two countries form different sources of 
legitimacy for populists – such as the continued liberation movement in South Africa or 
public denunciation of increasing professionalisation and cartel politics in the UK – 
democratic and institutional conditions create different restrictions and opportunities 
for populist action in the form of, for instance, institutional fragility or rigidity. 
Both countries are relatively economically powerful, ensuring a developed and 
competitive media system and a significant level of internet penetration (see below). 
An additional selection criterion for my case studies was the factor of party position. 
Key comparative studies on populism identify party position as a strong variable on the 
effects of populism on both media coverage (Mazzoleni et al., 2003) and 
democratisation (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Other studies note the 
importance of populist parties’ position with respect to their performance and 
communication strategy (e.g. Akkerman and de Lange, 2012; Albertazzi and Mueller, 
2013; Bartlett, 2014; Cheeseman and Larmer, 2013; Heinisch, 2003, p. 94; Rovira 
Kaltwasser and Taggart, 2015). I do not follow these studies in comparing populist 
cases across the factor of party position or focus on parties in power. Rather, I have 
chosen to isolate the factor of party position and focus exclusively on populist 
opposition parties. This approach has several advantages: first, populism tends to be 
more pronounced when in opposition and therefore easier to study. Second, it ensures 
that media coverage and hence communication strategy do not rely on the advantages 
of power. Finally, rather than analysing populism’s effects on democracy, focusing on 
opposition parties enables me to identify strategies and traits that may seek to change 
a nation’s democratic pathway, before it happens. Once in power, a limited number of 
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 There is a growing literature that argues that populism is directly associated with liberal representative 
democracy (see amongst others Abts and Rummens, 2007; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Arditi, 2003; 





options are available for dealing with such a scenario (Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart, 
2015). 
Instead of diverging across party positions, I investigate cases situated in different 
geographical regions. This enables the study to speak across localised sub-types of 
populism that tend to evolve among countries of close geographical proximity and 
with shared historical features, such as the populisms of Latin America, Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe, and so on. Further, I look at parties whose ‘host ideologies’ 
are situated at opposite ends of the traditional left-right ideological spectrum. This 
comparison aims to address outstanding conceptual issues in the literature and 
ensures that the parallels I draw are not specific to the host ideology but rather tell us 
something about populist ideology itself. 
Finally, both parties are highly active on Twitter, despite differences in the digital 
divide10 and the majority of both sets of constituents not being frequent users of the 
platform. Hence both parties appear to use Twitter for similar purposes, as a direct 
communication platform to speak to wider and elite audiences and to the media. 
3.2.3 THE OBJECT OF STUDY: DISRUPTIVE PERFORMANCE 
Disruptive performances of parliamentary institutional contexts are the objects of 
analysis. Disruptive performance has not been conceptualised in the literature on 
populism and only to a very limited extent in the field of political communication in 
general (Johnson, 2013; Spary, 2010; Spary et al., 2014). However, as I argued in the 
preceding chapter, I conceive of disruptive performance by populist actors as an 
especially emblematic manifestation of populist ideology that is geared towards 
processes of mediation through an explicit and spectacular struggle over democratic 
norms and procedures. Disruptive performances are therefore a rich source of data on 
processes of populist communication and representation in relation to mediated 
                                                     
10
 My main concern here is of course the less developed infrastructure of South Africa and its large digital 
divide. Regionally, however, the country has a highly developed media infrastructure, with an internet 
penetration rate of 40% in 2017 (World Wide Worx, 2017a) and growing at an exponential rate. Social 
media use is also growing rapidly. 2017 saw 14 million active Facebook users, while Twitter had 7.7 
million active users (World Wide Worx, 2017b). Most South African users (85-7%) access social media via 
their mobile telephones (World Wide Worx, 2014), which suggests that the demographics of social media 
users are more varied than one might expect. Given these patterns of access and use, I consider both my 
case studies satisfactory for digital research, although I retain awareness of inequalities especially in the 





events. The institutional focus of this type of event provokes conflict with elites and 
existing power structures. However, it also means that the horizontal Us-Them 
antagonism that often accompanies populism as a vehicle of its constructions of the 
people is relatively absent. This does not mean that it is not present in other contexts 
in both of the two cases – the anti-immigration stance of UKIP and the anti-white 
rhetoric of the EFF are otherwise very prominent aspects of their forms of populism. 
Disruptive performances constitute nested units within the comparative case study 
design. I consider each disruptive performance as the manifestation of a 
representative claim. This enables comparison across nested units within a case study 
in order to look at differences in claim-making, in responses to disruptions, and in 
consequences of disruptions over time. The design further allows comparison across 
case studies in order to consider the implications of – and to – different socio-political 
environments. Together, the nested units of each case study illustrate different facets 
of UKIP’s and the EFF’s performances of their representative claims in their given 
contexts. The events selected as objects of analysis are the most prominent recent 
disruptive performances by the EFF and UKIP: 
1) EFF’s disruptions of then-President Jacob Zuma’s State of the Nation Addresses 
(SONAs), delivered on 12 February 2015 and 9 February 2017 in the South 
African Parliament in Cape Town. 
2) A series of disruptions of the European Parliament (EP) by UKIP MEPs: 
a. 5 April 2017: Farage calls Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
mafia/gangsters during Article 50 debate. 
b. 1 February 2017: Farage defends Trump and accuses the EU of being 
undemocratic. 
c. 28 June 2016: Farage’s EU referendum ‘victory speech’. 
d. 1 July 2014: UKIP MEPs protest during the EP opening ceremony. 
I selected the above disruptive performances for their institutional settings (national 
and supra-national parliaments) to enable comparison of differences in institutional 
conditions and responses. However, I approach disruptive performances as broader 
events than instances of symbolic action confined to the institutions in which they 





to the media, I include the build-up phases and denouement of the performances that 
take place through legacy and other media. 
3.2.4 MIXED METHODS APPROACH 
I use a mixed methods concurrent nested design (Cresswell et al., 2003, pp. 229–30), 
which integrates the collection of quantitative and qualitative data. I undertook 
simultaneous, though iterative, data collection and sampling of quantitative and 
qualitative data, with weight given to qualitative data.  
In the analysis I give priority to qualitative research, nesting the quantitative element 
within this. The quantitative data forms the basis for a descriptive analysis and 
reconstruction of the events that are the objects of study, placing the populist 
disruptive performances in a broader mediated context. Primarily, however, I use the 
quantitative element for purposes of zoom-in sampling of Twitter data for interpretive 
analysis (Gerbaudo, 2016). In my qualitative analysis I again integrate quantitative 
methods at the interpretation stage in order to triangulate and contextualise my 
interpretation of primarily qualitative data. I detail these processes in sections 3.3 and 
3.4 of this chapter. 
3.2.5 SOCIAL MEDIA RESEARCH 
While my main objects of study are disruptive performances, these include ‘virtual’ as 
well as ‘live’ performances. In the case of mediated performance, I focus on the 
platform of Twitter as both the primary social media platform that enables hashtagged 
conversation by the public and as the platform most used by the two case studies and 
their party leaders. In my approach to social media, I take into consideration certain 
material conditions that provide a framework for performance in addition to the 
political institutional conditions noted above. For instance, media institutional 
characteristics such as commercial and ownership structures and legal terms and 
conditions affect media logics (Esser and Strömbäck, 2014). The technical affordances 
of a given platform also dictate its use by and utility for populist actors; as do practices 
of use, such as the way in which content is watched and shared across platforms and 
throughout the media ecology (Chadwick, 2013; Meyer, 2002). Norms, as patterns of 
social action, shape behaviour and are reinforced by user practices (Lievrouw, 2014). 





abstract social and cultural properties of symbols, myths and social imaginaries 
(Mansell, 2012; Taylor, 2002) specific to social media, such as “the myth of ‘us’” 
(Couldry, 2015a) and the imaginary of the “common man” (Gerbaudo, 2014). As 
Couldry puts it, the notion of myth can: 
help us see an underlying pattern in how, as societies, we make sense 
of organising things around assumptions that certain types of 
information, expertise and knowledge are more valuable than others 
and offer us a privileged view on the reality of social life. These myths 
are not merely an elite production: we are all, potentially, involved in 
producing these myths through our everyday actions. (2015b, p. 642) 
Such myths are in turn perpetuated by platform owners (Van Dijck, 2013a) and can be 
used to forge identities through mediated ideological performances.  
This approach to mediated performance has three advantages. First, live as well as 
digital (see also Isin and Ruppert, 2015) and otherwise mediated communications can 
be conceptualised as performances that are undertaken in the context of particular 
norms and conditions of specific media and platforms. This in turn overcomes the 
old/new media divide in a media ecology approach with more fluid boundaries. 
Second, the currently standard big data approach to social media study is unable on its 
own to answer interpretive questions concerned with meaning and its contextual 
construction. As in Geertz’s famous example of a boy’s wink/twitch taking on 
contrasting meanings in different contexts (1973, p. 6), so does the interpretation of 
the meaning of a ‘like’ or a retweet require understanding of its socio-political context, 
process of mediation (see also Gerbaudo, 2016) and conversation of which it forms 
part. To answer the question of how populism can be understood and explained from 
a communication perspective, I adopt a chiefly interpretive approach that considers 
action in its context in my investigation of digital and other symbolic forms of action. 
Part of this context is the conversation (for instance, through hashtagged indexing on 
Twitter) in which a social media post or other action takes place. Another part is the 
wider norms and conditions of the medium or platform, of the media ecology and 
system, and of the democratic context as a whole. In the mix of methods briefly 





observations that I use to describe the context of interpretation for qualitative 
analysis, identify relevant smaller samples, substantiate interpretations and fill in gaps 
in the description of my case studies. 
The consideration of both material aspects of media – institutional frameworks, 
technical affordances and practices of use – and the more abstract social patterns of 
meaning-making, such as myths, has a third and final advantage: its ability to cut 
across what Boczkowski and Siles (2014) have described as “silos” of media scholarship 
in the areas of production, consumption, content and materiality. They call for an 
integrated cosmopolitan approach to media technologies that are not confined to any 
one of these silos. A communication approach that integrates form and content cuts 
across these silos of content and materiality. This is reflected in my approach to the 
two interpenetrating dimensions of material and imaginary properties of media that 
constitute the context for meaning-making within processes of mediation. In addition, 
in the next section I detail a methodological approach to performance that takes a step 
towards accounting for both of the dimensions of production and consumption. To do 
so I map the received performance on Twitter to moments of the populist projected 
performance. 
3.3 DATA SAMPLING AND COLLECTION 
In this study I look at a number of interlinked datasets that together comprise a set of 
disruptive performances. The nature of social performance is a complex, 
intersubjective experience that involves embodied projection by actors, reception by 
an audience and, in most cases of political performance, a process of mediation 
connecting the two. For each disruptive performance, the data sets therefore include: 
the projected performance by populist actors, which is the main focus of the study and 
which includes the populist actors’ justification for and legitimisation of the disruption; 
the mediated performance in the form of media coverage of the disruption in 
mainstream media as exemplified by newspaper coverage; and a received 
performance as gauged through public Twitter conversations giving an immediate 
public reaction to the disruption. I conceive of these as a typology of ideal types that 
are not mutually exclusive – for instance, the mediated performance coincides with 





performance in the case of public reactions on Twitter – but are theoretically and 
methodologically useful. Together the data sets of projected, mediated and received 
performances provide a multi-dimensional, rich picture of the disruptive 
performances, their immediate contexts and the interaction between live events, 
digital and print media in the media ecology. 
The sampling periods are informed by the demarcation of each disruptive performance 
according to the populist projected performance, since this performance is the focus of 
my research questions. While I include media coverage and social media commentary 
on the performance, I therefore allow the projected performance to override the 
mediated performance. In other words, the performance ends when the populist 
actors’ communications about the event peter out, even if media coverage is still 
ongoing. My analysis of the event thus does not necessarily show how the event goes 
down in history. 
I base my approach to data collection on the methods of issue and conflict mapping, 
which consider how issues travel across media types and online platforms and 
between online and offline events (Burgess and Matamoros-Fernández, 2016; Graeff 
et al., 2014; Marres, 2015). I conduct much of my data collection online using digitally 
native methods (Rogers, 2013), using tools such as Google Trends and Twitter web 
searches (see section 3.3.1). 






 UKIP EFF 
TIME FRAMES a) 1 – 7 Jul 2014 
b) 28 – 29 Jun 2016 
c) 29 Jan – 2 Feb 2017 
d) 4 – 6 Apr 2017 
a) 1 Jan – 26 Feb 2015 
b) 2 – 14 Feb 2017 
PROJECTED PERFORMANCES 
LIVE PERFORMANCES 4 (live recordings, YouTube; EP 
recordings; BBC; EFDD Group’s 
website; EP minutes) 
2 (live recordings, YouTube; 
Parliament of the RSA website; 
Hansard transcripts; official minutes) 
PRESS RELEASES
11
 20 16 




149 unique tweets, or 101,312 
tweets with retweets 
976 unique tweets, or 47,952 tweets 
with retweets 
RADIO SHOWS 2 (LBC website; YouTube)  
NEWSPAPER COLUMNS  4  
PROMOTIONAL VIDEOS 1 (YouTube)  
MEDIA INTERVIEWS  1 (live recording, YouTube)  
RESOLUTIONS 1 (tabled in the EP; EP website)  
PRESS CONFERENCES  3 (live recordings, YouTube) 
MEDIATED PERFORMANCES 
NEWSPAPER COVERAGE 25 (Nexis) 99 (Nexis; National Archives, RSA)
13
 
MEDIA TWEETS See received performance See received performance 
OTHER PRESS 
STATEMENTS 
1 (Seb Dance website) 3 (Parliament of the RSA website) 
RECEIVED PERFORMANCES 










 1 (Twitter Moments website)  
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 The EFF renewed their website and URL since the 2015 event and old press releases were not available. I captured 
these from the original website with the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine (https://archive.org/web/). For UKIP I 
include press releases from UKIP’s, UKIP MEPs’, and the EFDD Group’s websites. 2014 press releases were captured 
with the Wayback Machine. 
12
 Twitter is both parties’ social media platform of choice. Analytically, I still consider tweets ‘mediated’ although they 
form part of the projected, not the mediated, performance. I cleaned out all tweets not directly relating to a given 
event. I carefully verified Malema’s account; it has since become officially Verified on Twitter. 
13
 Search terms: SONA OR “state of the nation” AND (EFF OR Malema), 1 Jan-26 Feb 2015; (SONA OR “state of the 
nation” OR parliament) AND (EFF OR Malema), 2-14 Feb 2017; (Farage OR UKIP) AND (EP OR "European Parliament" 
OR Brussels OR MEP* OR EU), 1-7 Jul 2014; (Farage OR UKIP) AND (EP OR "European Parliament" OR Brussels), 28-29 
Jun 2016; (Farage OR UKIP) AND (EP OR "European Parliament"), 29 Jan-2 Feb 2017; (Farage OR UKIP) AND (EP OR 
"European Parliament"), 4-6 Apr 2017. Nexis was unreliable for Business Day in 2017 so I supplemented with an 
online search of their archives for verification. 
14
 Search terms: (tweets in English only) (Nigel OR Farage) AND (speech OR EP OR "European Parliament" OR 
@Europarl_EN OR MEP OR MEPs OR EU), 4-6 Apr 2017; (Nigel OR Farage) AND (speech OR EP OR "European 
Parliament") 28 Jun at 8:33 am (first relevant tweet) -29 Jun 2016; (Nigel OR Farage) AND (speech OR EP OR 
"European Parliament" OR @Europarl_EN OR MEP OR MEPs) 1 Feb 2017 at 14:48:43 (first relevant tweet) -2 Feb 
2017; (Nigel OR Farage) AND (speech OR EP OR "European Parliament" OR @Europarl_EN OR MEP OR MEPs), 4-6 Apr 
2017. 
15
 Search terms: (tweets in English only) #SONA OR #SONA2015, 1 Jan-26 Feb 2015; #paybackthemoney, 1 Jan-26 Feb 
2015; #bringbackthesignal, on 12 Feb 2015; #SONA OR #SONA2017 OR #Asijiki OR #FearFokol, 2-14 Feb 2017. 
16
 Twitter Moments is Twitter’s own news service. 
17
 Search terms (searches made within the UK): “‘Nigel Farage’ or ‘UK Independence Party’”, 17 Jun-16 Jul 2014; 
“Farage or ‘Nigel Farage’”, 27-30 Jun 2016; “European Parliament and Nigel Farage”, 27-30 Jun 2016; “Nigel Farage 
and European Parliament”, 1 Jan-28 Feb 2017; “Nigel Farage”, 22 Mar-19 Apr 2017. 
18
 Search terms (searches made within South Africa): “pay back the money”, 20 Aug 2014-26 Feb 2015; “SONA”, 1 
Jan-26 Feb 2015; “SONA2015”, 1 Jan-26 Feb 2015; “state of the nation”, 1 Jan-26 Feb 2015; “pay back the money”, 2-
14 Feb 2017; “Zuma must go”, 2-14 Feb 2017; “SONA”, 2-14 Feb 2017; “SONA2017”, 2-14 Feb 2017; “state of the 





TABLE 3.2: Datasets of UKIP and the EFF’s projected, mediated and received performances 
To reconstruct the projected live performances, I selected and combined a number of 
data sources and pieced together the real-life event from these as faithfully and 
accurately as possible using methods of verification and triangulation. I recorded both 
linguistic and extra-linguistic modes in a complete transcript of events that specifies 
the mosaic of original primary data sources. For example, in the case of the EFF’s 
disruption of the SONA 2015, the Parliamentary video recording does not show images 
of the EFF’s eviction from the chamber but has the camera focused on the Speaker of 
the House. The Hansard transcript only contains the linguistic elements of the 
disruption and in some cases include additional explanatory text that was never 
uttered by the participants it is attributed to in the transcripts. My transcript records 
the events as they actually happened, as far as possible. For the projected 
performances I also included data sources that emerged as salient through iterative 
engagement with the data, including newspaper columns, radio shows, promotional 
videos and broadcast interviews. I was able to supplement the data for the projected 
performances with two semi-structured interviews with UKIP MEPs that I conducted as 
part of the COST IS1308 project on Populist Political Communication in Europe19. 
Unfortunately I was unable to conduct corresponding interviews in South Africa. 
For the mediated performances I searched four mainstream newspapers. The sample 
included both elite and tabloid newspapers from across the political spectrum and can 
be seen to broadly represent mainstream media coverage as well as to reflect the 
plurality of the mainstream media sphere in the two countries. For South Africa, the 
newspapers are Mail & Guardian (elite, left-wing), Business Day (financial, elite), Daily 
Sun (largest tabloid) and The New Age (elite, owned by the Gupta family, who are 
closely associated with then-president Jacob Zuma). For the UK, the newspapers are 
The Guardian (elite, centre-left, supported Remain), the Daily Telegraph (elite, centre-
right, supported Leave), the Daily Mail (tabloid, right, supported Leave), and The 
Mirror (tabloid, centre-left, supported Remain). I searched all newspapers in their print 
editions through Nexis, except the Daily Sun, which I obtained through manual 
searches in the National Archives in Cape Town. For each disruptive performance, I 
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included articles that mentioned the event in the title or first two paragraphs, 
mentioned the party or party leader anywhere in the article and had a minimum 
length of two paragraphs. Where Nexis returned more than one version of an article, 
the latest was selected. I excluded readers' letters. 
For the received performances I collected Twitter conversations about each disruptive 
performance. Where possible, I identified relevant hashtags through iterative 
engagement with the data and collected data based on these for the relevant period of 
the disruptive performance. Where no hashtags were generated, I used keyword 
searches relating to the event. I combined these in search queries with known key 
actors and specific time intervals. I then undertook extensive manual data cleaning to 
remove irrelevant tweets from the sample. In most cases this was an iterative process 
as relevant search terms were refined and/or identified through familiarising myself 
with significant moments of the disruptive performance and new emerging hashtags. 
The UKIP events did not generate hashtags of their own (and the search terms may 
therefore capture less of the relevant Twitter posts about the event) but were selected 
to ensure focus on the central actors as they performed in the specific setting of the 
EP. I supplemented the Twitter datasets with Google Trends searches, where I 
collected normalised search volumes for key Google searches undertaken from within 
the UK and South Africa within a given time period. Google Trends allocates the 
number 100 to the peak of search interest and expresses other volumes as essentially 
percentages. Where available and relevant I also referred to opinion polls to develop 
my understanding of the underlying context of public opinion in which the received 
performance took place. 
3.3.1 EXTRACTION OF TWITTER DATA 
I used the tool Mecodify20 to extract and analyse data from Twitter. Unlike most other 
tools for this purpose, Mecodify enables the extraction of historical Twitter data from 
Twitter’s web search (that is, Twitter’s own Advanced Search function), rather than 
being restricted to the seven-to-nine-day historical limit on Twitter’s API. As for API 
searches, Twitter does not reveal the exact criteria for what is included in the results of 
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its web search so the limitations of this approach are unknown. The completeness of 
Mecodify’s extracted sample appears to be related to its size (Al-Saqaf, 2016, p. 13). All 
my samples were of a relatively modest size, below 200,000 unique tweets for 
individual datasets from each event.  
Mecodify outputs a list of all tweets, including images and links, and/or tweeters 
matching the search criteria. The metadata of a given tweet relates to the specific 
search criteria. For instance, the number of retweets of a given tweet will only be 
counted within the period of the search criteria; it may have been retweeted more 
times after the end of that period. The volume of tweets and retweets can be viewed 
on a time-series graph and can be exported as a csv file. 
3.3.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
My social media data sets include tweets by both public figures (such as populist 
politicians, celebrities, journalists and media organisations) and private individuals. The 
ethical issues relevant to my study relate to the privacy and anonymity of social media 
data: the ability to identify individual users and the contextual nature of privacy. The 
tweets of public figures are without doubt intended for public consumption, and these 
users can be considered to be aware of potential uses of their content by the media 
and researchers. Ethical issues are therefore confined to the tweets of private 
individuals who may arguably be less aware of the public nature of their tweets.  
My study only uses publicly available content where no registration or group 
membership is required to view it. The data is not sensitive and has a low risk level as it 
involves no groups of vulnerable users. I therefore have not felt a need to seek the 
consent of users. Yet the ethical implications of, and guidelines for, social media 
research are evolving, and I have therefore had approval by the university’s Research 
Ethics Committee (approval reference LTCOMM-027). I considered the following: 
Identifying individual users 
My study collects hashtagged tweets by private individuals. Moreno et al. (2013) argue 
that in a study of a given topic on social media that does not collect any profile owner 
identities, the unit of analysis is the page (or, in my case, the tweet or retweet), rather 





also the Association of Internet Researchers’ report, Markham and Buchanan, 2012, p. 
6). However, Zimmer notes that “even if one feels that ‘all identifying information’ has 
been removed from a data set, it is often trivial to piece together random bits of 
information to deduce one’s identity” (2010, p. 319). Moreover, Moreno et al. (2013) 
also point out that quotes by social media users entered into a search engine can often 
be used to identify a user. In quantitative analyses I therefore only include hashtagged 
tweets by private individuals as aggregate data. In qualitative analyses, I avoid the use 
of recognisable quotes longer than a few words from tweets by private individuals. In 
all cases, I anonymise names and account names. 
The contextual nature of privacy 
According to a dignity-based theory of privacy,  
…merely having one’s personal information stripped from the intended 
sphere of the social networking profile, and amassed into a database for 
external review becomes an affront to the subjects’ human dignity and 
their ability to control the flow of their personal information (Zimmer, 
2010, p. 321).  
Thus, I consider the “contextual nature of privacy” (ibid., p. 323), as also advocated by 
boyd (2008), both in the context of the platform and the individual act on that 
platform. Moe and Larsson elaborate: “Users’ ideas about what is restricted and meant 
for the private sphere, and what is in the open and intended for the public, vary 
substantially, and might not match the researchers’ impression, or the service 
provider’s intentions” (2012, p. 121). In the context of my study, it is therefore worth 
noting that the content by private individuals to be included is only produced in the 
context of public discussions in hashtagged conversations relating to public political 
events. By proactively including such hashtags, users are clearly intending to engage in 
a public, political discussion with other people they do not know, in a manner 





3.4 APPROACH TO DATA ANALYSIS 
Although populist ideology can take many forms, it manifests itself most emphatically 
in disruptive performance. My empirical analysis of disruptive performances by each of 
my cases consists of two interlinked parts: 
1) A chronological, descriptive analysis that reconstructs the events on the basis 
of the projected, mediated and received performances, mostly based on 
quantitative data. 
2) An in-depth, interpretive analysis of the projected performance by populists. 
My approach to data analysis is inductive, prioritises interpretive analysis and is aimed 
at theoretically developing the three core concepts of ideology, performance and 
mediation in relation to populism. It builds on an important emerging body of work on 
interpretive approaches to the analysis of social media data during conflict and protest 
events (Gerbaudo, 2016; Innes et al., 2016; Roberts et al., 2017) and on Bode and 
Vraga’s (2018) call for cross-platform research in political communication. In the 
following I first outline the descriptive and mainly quantitative element of the mixed-
methods approach. I then move on to the more prominent interpretive analysis of the 
projected performances. This element of the method centres on the use of three 
sensitising concepts (Blumer, 1954) that constitute analytical focal points in a 
multimodal inductive analysis. 
3.4.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
The descriptive analysis reconstructs and maps populists’ projected performances, the 
mediated and the received performances as well as the interaction between different 
elements of the media ecology and live events. It serves several purposes: 
 It reconstructs the events as they really happened by bringing together multiple 
accounts and undertaking extensive verification and triangulation. As such, it 
constitutes the collective representation that is broadly accepted as reality 
(Farmer, 2012). The descriptive analysis identifies the basic social processes 
that are going on in relation to the disruption, as well as points of contention in 






 It is a means of gaining rich and sufficient data by collecting background data 
on the actors, processes and settings involved and obtaining detailed 
descriptions of key actors’ views and actions (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 18–19), thus 
providing detailed context that can inform interpretation and comparison 
across cases. 
To conduct the analysis, for each disruptive performance I first read through all press 
releases, media stories and most popular tweets to identify significant ‘live’ events and 
points of contestation of signification between projected, mediated and received 
performances. I reconstructed the live event and visualised the general pattern of ebbs 
and flows in attention in relation to each event on two graphs: 
HISTOGRAM OF THE PROJECTED, MEDIATED AND RECEIVED PERFORMANCES 
The histogram extends over the full period of the disruptive performance and is 
visualised in days. It shows the engagement of populist actors, print media and Twitter 
users in relation to significant episodes of the event. To plot it, I exported as csv files 
the volume of tweets by day for two datasets: that of the populist party and party 
leader’s tweets (projected performance) and that of public discussion on central 
hashtags relating to the disruption (received performance). I plotted these along with 
normalised volumes of newspaper articles21 (mediated performance). I then identified 
on the histogram significant ‘live’ and mediated moments of the event to visualise 
interaction within the media ecology in relation to important moments of the 
disruptive performance. 
I summarised these points of interaction in a descriptive analysis that formed the basis 
for further interpretive work. I also identified and described issues of contention and 
struggles over signification between the projected, mediated and received 
performances. For the Twitter dataset of public tweets, I used peaks in tweet volumes 
as a zoom-in sampling mechanism and read through the content of the top 20 most 
retweeted tweets in each peak, followed all links, watched all multimedia content and 
read linked-to news stories. This enabled me to determine how popular (conceived as 
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the most retweeted) activity on Twitter relates to the live events, the basis of the 
peak’s formation (few tweets with many retweets versus a cacophony of many less 
retweeted voices), the types of tweets and tweeters favoured by the Twitter public, 
and the dominant public evaluation of the events on Twitter. 
For the Twitter dataset of populists’ tweets, I also identified similar peaks of activity 
and samples and conducted a similar analysis. Further, I extracted and retained these 
smaller samples of populist tweets for in-depth analysis of the projected performance 
(see section 3.4.2). 
TIME-SERIES GRAPH OF THE CLIMAX: PROJECTED (LIVE) PERFORMANCE AND RECEIVED 
PERFORMANCE (ON TWITTER) 
For this graph I zoomed in on the climax of each performance in parliament (visualised 
in minutes) to match the public Twitter discussion (received performance) to moments 
of the live event in parliament. The graph visualises offline-online interaction in the 
form of real-time public reaction to the populist disruption. To create the graph, I 
exported as csv files the volume of tweets by minute for selected sets of public Twitter 
data. I described the projected, live performance in parliament in full based on sources 
of video footage and identified significant moments of action and contention and the 
time they occurred. I then plotted these on the time-series graph to identify points of 
interaction between the projected performance and the audience reaction. As above, I 
used peaks in public tweet volumes for zoom-in sampling and read through the 
content of the top 20 most retweeted tweets in each peak of Twitter activity and 
described them. This enabled me to gauge the real-time audience response to specific 
moments in the live disruptive performance. 
3.4.2 INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS OF PROJECTED PERFORMANCE 
The interpretive analysis of populists’ projected performance is the primary part of the 
method. It has an iterative and cyclical character in which theory and empirical 
research is in constant communication. To achieve this balance methodologically, my 
interpretive approach relies on three sensitising concepts which theoretically inform a 
multi-modal analysis, yet retain theoretical flexibility and openness in an inductive 
approach. The datasets are direct (as in, un-gatekept) communications by the populist 





tweets. The analysis builds on the descriptive reconstructions of the events and the 
background context these analyses provide. 
SENSITISING CONCEPTS 
I use sensitising concepts to focus and guide my analysis. They differ from definitive 
concepts in their lack of specification and serve as points of reference in an inductive 
approach (Blumer, 1954, p. 7; Carpentier, 2017, pp. 75–9). While sensitising concepts 
may alert us to important aspects of research situations, they may also direct attention 
away from other important aspects. Therefore it is important to approach the coding 
process with an open mind to any theoretical direction. As Bowen states (2006), 
quoting Padgett, “the ultimate survival of a sensitising concept ‘depends on where the 
data take us; emergent concepts may supplement or displace them altogether’”. 
Sensitising concepts are a way of explicitly acknowledging the researcher’s 
preconceptions and ideas while balancing these with an open-ended, inductive inquiry 
of the data. As Dey (quoted in Charmaz, 2006, p. 48) suggests, “There is a difference 
between an open mind and an empty head.” I adopt three sensitising concepts to 
guide my analysis, all of which we briefly explored in the preceding chapter and which I 
develop in more detail in chapters five, seven and nine respectively: ideology, 
performance and mediation.  
TRANSCRIPTION AND CODING 
I transcribed the live events in parliament by piecing together a variety of sources (see 
Table 3.2). I adopted a score layout (in the format of a music score sheet; Maiorani and 
Christie, 2014) with separate annotation tiers for simultaneous modes of symbolic 
action. Each tier – or mode of symbolic action – has its own unit of coding: line-by-line 
coding for speech, and incident-by-incident coding, where an incident is the 
production or issuance of the symbol, word or sentence in the performance of the 
(speech) act (Loxley, 2007, p. 46). This approach enables me to code at multiple levels 
of analysis simultaneously, for instance to code the overall incident of the disruption as 
well as its constituent elements (dress, gesture, and so on). This approach is consistent 
with grounded theory’s acceptance of different levels of abstraction for codes, given 





I proceeded inductively with coding through several iterative cycles that related back 
to the sensitising concepts as the top level of hierarchical codes, yet I stuck closely to 
the data without forcing these pre-existing categories onto them. I based codes on 
processes rather than themes so as to portray meanings and actions, in keeping with 
my concern with the construction of meaning, in order to capture the story in its 
telling, not the narrative or its themes. In a subsequent process of interpretation, I 
integrated parts of my quantitative data analysis for triangulation and 
contextualisation and returned to the qualitative data for further coding where 
needed. 
ANALYSIS 
Disruptive performance – like any political performance – communicates through 
multiple modes of symbolic action: dress, speech, gesture, key, and so on. As Geertz 
argues, we can gain empirical access to a: 
…symbolic system [of culture, of behaviour, and hence of discourse and 
performance], the underlying structure of which it is a surface 
expression, or the ideological principles upon which it is based… by 
inspecting events… even if [they are]… constructed in multiple tongues 
and as much in action as in words (1973, pp. 17–18). 
The approach of multimodality (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2001), which acknowledges 
these multiple modes of meaning-making, therefore informs my investigation into 
populist representative claim-making. I adopt a meso-level analytical perspective in 
relation to text. At the macro end of the spectrum, abstract discourses circulate in 
society (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002, pp. 157–8). At the micro end, researchers are 
concerned with meaning-making through linguistic detail (ibid.). In a multi-modal 
analysis, this would involve detailed analysis of each mode of communication, which 
would result in an unfeasible scope of analysis. It would also miss the semiotic struggle 
inherent in disruptive symbolic action. A meso-level perspective captures this by 
focusing empirically on situated discursive practices in specific interactional contexts. 
Looking at semiotic practices-as-representation (rather than at practices-as-language) 
warrants a higher level of abstraction that considers semiotic practices as (speech) acts 





of analysis therefore is the production or issuance of the symbol in the performance of 
the (speech) act (Loxley, 2007, p. 46) and not the word. I conceive of text as 
materialisations of meaning, and focus is on the meanings, representations and 
ideologies embedded in them. The approach then interweaves semantic aspects of 
language with the pragmatic aspects of actions consistently with Alexander’s cultural 
pragmatics approach to social performance (2006). The struggle over meaning that this 
approach captures is at the root of populist ideology and its manifestation in 
disruptions of dominant semiotic claims. The method of analysis is therefore based on 
an understanding of populism as an epistemological struggle against established 
systems of meaning through the communicative and performative constitution of 
reality. 
In the analysis of populist communication, I paid particular attention to the moral 
agonism inherent in what Alexander terms “performing the binaries” (Alexander, 2006, 
p. 61; see also Van Dijk, 2016) and to chains of equivalence (Carpentier and De Cleen, 
2007; Laclau, 2006; Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002) to assess how the populist parties 
construct reality in different media. In particular, I considered the binary structure of 
the populist argument, its foundation in the nature of populist ideology and how 
populists use this structure to identify and define the key features that they support 
and oppose. Inspired by an inductive grounded theory approach, I used my sensitising 
concepts flexibly to: 
 define and theoretically develop the phenomena of ideology, performance and 
mediated representation in relation to populism through an iterative and 
structured coding process; 
 focus the study on processes and action (Charmaz, 2006, p. 9), such as how the 
process of populist representative claim-making is achieved through symbolic 
action; 
 relate such action to specific democratic contexts, scenes and situations of 
action (Charmaz, 2006, p. 21); and  
 compare within and across cases and contexts, through grounded theory’s 





phenomena of ideology, performance and mediated representation in relation 
to populism. 
These principles lend rigour to the method, provide explicit guidelines for, and 
strategies of, how to proceed with a structured qualitative enquiry, move analysis 
beyond description onto questions of explanation, and ground theoretical 
formulations soundly in empirical data.  
3.5 BRIEF SUMMARY OF METHOD 
In this chapter I have outlined a research design and interpretive method for the 
analysis of populist communication across the media ecology. I adopt a comparative 
approach to explore the phenomenon of populist communication through two case 
studies. These are populist parties situated in different democratic contexts: UKIP, a 
right-wing party from an established liberal democracy (UK), and the Economic 
Freedom Fighters (EFF), a left-wing party from a transitional democracy (South Africa). 
The objects of study are disruptive performances by these parties in live, virtual and 
other mediated forms. I consider such performances emblematic manifestations of 
populist ideology as their essential function is to establish an antagonistic relationship 
between the elite and populist actors who embody the people; they seek to visibly 
overturn established norms and construct a ‘new normal’ (Kress, 2017). While 
democratic conditions and media systems and technologies provide a framework for 
comparison, my analytical concern is with how populists portray this reality and 
change it in the process of doing so. Using mixed methods with an interpretive focus, 
the case study approach paints a rich picture of the interaction that takes place 
between context and the constitution of meaning in populist communication. 
Step by step my method proceeded as follows:  
Starting out with a literature review of populism, I identified sensitising concepts and 
research questions. I collected qualitative and quantitative data simultaneously, using 
quantitative methods to zoom in on smaller samples for qualitative analysis. I collected 
three data sets: projected, mediated and received performances covering a total of six 
disruptive actions by the two parties. My data set on the projected performances – 





dictated the sampling period of all data. In a descriptive analysis of all data sources I 
reconstructed the events and identified key acts of signification and contestation over 
meaning between actors. To do so I mapped the data on timelines of key events and 
identified intersections and relations between different mediated performances and 
live events. The mapping resulted in a histogram of each set of projected, mediated 
and received performances and a time-series graph of their climaxes. These formed a 
basis for later qualitative analysis. 
I then undertook the main interpretive analysis of the projected performances, doing 
an initial fast and intuitive round of coding followed by a second cycle of focused 
coding. I developed codes inductively but with my sensitising concepts in mind. 
Throughout I reflected on the sensitising concepts and other emerging concepts and 
their role in the given social process in memos. During the coding process, I engaged in 
constant comparison between codes, between disruptive performances and between 
cases. I identified important instances of symbolic action and returned to the 
descriptive analysis and histograms to gauge audience response to these. Through a 
review of advanced memos, I identified any needs for further sampling, and repeated 
the whole process iteratively until new data did not result in further theoretical 
development. I then discarded, adopted and refined concepts through a process of 
theoretical memo-writing and interpretive analysis. 
In chapters five to ten I develop my key concepts of ideology, performance and 
mediation, which were also my sensitising concepts. Following each theoretical 
chapter I engage in an empirical analysis that focuses on the given concept and related 
research question. I first describe the six events that are the objects of study, based on 





4. PERFORMANCE EVENTS 
The objects of study of this research are a total of six performances by the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which I briefly 
describe in this short chapter. The climax of each performance is set in the parties’ 
respective institution as public representatives – the European Parliament and the 
Parliament of South Africa. The performances take place in the period 2014 – 2017. 
While the EFF’s performances are very elaborate and feature extended build-up 
phases, UKIP’s performances chiefly consist of the climactic moments within the 
European Parliament themselves. Given the brevity of UKIP’s performances, I have 
therefore selected four events for UKIP and two for the EFF. While each performance 
is self-contained, the two series of performances can also be seen as key moments in 
larger trajectories. UKIP’s performances lead up to the EU referendum and engage in 
its climax and denouement, while the EFF’s performances lead up to the resignation of 
Jacob Zuma as the President of South Africa in February 2018. 
4.1 THE ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS: THE STATE OF THE NATION 
ADDRESS, 12 FEBRUARY 2015    
On 12 February 2015 the EFF disrupt the president’s State of the Nation Address 
(SONA) for the first time, in what becomes an almost ritualised annual protest action. 
Their performance shines a light on the crisis of South Africa’s democratisation 
process. Up until this moment, the ANC government have increasingly been challenged 
by opposition parties and the public on its lack of responsiveness and Zuma on his 
personal lack of accountability and trustworthiness (Lekalake, 2015). Public service 
delivery protests have been wrecking the country for several years. President Zuma 
continues to be embroiled in the serious Nkandla corruption scandal in which he is 
accused of embezzling public funds for upgrades to his Nkandla home. And his 
response to critique is becoming increasingly authoritarian: police firing at, and killing, 
striking Marikana miners in 2012, expelling the opposition party the EFF from the 
National Assembly in August 2014 when they raise the question of corruption 
(Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2014) and, more recently, firing successive 





public broadcaster SABC’s protest coverage (Jones, 2017). In the dominant-party 
regime, performing the role of opposition has not become easier as the 
democratisation process has progressed. It is against this backdrop that the drama of 
the EFF’s disruption of the State of the Nation Address in 2015 unfolds, a state of 
affairs where the role of democratic opposition can, in their view, only be performed 
effectively through disruptive action. 
In the months leading up to the State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 12 February 
2015, the EFF continue to seek legitimate occasion to confront President Zuma about 
the Nkandla case but Zuma’s avoidance strategy does not give them the opportunity. 
The EFF then inform the Speaker of Parliament, Baleka Mbete, that they intend to 
question Zuma during his SONA if they are not given another opportunity before then. 
The EFF continue to warn of impending disruption to the SONA in statements, tweets 
and press releases in the weeks leading up to the event (EFF_press1; EFF_press4; 
News24, 2015b). On their side, the government mobilises extra security personnel 
(SABC, 2015; Steenhuisen, 2015). The EFF respond by representing themselves as 
fighters for democracy in the face of “threats of police brutality”, evoking the legacy of 
Nelson Mandela (EFF_press1). Ramping up expectations, they further warn the public 
to expect a “security threat” during SONA, where riot police will “manhandle” EFF MPs 
that raise a point of order into a “secret dungeon tunnel” (EFF_press8; EFF_tweet20). 
In a final play-off before the actual SONA event, the EFF announce that they will hold 
an “alternative SONA” on Robben Island, the location where Nelson Mandela and 
other freedom fighters were held prisoner during the Apartheid era (EFF_press9). 
However, they are forced to cancel the event when the Robben Island Museum 
unaccountably closes the island ferry for last-minute “essential repairs”. The EFF claim 






FIGURE 4.1: EFF leader Julius Malema builds up tension via Twitter in advance of the SONA 
(EFF_tweet32). Credit: @Julius_S_Malema, Twitter, 25 Jan 2015. 
On the day of the SONA, the EFF set expectations by pushing the hashtag 
#paybackthemoney on Twitter (EFF_tweet21). While police and armed military line up 
outside parliament, EFF MPs clad in their distinctive red overalls and plastic miners’ 
helmets dance up the red carpet to the National Assembly while chanting “pay back 
the money”.  
As the proceedings in Parliament begin (EFF_live1), it soon turns out that the 
government have planned for the EFF’s disruption in other ways than training security 
officers. Journalists realise that there is no cell phone signal in the chambers. The 
hashtag #bringbackthesignal starts to circulate on Twitter. Journalists within the 
chamber loudly demand the signal back, and eventually a signal jamming device is 
discovered in the chambers and dismantled. An hour later than planned, President 
Zuma takes to the podium to deliver his speech. 
Within a few lines of Zuma’s speech, the SONA is interrupted for the first time since 
the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994. EFF MP Godrich Gardee rises on a 
“point of order” with reference to parliamentary rules and asks, “When are you going 
to pay back the money?” (EFF_live1). The Speaker permits him to ask his question, 





events escalate. EFF MPs one by one rise “on a point of order”, requesting to speak. As 
the Speaker’s patience wears thin, she eventually orders them to leave the chamber. 
The EFF insist on their constitutional rights. Security personnel are called in and they 
are evicted by force. 
 
FIGURE 4.2: The Mail & Guardian’s coverage of the event the morning after the SONA (EFF_news1). 
Copyright David Harrison, Mail & Guardian, 13 February 2015. 
The ruckus in Parliament is audible in the background of the live broadcast footage 
aired by the public broadcaster SABC. However, the cameras remain squarely focused 
on the impassive Speaker as the government has ordered that EFF MPs not be shown. 
Soon, however, footage filmed on mobile telephones emerges via Twitter. In a press 
conference outside Parliament shortly after, Malema explains to the press that seven 






FIGURE 4.3: The EFF hold a press conference outside Parliament following their eviction. Credit: SA Daily 
News, YouTube, 12 February 2015. 
4.2 THE ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS: THE STATE OF THE NATION 
ADDRESS, 9 FEBRUARY 2017   
Since the 2015 SONA, the EFF have performed a very similar disruption of the 2016 
SONA. A Constitutional Court order has ruled, in a case filed by the EFF, that Zuma has 
breached the constitution by not repaying government money spent on his Nkandla 
home as dictated by the Public Protector. The weakened position of Zuma is reflected 
in the ANC’s performance in the municipal elections on 3 August 2016, where popular 
support for the ANC falls to its lowest level since independence in 1994 at 53.9 percent 
of the total vote and they lose the capital Pretoria (Electoral Commission South Africa, 
2016). Cut to February 2017. 
The EFF’s build-up phase to this event is much more limited than in 2015, but public 
expectations are clear. A few days before the event they issue a press release 
condemning Zuma’s deployment of 441 military personnel for the supposed 
maintenance of law and order during the SONA (EFF_press11), which Parliament has 
just announced (News24, 2017). The EFF describe this initiative as “the unleashing of 
the army on the people of South Africa”. They also accuse Zuma of “planning to 
murder those he disagrees with at the SONA” and introduce the label of 





compliance with the Constitutional Court Order, which becomes a refrain in their 
performance. 
 
FIGURE 4.4: EFF MPs dressed in red domestic workers’ uniforms and plastic miners’ helmets dance and 
sing liberation struggle songs on the red carpet leading up to Parliament (EFF_tweet22). Credit: 
@EFFSouthAfrica, Twitter, 8 Feb 2017. 
Shortly before the SONA is about to start, a remarkable conglomeration of 
performances take place in- and outside Parliament: MPs and VIPs arrive on the red 
carpet accompanied by the flash of the cameras, their political supporters ululate, and 
they give lengthy comments to enquiring journalists on their choice of glamourous 
dress (Bendile, 2017). EFF MPs, in contrast, arrive in their red overalls and “Fear fokol” 
(fear nothing) T-shirts (EFF_live3). Meanwhile rival protests erupt outside Parliament 
by ANC and EFF supporters who start fighting and are dispersed by police in riot gear 






FIGURE 4.5: EFF MPs dressed in red shouting “Tsotsi!” (thief) at Jacob Zuma as he takes to the podium 
(EFF_live2). Credit: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, YouTube, 9 February 2017. 
As Zuma enters the chamber, EFF MPs shout “Tsotsi! Tsotsi! Tsotsi!” (thief) and ANC 
MPs counter with shouts of “ANC, ANC, ANC”, all falling into tune with one another so 
the parties’ shouts rhythmically alternate (EFF_live2). The EFF repeat their 
performance of previous years of interrupting on points of order, starting by accusing 
the government of arming security personnel with “biological agents” and cable ties, 
which they hold up as proof. As Zuma attempts to start his speech, all political parties 
do their best to mimic – and appropriate – the EFF’s strategy of disrupting on points of 
order. This results in a cacophony of disruptions from the EFF and the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), as well as the ANC itself engaging in counter-disruptions, all of which end 
up effectively delaying Zuma’s speech for over an hour. EFF leader Julius Malema’s 
microphone continuously cuts out when he attempts to speak. Outside Parliament, 
riot police gather and prevent journalists from going to the National Assembly exit 
point (EFF_mediatweet1) where EFF MPs will soon be thrown out. The EFF are 






FIGURE 4.6: White-shirted security personnel forcibly evict EFF MPs from Parliament (EFF_live2). Credit: 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, YouTube, 9 February 2017. 
Someone throws pepper spray, or possibly tear gas, from the public gallery. When DA 
MPs stand to question the unconstitutional presence of riot police and soldiers in 
Parliament, they are foully abused by ANC MPs shouting “Fuck you, racist” and other 
insults. The DA then also walk out, followed by other opposition parties. Zuma delivers 
his speech to a half-empty chamber of ANC MPs. Upon their exodus from the chamber, 
opposition leaders Julius Malema (EFF) and Mmusi Maimane (DA) in turn speak to the 
press outside Parliament. Meanwhile EFF MPs tend to their injured under the lights of 
the flashing cameras, while stun grenades can be heard in the background (Whittles, 
2017). 
4.3 THE UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY: OPENING CEREMONY OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 1 JULY 2014 
UKIP have just won the European Parliamentary elections in the UK and now have an 
unprecedented 24 MEPs (up from 13 in the previous election for the European 
Parliament). They announce their strong presence in the European Parliament (EP) 
with a symbolic statement on its opening day on 1 July. They do not communicate 





raising of the EU flag by military personnel takes place. UKIP create a video, which they 
post on YouTube (UKIP_vid1), in which they condemn the ceremony.  
 
FIGURE 4.7: Screenshots from UKIP’s promotional video about the EP flag raising ceremony (UKIP_vid1). 
Credit: UKIP MEPs, YouTube, 30 June 2014. 
The next day they stage a “March for Freedom” (UKIP_press4; UKIP_press7), which 
they publicise in press releases showing a picture of the group of UKIP MEPs with 
Farage in the centre walking across the square towards the EP. This goes unnoticed by 
the media. During the EP opening ceremony, an orchestra plays Beethoven’s Ode to 
Joy, the unofficial anthem of the EU. MEPs in the chamber stand up. Nigel Farage and 






FIGURE 4.8: Farage writes his weekly column in the Daily Express on UKIP’s protest during the EP 
opening ceremony (UKIP_col1). Copyright: Express Newspapers, 4 July, 2014. 
Before the debate starts, Martin Schultz is elected as EP President, which Farage 
describes as a “stitch-up” in his speech to the chamber the next day (UKIP_live3). Both 
he and UKIP Deputy Leader (and short-lived Leader) Paul Nuttall condemn the EP for 
its lack of democratic representation which is not discharged by the “naked militarism” 
of the flag raising ceremony and anthem. Farage brings up the promised UK 
referendum on leaving the EU as the only “progressive” and democratic solution. 
UKIP’s silent protest receives extensive newspaper coverage but in very negative terms 
(UKIP_news1; UKIP_news2; UKIP_news3), while their claim about the “stitch-up” of 
Schultz’ election to President of the European Parliament is supported by the media 
(UKIP_news2; UKIP_news4). 
4.4 THE UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY: FARAGE’S POST-REFERENDUM 
‘VICTORY SPEECH’ IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 28 JUNE 2016 
As the vote counts come in on the eve of referendum night, 23 June 2016, a downbeat 
Farage addresses the press in a short speech, seemingly recognising defeat with the 
words “I’m not conceding, but…” (Bloom and Williams, 2016). Within hours, however, 
events take an unexpected turn. It becomes evident that the British public have voted 





campaign party and the press. This time his performance is rather more jubilant and 
upbeat as he triumphantly announces the UK’s “independence day” to a cheering 
audience (rtrumble, 2016) in tones that are more evocative of the Tom Cruise film than 
the historical event in the US. He picks up on this trope again in his first speech in an 
institutional setting. This takes place in the European Parliament during an emergency 
plenary on 28 June 2016 (UKIP_live1), called to discuss the controversial results of the 
UK referendum. Farage takes to the limelight, knowing that, for once, his EP 
performance will reach a domestic audience that includes not only the British media 
but also his constituents. 
 
FIGURE 4.9: The Daily Mail pictures Juncker’s meeting with Farage in their coverage of the event 
(UKIP_news5). Copyright: AFP/Getty Images. 
As MEPs arrive for the session, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European 
Commission, sarcastically air kisses Farage in European fashion to congratulate him on 
the referendum results. The plenary session begins and Juncker immediately raises a 
laugh from the audience at Farage’s expense as he addresses Farage directly in his 





each of the groups in the EP speak in turn. Finally, it is the moment everyone has been 
waiting for: it is Farage’s turn to speak. With his faithful Union Jack stuck with a rubber 
sucker to his desk, Farage starts his speech and is instantly greeted by heckling and 
jeering from the chamber. “You’re not laughing now, are you?” he retorts. He clearly 
delights in his own ability to provoke the live audience of MEPs and effect their vocal 
and gestural reaction throughout his speech. Chair Martin Schultz is forced to interrupt 
proceedings several times in attempts to calm the audience and to admonish Farage 
for accusing the MEPs in the chamber of never having done “a proper job in your 
lives”. Farage fully observes official protocol, if not norms, during these interruptions, a 
bemused smile playing on his lips as Schultz admonishes the chamber not to behave 
“like UKIP”. These provocations by Farage, alongside Juncker’s teasing, are the subjects 
of the next morning’s headlines (UKIP_news5; UKIP_news6; UKIP_news7; UKIP_news8; 
UKIP_news9; UKIP_news10; UKIP_news11) and of the relatively limited Twitter debate 
that engages with the live event. Farage leaves the chamber shortly after his own 
speech is finished to do an interview with Sky News, which he then tweets with the 
comment “they were pleased to see me as you can tell” (UKIP_tweet6). This soon 
becomes the most retweeted tweet in relation to the event. 
4.5 THE UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY: FARAGE’S SPEECH IN THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON TRUMP’S TRAVEL BAN, 1 FEBRUARY 
2017 
Since Donald Trump’s election as President of the US, Farage has become known as 
the link between the UK and the newly instated US President, having made several 
visits to Trump Tower and appeared at one of Trump’s campaign rallies. Trump 
imposes a travel ban on entry into the US for nationals from seven countries known for 
links to terrorism. This sparks a major international reaction, and the EP discuss the 
ban in a plenary session on 1 February 2017. Farage engages extensively with the topic 
of Trump’s travel ban in the days leading up to the plenary. He is frequently invited to 
appear in the media as the most prominent voice supporting Trump, while most of the 





During the debate in the EP (UKIP_live4), Farage is repeatedly met by catcalls from his 
fellow MEPs and responds in several speeches by indignantly criticising the house for a 
lack of democracy and open-mindedness. In his main speech, he contrasts the lack of 
representative democracy in the EP with Trump’s “genuine democracy”. Less than a 
minute into Farage’s main speech, President of the EP Antonio Tajani interrupts to 
admonish him, asking him to show “institutional respect to the Commission”. Farage 
confronts him head on, pointing his finger at the President, replying that he will show 
“institutional respect to the truth”.  
As the camera within the chamber pans back to Farage, its angle is widened to show 
UK Labour MEP Seb Dance sitting immediately behind Farage, holding a handwritten 
sign saying “He’s lying to you” with an arrow pointing to Farage. As Farage continues 
his speech, an official walks over to Seb Dance holding the sign and they have a 
whispered conversation. Seb Dance keeps up his sign during most of Farage’s speech, 
during which Farage suggests that the EP invite Trump to visit. Although Farage is 
interviewed on Fox News that evening about his views on Trump (which he later 
tweets, (UKIP_tweet7)), both the discussion on Twitter and coverage of the event in 
British legacy media entirely focus on Dance’s sign, which dominates all headlines and 







FIGURE 4.10: The Guardian’s front page (UKIP_news16) the morning after the event features as its main 
image Seb Dance’s sign behind Farage and a column by Seb Dance inside the paper. Copyright Guardian 
Newspapers, 2 February 2017. 
4.6 THE UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY: FARAGE’S SPEECH IN THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON THE TRIGGERING OF ARTICLE 50, 5 
APRIL 2017 
On 29 March 2017 Theresa May triggers Article 50, starting the two-year time limit for 
negotiations for the UK to leave the EU. This move also triggers a plenary in the EP in 
which the negotiation and withdrawal process between the UK and the EU is discussed 
and voted on. In the days that follow, Farage invokes the national symbol of the British 
passport in his comments on the historical event, both on Twitter and in his LBC radio 
show (UKIP_tweet8; UKIP_radio1). In the same media, he sets the scene for a dramatic 





and the EFDD Group22 motion for resolutions relating to Gibraltar and immigration to 
be tabled and voted on in the plenary (UKIP_press8; UKIP_tweet9). 
 
FIGURE 4.11: Farage glances at the camera as he starts to speak in the EP before he turns back to 
address the Chair and his fellow MEPs (UKIP_live2). Credit: European Parliament, 5 April 2017. 
Farage speaks in the EP early in the morning (UKIP_live2). As he is about to start his 
talk, he briefly glances at the camera that broadcasts his speech to the wider audience. 
In his speech he establishes the democratic nature of the UK’s decision to leave the 
EU, in contrast to the practices of the EU and EP, which he calls “unreasonable” and 
“impossible” with the aim of destroying nation state democracy. His speech has a 
moral overtone and calls for sensible and adult behaviour from the EP. Farage is 
interrupted by the EP President after a few minutes and admonished for comparing his 
fellow MEPs to “the mafia”. As he resumes, Farage sarcastically corrects himself on the 
grounds of having been culturally insensitive to the Italian EP President and changes it 
to “gangsters”. Cheers and jeers ensue. Farage goes on to argue for tariff-free trade 
and warns his MEP colleagues of more countries wanting to leave if they continue to 
put the interests of the EU above that of their citizens by refusing the UK the trade 
deal they want.  
Paul Nuttall speaks in the plenary debate a little later about the role of Gibraltar in the 
negotiations for the UK to leave the EU and suggests that Gibraltar should be given 
                                                     
22
 EFDD – Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy – is the political group in the European Parliament 





MPs in the British Parliament. This topic also dominates a column by Farage in the 
Daily Telegraph (UKIP_col2) the same morning, and Farage describes it as a red line in 
a second comment to the EP. He then accuses Donald Tusk, President of the European 
Council, of not acting in good neighbourliness in relation to Gibraltar and complains 
about the 52 billion pounds settlement payment demanded by a resolution tabled by 
Guy Verhofstadt, Leader of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, as 
unreasonable. Voting then takes place in the EP on Verhofstadt’s resolution, UKIP’s 
amendments and various other motions relating to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 
Verhofstadt’s resolution is adopted and UKIP’s amendments dismissed. UKIP later 
complain that British Labour MEPs betrayed the country by voting against UKIP’s 





5. THE MEANING OF THE POPULIST REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM: 
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO POPULISM AS AN IDEOLOGY  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As ideologies go, populism is not particularly coherent or specific. As I noted in chapter 
two, this has raised some objections in the literature to the classification. Yet, despite 
its thinness, it is an ideology that communicates well as the meaning it constructs is 
approachable and consistent with popular myths about democracy and the nature of 
representation. These characteristics lie partly in the performance of populist ideology, 
which I explore in chapters seven and eight. But they are also inherent in the very 
meaning and structure of populist ideology itself. In this chapter I develop a conceptual 
approach that can form a basis for empirical analysis to answer the question, how is 
populist ideology constructed through communicative processes? I build on the 
introduction and chapter two, where I defined populism as an ideology consisting of 
the concepts of sovereignty, the people, the elite and the populist and noted its 
relational nature that establishes the strong connection between the populist 
representative and the people that populism is so famous for. This relationship is 
established through communicative processes. To address the above question, I 
therefore concern myself with the ways in which ideologies become observable 
through discourses and performances and the mutually constitutive and integral 
nature of this process. This is a matter of the relationship between form and content in 
the formation of meaning that I engaged with in chapter two. In other words, the 
meaning of populist ideology is shaped by its process of communication; the semantics 
of its constituent concepts are shaped by the pragmatics of their performance. I 
gradually elaborate on this theme in this and the following chapters as it relates to 
both ideology and performance theory where these are inextricably intertwined. As far 
as it is possible to analytically separate them, for now I concentrate on the former. 
In order to develop a perspective on populist communication that encompasses the 
concept of populist ideology, its manifestation in political performance and the ways in 
which this manifestation contributes to meaning-making, I adjust the populism 





populism canon’s structural focus to the communicative properties of ideology 
explicates this process of meaning-making, while it also resolves the charges that are 
raised in the literature against the classification of populism as ideology. To develop 
this perspective, I explore relevant ideology theory: structural approaches that aim to 
understand the conceptual content of ideologies and their architecture, and process-
oriented approaches that are concerned with what causes such beliefs to be the ones 
subscribed to and what effects they have on the social world (Humphrey, 2005, pp. 
242–3; Maynard, 2013, p. 301). I first engage with the well-established notion of 
populism as a thin ideology and the factors of host ideology and context in the 
formation of its concepts. I then consider the cause and strength of this thinness in the 
bottom-up character of populist ideology as formed according to popular conceptions 
of politics and democracy rather than intricate elite systems of belief. I move on to 
consider the constitutive nature of populist claims, alongside their constituted 
character. This in turn leads to a discussion of the epistemological foundations of the 
representative claim that populism offers. The chapter ends with a discussion of the 
nature of the ideological cleavage that populism constructs in the political spectrum. 
5.2 THE STRUCTURE OF POPULIST IDEOLOGY 
In ideology theory, we can draw a distinction between structural and process-oriented 
approaches, although many variants exist within these (indeed, Eagleton lists 16 
alternative definitions (1991, pp. 1–2)). Structural approaches focus on a number of 
neutral, descriptive aspects of political ideologies. They consider, for instance, the 
internal structure of ideologies as systems of beliefs, such as which core and peripheral 
political values constitute a given ideology (Freeden, 1998a). Other structural 
approaches focus on the relations between ideologies, such as the left-right dimension 
(Bobbio, 1996). And others again are concerned with the hierarchical ordering of levels 
of abstraction of political thought, from abstract logical and coherent belief systems, 
through issues, policy and concrete political action, to the personal qualities of 
candidates (Converse, 1964a). In other words, such structural approaches are chiefly 
concerned with describing and mapping systems of belief. In the populism literature, 





morphology approach to the internal structure of ideology, including Wirth et al.’s 
(2016) definition adapted and applied in chapter two. 
Freeden’s approach forms a starting point for understanding how the ideational 
structure of populism relates to meaning-formation. However, it chiefly addresses the 
non-communicative aspects of the relationship between content and form. That is, it 
considers how mental representations adapt their meaning to other concepts 
contained within the architecture of an ideology but not how this meaning is 
constructed and changed through communicative processes. This in turn creates a 
rather rigid insistence on coherence that is rarely found in empirical expressions of 
ideologies. In the following sections I therefore also explore more process-oriented 
approaches to ideology to address the communication-related aspect of meaning 
formation. Such approaches are more preoccupied with the exercise and attainment of 
power, how an ideology emerges, and how it is performed and reinforced through 
representations by particular social groups and institutions. These approaches thus 
engage more with communicative processes. First, however, I consider a useful aspect 
of Freeden’s approach, namely the way in which it conceives of “ideology [as] located 
at the meeting point between meaning and form” (1998a, p. 54). By ‘form’ Freeden 
here refers to the internal structural configuration of political concepts in a given 
ideology, which he describes as “a communicable and action‐inspiring pattern” (ibid.). I 
argue that, in populism’s bid for communicability, it places ‘the people’ and their 
sovereignty at its structural core. This has consequences for the assignation of 
meaning to populism’s other core and peripheral concepts, which in turn inform the 
construction of populism’s ideological narrative. 
5.2.1 POPULISM’S THINNESS 
As I have already briefly noted in chapter two, Freeden’s conceptual morphology is 
concerned with mapping the internal composition of ideologies as constituted of a 
range of core and peripheral political concepts. This approach helps us identify the 
conceptual structure and content of populism. Thin ideologies such as populism have a 
restricted morphology consisting of relatively few core political concepts. They lack 
some of the concepts usually present in most ‘thick’ ideologies, such as liberty and 





‘host’ ideology to achieve fullness and be able to compete against other ideologies. 
They are also less coherent in the way that they bind together the concepts that do 
constitute them. In Converse’s classical treatise on voters’ perceptions of ideological 
differentiation, he makes a similar distinction between narrow-range and mainstream 
ideologies. The latter consist of a wide range of objects of belief (1964b, p. 4) that are 
built on “vast treasuries of well organized information among elites” (ibid., p. 10). In 
other words, thick ideologies are systematically constructed by elites; thin ideologies 
are not necessarily so. This is an important point that relates to the formation of 
meaning within populist ideology and that I return to shortly.  
According to Freeden (1998a), an ideology’s core concepts are “decontested” (given 
definite meaning in a given socio-political environment) through their association with 
each other in a particular ideological composition, with competing ideologies, and with 
specific social contexts. That is, meaning is situationally constructed. In the case of thin 
ideologies, their relatively few core concepts form different interpretive paths 
depending on the social context and the thick ideology that a thin ideology may attach 
itself to in parasitical fashion (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 498). The core 
concepts of populism are thus also decontested in relation to each other and to a 
potential host ideology; meaning is constructed in response to factors both internal 
and external to an ideology. Further, Freeden explains decontestation in relation to 
external social context through his notion of “cultural adjacency”: the “specific internal 
formation [of concepts in an ideology] is shaped by what is here referred to as culture: 
temporally and spatially bounded social practices, institutional patterns, ethical 
systems, technologies, influential theories, discourses, and beliefs” (Freeden, 1998a, 
pp. 69–70). The structural formation of core and peripheral concepts and their 
culturally contingent decontestation thus co-contribute to meaning-formation. In the 
context of populism, this approach becomes useful when considering the question of 
how institutional context and political culture shape the meaning of core populist 
concepts. It therefore lends itself to comparative study. 
Coherence of an ideology’s internal structure and various interpretive paths may 
indeed enhance its communicability as discussed above. Yet when we consider the 





mental representation, via language, institutional and technological mediation, to 
reception and interpretation – the link between meaning and form as explicated by 
Freeden needs to be developed further in relation to the communication of ideology. 
In particular, I suggest taking into consideration the perhaps more tangible yet much 
more complex communicated, rather than communicable, form of ideology. In a 
communication perspective, then, I integrate structural approaches and their focus on 
the architecture of ideas with theory that can explain the processes of meaning 
formation that are inherent to communication itself: the processes of anchoring ideas 
in discourse and of their mediation. In doing so, I find that it is not only the coherence 
of thick, mainstream ideologies that is “communicable and action-inspiring”, as 
Freeden suggests. Thin ideologies like populism find vehicles other than coherence to 
achieve these ends. 
Before I return to this point in the following section, it is worth bringing up a concern 
recently raised by Freeden himself (2016). He questions whether the very thinness of 
populism – its lack of position on so many core political questions – disqualifies it as a 
thin ideology (see also Aslanidis, 2016, pp. 90–1 for a strong argument on this point). 
Further, not only does populism lack comprehensiveness; it also lacks specificity in 
what it does cover. On the other hand, Freeden deliberates, populism does tick a lot of 
other boxes that would mark it as a successful ideology on its own terms: it can easily 
be consumed by its intended audiences and make an impact, it displays imagination 
and creativity in the attractive ordering of its ideas, and so on. Note that these 
ideological qualities of populism that Freeden enumerates are all process-oriented: 
they relate to populism’s ability to communicate. Freeden concludes that, in structural 
terms, populism may be a new and unfamiliar genre of ideology that is “amorphous, 
sporadic and truncated” (2016). He also notes, however, that approaches to ideology 
that regard its function as one of dissimulation and mythologising may better describe 
populism – that is, approaches that focus on process-oriented aspects of ideology, on 
how it is constructed and communicated. As I argue below, the integration of such 





5.2.2 POPULISM AS A MASS IDEOLOGY 
As we have just seen, populism’s thinness explains part of its malleability but is also 
considered conceptually problematic by some critics. I now progress through an 
argument that seeks to integrate Freeden’s structural perspective on ideology with 
processual elements. I find that the answer to the issue of excessive thinness lies in 
populism’s communicability. I start by considering Converse’s distinction between 
ideology as constructed and espoused by elites and as understood by mass publics. 
The first part of his famous dictum “what goes with what and why” (1964b, p. 9, my 
emphasis) accounts for the coherence of mainstream ideologies. His survey-based 
study demonstrates that, in the case of thick (wide-range, in Converse’s terms), 
coherent mainstream ideologies, only fragments of such belief systems trickle down to 
mass publics whose perception of the belief system is much less coherent and 
extensive (Converse, 1964b, pp. 11–12). This discrepancy between projection and 
reception highlights the need to account for both elite construction and public 
reception and interpretation in the communication of ideology. From the perspective 
of mass publics, then, the lack of coherence and specificity and the narrower range of 
objects present in populist ideology are not necessarily perceived as such compared to 
their perceptions of mainstream ideologies. In fact, Converse found lower levels of 
ideological differentiation and perceived coherence in lower socioeconomic groups of 
voters; and studies on populism indicate that these lower educated and less politically 
efficacious groups are exactly the ones that constitute the populist voter base (Bos et 
al., 2013; Reinemann et al., 2016b, p. 383). This demographic is less likely to 
distinguish between differing levels of coherence and specificity in thin and 
mainstream ideologies.  
In order to account for populism’s grip on its subjects, the lack of structural coherence 
and fullness in the case of populism’s core and peripheral concepts must, by necessity, 
be resolved through process. The communicative construction of populist ideology 
lends it coherence in the eyes of mass publics (to adopt Converse’s terminology). In 
contrast, mainstream (elite) ideologies’ reliance on economies of communication – for 
instance, the extensive but relatively coherent set of values associated with the word 





then how such communicative construction works – how does populist communication 
lend perceived coherence to its thin ideology and grip its supporters? 
The latter part of Converse’s dictum – “what goes with what and why” – is in this 
respect populism’s core strength. Converse argues that the ‘why’ is more difficult to 
communicate to the public, given its complexity. Mainstream ideologies therefore 
rarely manage to get across this message to non-elite voters. Instead, “visible social 
groupings come to play [the role of]... objects of high centrality in the belief systems of 
the less well informed” (Converse, 1964b, p. 38). Populists capitalise on this feature of 
low ideological comprehension and perception by mass publics by explicitly placing 
such visible social groupings at the structural centre of their belief system in the form 
of an antagonistic relationship between elite and people. They project what will be 
received. Using visible social groups as scapegoats through strategies of blame 
attribution (Hameleers et al., 2017), populists then construct the ‘why’ of their 
ideology bottom-up, that is, based on mass publics’ perceptions of central objects of 
beliefs. ‘The people’ – and their inverse definition in relation to ‘the elite’ – are 
constructed as the reason behind the populist belief system.  
In this sense, populist ideology’s conceptual structure – its thin conceptual morphology 
and its relation to other ideologies in the traditional spectrum – is moulded on 
communicative effectiveness. Its starting point is not that of an elite ideology with a 
complex set of constraints that are difficult, if not impossible, to communicate 
coherently to a lay public and therefore serves to dislodge elite conceptions of society 
from those of citizens. Instead populism starts from the premise of the mass public. 
Populists identify situationally relevant visible social groupings and build their (quasi-
)logic (Converse, 1964b, p. 7) from this foundation. This notion of populism as a mass 
ideology may explain the frequent popular use of the term populist in the sense of 
popular or crowd-pleasing, but it also explains its more substantive content and its 
appeal. Further, it demonstrates Block and Negrine’s observation that “the populist 
communication style is much more than a mere top-down appeal because… it 
embodies more complex identity affiliations and emotional interplay between populist 
actors and their publics” (2017, p. 182). This bottom-up approach to ideological 





also enables it to communicate the ‘why’ of its ideology, which in turn gives it 
communicative power.  
Converse argues,  
A realistic picture of political belief systems in the mass public, then, is 
not one that omits issues and policy demands completely nor one that 
presumes widespread ideological coherence; it is rather one that 
captures with some fidelity the fragmentation, narrowness, and 
diversity of these demands. (1964b, p. 54).  
This description of received ideology corresponds closely to Freeden’s (2016) above-
mentioned analysis of populist forms of ideology as “amorphous, sporadic and 
truncated”: unlike mainstream ideologies, mass publics’ perceptions of ideology are 
captured in populism’s actual structure. In other words, populism can be classified as a 
bottom-up mass belief system rather than an elite belief system. This explains its 
structural thinness and lack of coherence. Indeed, a mass ideology is exactly what 
populism claims to be: its representative claim corresponds to its structure. 
5.3 THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF POPULIST IDEOLOGY 
Let us explore this populist representative claim in a little more detail. I have argued 
that Freeden and Converse’s perspectives both see ideology as socially constructed. In 
chapter two, I started to outline an approach that acknowledged both the socially 
constructed and the constitutive nature of communication in the process of political 
representation. This approach invites the analysis of how populism attains and 
practices the power to represent its ideology as common sense. This is a process of 
decontestation that is carried out by political actors. However, on the basis of Freeden 
and Converse’s approaches, we are as yet unable to account for the constitutive 
nature of populist ideology and the ways in which the assignation of meaning is 
affected by discursive form. To address this aspect of ideology, I turn to discourse-
oriented ideology theory that better lends itself to the analysis of political actors’ 
attempts at meaning construction geared towards the media’s role in circulating, 





Van Dijk’s (2016) discourse-oriented theory of ideology, for example, describes 
ideologies as mental representations shared by social collectivities (ibid., p. 1). To 
return to Hall ([1997]2013, pp. 3–4) and the conceptual framework outlined in chapter 
two, this process is one of representation. Mental concepts help us interpret material 
reality in a meaningful way as they form part of a system of representation. These 
mental concepts are in turn represented through language. The representative work of 
ideologies that political actors undertake as they empirically manifest concepts in the 
world through signs and symbols is both political and communicative. This is because 
“ideologies are formed and reproduced [through] …social practices such as discourse 
and communication” (Van Dijk, 2016, p. 5). This is useful to explain populism’s 
ideological mechanisms of constructing meaning and representing it as ‘truth’. It 
enables me to query the process of representative claim-making, which mediates the 
mental representations of ideology through performance. 
5.3.1 THE CONSTITUTIVE FUNCTION OF POPULIST IDEOLOGY 
The above argument that populism can be conceived as a mass ideology suggests that 
it is grounded in people’s lived experiences and social practices. These are indeed 
inherent aspects of the mutually constitutive relationship between ideological content 
and their communicated form. The dual function of discourse in the construction of 
identity follows immediately from this: the performative qualities of ideology are both 
based on and bring into being such social practices and identities. Ideology is 
“concerned less with the situation ‘as it is’ than with the production of certain useful 
effects for political purposes” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 29). In Austin’s terms, ideological 
discourse belongs to the class of speech acts – performatives – “that get something 
done… rather than to the discourse of description” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 19). The 
mechanisms of such performative identity construction work, for example, by 
incarnating a particular and specific political measure into something with a different 
and more generalised meaning that constructs the identity of the community as a 
coherent whole (Laclau, 1997, p. 303). For instance, a populist party’s representative 
claim may portray a particular immigration policy as a means of emancipation from 
elite domination and achieving sovereignty for the silent majority. In the process of 
making this claim, it constructs ‘the people’ as a whole and legitimate entity through a 





ideology whenever a particular content shows itself as more than itself… what an 
ideological distortion projects on a particular object is the impossible fullness of the 
community” (ibid.). 
The process described by Laclau is closely related to the discussion above of populism 
being constructed as a mass ideology. For the bottom-up construction of populist 
ideology occurs on the basis of ‘the people’ being defined in negative terms through 
blame attribution against visible social groupings. Yet the constitution of a social 
identity through the invocation of ‘the people’ as an empty signifier is the inverse 
process of that denoted by the notion of mass ideology. It forms the constitutive, 
rather than the constituted, side of the dual function of discourse in identity 
construction. I noted above that some structural approaches to ideology argue that 
populism’s lack of specificity disqualifies it as an ideology. However, this mechanism of 
replacing the specific with an ambiguous and generalised social identity is exactly what 
constitutes ideological meaning-making in processual terms. In populism, specificity 
and particularity are replaced by the evocation of ‘the people’ as an empty 
construction. This process of communication therefore explains the lack of specificity 
in populism’s thinness. Moreover, the mechanism of making a particular measure 
equivalent with the community as a coherent whole is essentially a performative 
process. It demonstrates how inherent performative devices are to the ideological 
process of meaning-making. I explore this aspect of representation further in chapters 
seven and eight.  
Along with its constitutive function, discourse provides the rationale for an ideology. 
Access to this function of discourse, argues Van Dijk (2016, pp. 9–10), is usually 
reserved for elites in politics, education and the media who provide more abstract 
legitimation for, and coherence of, an ideology. As argued above, however, populism 
as a mass ideology grounds its rationale – the ‘why’ of populism – in visible social 
groupings that are easily identifiable by mass publics (Converse, 1964b, p. 38). Instead 
of developing attitudes into a more abstract and coherent system, this type of 
grounding serves to reinforce a polarised Us-Them identity construction between the 
people and the elite that takes lived experience as its starting point, or at least claims 





their red domestic workers’ uniforms in parliament (see, for example, Figures 4.4 and 
4.5), and Farage is frequently pictured with a pint of bitter in the pub. Both parties’ 
populism is also made more communicable by their horizontal forms of polarisation 
that, like their anti-elitism, are based on visible social groupings, such as the EFF’s 
exclusion of whites and UKIP’s demonisation of immigrants. Such polarisation is in turn 
reinforced by culturally specific decontestation (Freeden, 1998a) as populists make use 
of socially shared myths and symbols in their construction of who ‘the people’ are (and 
are not).  
Populists legitimise their ideology as an ‘ideology of the people’ in their representative 
claim, and, I argued above, justly so. They can therefore justify their claims by 
reference to ‘common sense’. I have already explored the first part of this claim of 
being an ideology of the people, which is based on the epistemological position of 
knowledge as socially constructed. I now turn to its justification – the common sense 
of populist ideology. Populists’ self-representation as the source of common sense, 
however, implies their occupation of the territory of objective truth. I find that this is 
inherently contradictory with the notion of an ideology of the people as it sees 
knowledge not as socially constructed but insists on the existence of objective truth. 
Yet, as I have also suggested, epistemological contradictions in the construction of 
populist ideology are in fact not a problem for populism, as such inconsistencies are 
not discerned by its constituents. 
5.3.2 POPULIST IDEOLOGY’S CLAIM TO OBJECTIVE TRUTH 
Populism’s representation of its ideology as common sense rests on a claim to 
epistemological privilege, which it shares with false consciousness approaches to 
ideology. It is a claim that is ideologically constituted in and of itself. In other words, 
what I now turn to is populism’s claim about ideology, while I have already explored 
how such claims are ideologically and communicatively constructed. I attempt to take 
populists’ claims about politics and ideology at face value and then to query their 
epistemological foundation. To do so I engage with more critical approaches to the 
concept of ideology and in the course of this also further clarify my own position. To 
reiterate, the conception of ideology that I have developed here does not see ideology 





The neutral but analytically useful approach to ideology that I developed above is an 
inclusive one in that it conceives of ideologies as plural and competing phenomena. 
Many critical approaches, in contrast, tend to be restrictive as they hone in on what 
they consider to be particularly problematic social phenomena (Humphrey, 2005, p. 
231). To Thompson (1984, p. 4), for example, studying ideology “…is to study the ways 
in which meaning (or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination”. 
Thompson here restricts his definition of ideology to dominant phenomena. By 
implication, he also conceives of ideology in the singular. Thompson’s and similar 
Marxism-inspired approaches are geared towards answering questions on the media’s 
role in constructing consent to structural inequalities through processes of 
naturalisation (Downey et al., 2014; Hall, 2001). While such perspectives address 
related questions to a communication approach to populism – questions of the 
mechanisms of ideological power – their restriction to dominant forms of political 
power as objects of analysis is not broadly applicable to populism and I therefore do 
not adopt them here. 
Populism’s own view of ideology is different, however. Populism positions itself in an 
antagonistic relationship to the elite as one homogenous and dominant force; 
populism has no need for pluralist differentiation. Its people-centrism and anti-elitism 
are vehicles of a narrative that sets out the populist project as in fact seeking to undo 
“relations of domination”, as per Thompson’s account of ideology. In this sense, 
populists themselves present a pejorative, critical conception of ideology in their 
representative claim to describe the supposed domination of the elite (and, as part of 
it, the media) and how it seeks to control the people. Their claim is concerned with the 
elite’s obfuscation of social reality (Eagleton, 1991, pp. 5–6). In proponing this claim, 
however, they also assume that there is such a thing as ‘objective reality’ for the elite 
to obfuscate; they conceive of ideology as standing in opposition to ‘truth’. Further, 
they assume that the critic (in this case the populist) is able to occupy this objective 
ground in the analysis that they present to the people. In their ideological 
representation of the dominant elite’s quest to control the people, populists are then 
employing a false consciousness approach to ideology that implies the existence of 
objective truth. Moreover, they claim to occupy this epistemologically privileged 





claim that such truth equates to common sense, which resides in the people. When we 
consider the populist claim to truth as an ideological representation in and of itself, it 
becomes a means of lending a fictitious coherence to populist identity and to ‘the 
people’.  
Yet, as I (unlike populists) have adopted a non-pejorative attitude to ideology, I do not 
necessarily assume an intention to mislead on behalf of populists and must consider 
ideology a necessary and ubiquitous phenomenon: without ideology’s “fictitious fixing 
of meaning there would not be meaning at all” (Laclau, 1997, p. 302). I thus retain a 
critical stance that questions the mechanisms of meaning-formation within populist 
ideology whilst avoiding a claim to objective truth and accepting my own analysis as 
intra-ideological. Such an approach is consistent with a view of discourse as both 
constitutive of, and conditioned by, society. It recognises its role as an intervention 
aimed at liberating people from beliefs considered harmful to themselves, presenting 
alternatives rather than truth (Humphrey, 2005, p. 235). Conceiving of ideology as 
necessary and unavoidable (Laclau, 1997, p. 300) rather than as simply bad, I then 
retain an analytical focus on the “production of certain useful effects for political 
purposes” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 29) and on Hall’s and Van Dijk’s representational means 
of doing so (Hall, [1997]2013, pp. 3–4; Van Dijk, 2016, p. 1). 
This position follows Laclau in his reformulation of the notion of ‘distortion’ in a non-
pejorative way. Distortion, he argues, works by constituting a new meaning, which is 
then represented as ‘truth’ (Laclau, 1997, p. 301). This constitutive function of ideology 
is part of ‘the work of representation’ (Hall, [1997]2013). The process of 
representation concerns itself with the communicated form of ideology, where 
Freeden’s (1998a) notion of the decontestation of the political concepts that 
constitute an ideology concerns their communicable form. Yet in the service of 
ideology this work of representation is not restricted to constructing definitions of 
abstract political concepts; it is specifically aimed at constructing social identities: 
“ideologies typically represent who we are, what we do, why we do it, how we (should 
or should not) do it, and what we do it for, that is, our social identity, actions, goals, 
norms and values, resources, and interests” (Van Dijk, 2016, p. 2). In other words, 





specifically populist notion of its constituents as suppressed by the ideology of a 
dominant elite. As a discursive construction, ideology is then concerned with “conflicts 
within the field of signification” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 11) of social identities. 
5.4 DISCUSSION: THE POPULIST CLEAVAGE 
I now take a step back and return to Converse’s distinction between public perceptions 
of ideological differentiation and elite constructions of complex belief systems and to 
the notion of populism as a mass ideology based on the former. From this perspective, 
the current success of populism around the world is a sign that the gap between 
mainstream elite ideologies and the public’s understanding of them is broadening. As 
politics in turn responds to this gap, Stavrakakis (2014, p. 505) even suggests that the 
traditional liberal-conservative cleavage that Converse’s study is based on is being 
replaced by a populism-antipopulism cleavage as the most dominant one in politics 
today23. Based on his study of Peronism, Ostiguy (2009) also identifies a corresponding 
low-high cleavage in politics that cuts across the left-right spectrum while Norris and 
Inglehart (2018) conceptualise a populist–pluralist cleavage. In describing the low–high 
cleavage, Ostiguy mixes together stylistic elements – “ways of being and acting in 
politics” (2009, p. 5) – with ideological elements – attitudes to democracy and to the 
people’s participation in politics. Norris and Inglehart similarly define populism as a 
style but oppose it to the ideological notion of pluralism in their cleavage. Although 
such stylistic and ideological elements are indeed intertwined in political reality, 
retaining a conceptual distinction has analytical advantages, as I have already noted in 
chapter two. 
I therefore adopt Ostiguy’s quadrant model of a populism-antipopulism cleavage that 
cuts across the left-right spectrum (Figure 5.1). However, I identify this as a purely 
ideological differentiation in the political spectrum, even if it empirically manifests 
itself stylistically and performatively. In this cleavage, populism on the one hand is 
associated with a homogenous representation of the people in opposition to the elite 
and as embodying common sense and objective truth. Antipopulism, on the other 
hand, is associated with a heterogeneous representation of the people that includes 
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the elite and where the role of the elite is to represent the people’s best interests on 
the basis of their expertise. This cleavage, then, is concerned with vertical and 
horizontal relationships to ‘the people’ and with different modes of and claims to 
political representation. It explains populism’s famous, but conceptually problematic, 
resistance to traditional ideological cleavages (Germani, 1978, p. 88; Giglioli, 2013, p. 
34; Ostiguy, 2009) by mixing elements from both the left and the right. For, as I have 
argued, so does its voting public, many of whom do not perceive this inconsistency. 
For this reason, studies that define populism as an ideology according to the classical 
unidimensional tradition of ideology theory may miss more relevant and urgent 
cleavages, both within populism and in the political spectrum overall. For the same 
reason, scholarship that channels studies into left-wing and right-wing subtypes of 
populism can be difficult to generalise to populism overall as they may say more about 
the left- or right-wing host ideology than about the phenomenon of populism itself. 
 
FIGURE 5.1: Ostiguy’s two-dimensional political space of positions and appeals (2009, p. 17) 
Populism breaks down and re-erects traditional ideological structures – internally by 
founding its conceptual morphology on mass perceptions, and externally in its relation 





spectrum. It thereby also subverts the normative hierarchy of some strands of ideology 
theory that dictate that ideology is an expression of ‘high’ politics while rhetoric and 
political style are ‘low’ or base forms of politics (Corner and Pels, 2003, p. 2; Laclau, 
2005a, chap. 1). Indeed, Converse’s study described above is based on such an 
assumption, assigning the personal qualities of candidates and their rhetorical abilities 
to the bottom rung of a ladder of abstraction and, by implication, ideological 
sophistication. I posit that, while it is necessary to analytically separate ideology and 
performance in the conceptualisation of populist communication, we must also 
acknowledge that style, rhetoric and performance – means of communicating ideology 
– do not exist in an either-or dichotomous relationship with ideology. Process-oriented 
approaches to ideology clarify this intertwined relationship.  
From this perspective, populism as an ideology constructs a social identity through the 
invocation of ‘the people’ as an empty signifier. But populism uses different 
mechanisms of identity construction from mainstream ideologies. Traditional 
ideological cleavages centre around the systematic but complex economies of 
communication inherent in mainstream ideologies, for instance on the meanings of 
‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’, which are understood by mainly elite voters (Converse, 
1964b). The populist cleavage, in contrast, replaces these abstract systems with 
objects of high centrality to mass publics, such as visible social groupings and culturally 
shared background symbols and imaginaries, which are then used to form 
representative claims and thereby constitute broad social identities. This results in 
polarisation between the elite and the people – and between populism and all 
mainstream ideologies – as populism constructs its narrative of elites imposing a false 
consciousness on the silent majority to serve their own selfish purposes at the expense 
of good, ordinary people. The cleavage is therefore also morally constituted rather 
than reliant on differentiated contestations of central political concepts. 
Populists can then represent themselves as being in a unique position to unveil the 
truth as they claim to occupy the only objective ground in the political spectrum 
characterised by the populism-antipopulism cleavage. The constructed nature of these 
representations directs attention to the aesthetic and performative dimensions of 





identity construction – stylistic as well as conceptual – tap into mass publics’ means of 
appreciating politics, their claim to be an ‘ideology of the people’ is perceived as 
authentic. This perspective, then, highlights the central role of representation in a 
communication approach to populism; representing the people in political terms, and 
representing the people and the antagonism between the people and the elite in 
discursive terms. Populism plays with the intersection of these two meanings of 
representation that I outlined in chapter two and is in itself a particular mode of 
(antagonistic) representation. 
Let me sum up. I have explored ideology theory for the purpose of developing an 
approach that can explain how populist ideology is constructed through 
communicative processes. In my approach to ideology, I have shifted the focus from 
the structural approaches traditionally used to classify populism as an ideology onto 
processes of communication. Such a conceptualisation looks beyond ideology as a 
mental construct with a given internal structure and concerns itself with how ideology 
comes about and plays out. In other words, it conceives of ideology as both socially 
constructed and as constitutive. These are the communicative processes through 
which ideology interacts with its context. Such an approach necessitates a breaking 
down of existing dichotomies of ideology and performance and of content and form. 
My communication approach to populist ideology is thereby informed by the 
conceptual framework of meaning-making through processes of representation that I 
developed in chapter two. 
More specifically, the process-oriented approach to populist ideology that I have 
outlined is, first, inclusive enough to accommodate both dominant and counter-
dominant phenomena. Second, it is in and of itself ideologically neutral in its 
conception of the function of ideology in society, which it sees as one of constructing 
meaning and (mis-)representing reality through a necessary and unavoidable process. 
Third, it acknowledges that the analyst of ideology can hold no position of 
epistemological privilege but rather performs a function of intra-ideological analysis. 
Fourth, and most importantly to the main question of this study – How can populism 
be understood and explained from a communication perspective? – it conceives of 





representations on the one hand and a materialist dimension on the other as 
ideologies performatively construct situated social identities through communicative 
processes. Moreover, the bottom-up construction of logic and coherence of populism’s 
mass ideology highlights the consequent importance that political performance and 
communication play in imparting meaning. In this sense, the notion of a dichotomy 
between ideology and performance is antithetical to a communication perspective 
that considers the mechanisms of the communication of ideology and views ideology 
and performance as interdependent. It is also incompatible with the notion of 
populism as a mass ideology that is based on processual – and thus communicative – 
foundations. My approach is therefore not confined to a definition of ideology as 







6. THE MEANING OF THE POPULIST REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM: 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS24 
Cape Town, 9 February 2017 
Once an accident, twice a coincidence, three times a habit. The EFF’s disruption of 
South Africa’s annual State of the Nation Address has by 2017 become almost 
ritualised; certainly expected; though not sanctioned by all. Yet this year it has been 
proven right. Their calls for President Zuma to #PayBackTheMoney since their first 
disruption of a parliamentary sitting in August 2014 has been confirmed by a 
Constitutional Court order. Malema addresses the press upon his party’s usual eviction 
from Parliament:  
It doesn't matter whether they are a majority or not, when they are 
wrong, they are wrong… We are prepared to leave this parliament in a 
coffin, standing for the truth! We are not going to be intimidated by 
soldiers, by police, by criminals… (EFF_conf1) 
The EFF are martyrs, and they sacrifice themselves for a moral cause, for the truth. In 
February 2018, a few days before yet another disruption is about to go off at the 2018 
SONA, the final act of the drama plays out: Zuma resigns. 
Strasbourg, 28 June 2016 
Britain has voted to leave the European Union. Nigel Farage speaks in a European 
Parliament extraordinary session. This is his moment in the limelight, the culmination 
of his career. His claim to speak for the silent majority of Britain (nay, of the world!) 
and to give voice to their central concern of sovereignty has been confirmed: 
It was indeed a seismic result, not just for British politics, for European 
politics, but perhaps even for global politics, too, because what the little 
people did, what the ordinary people did… they rejected big politics, 
and they said, actually, we want our country back… we want to be an 
independent, self-governing normal nation… (UKIP_live1) 
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As he accuses his fellow MEPs of being “in denial”, he invites democrats around the 
world to rejoice. His representation of reality has been confirmed as ‘the new normal’. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In UKIP and the EFF’s claims above, the elite play a game of dirty politics in which 
‘politics’ is dissociated from democracy. Claims such as these reflect populist ideology. 
My chief concern in this chapter is the question, how is populist ideology constructed 
through communicative processes? In my approach to this question, I explore two 
aspects of populist ideological communication: first, the populist representative claim 
at face value and, second, its construction. In my inductive analysis I used ideology as a 
sensitising concept to engage with populists’ ideological practices. However, ideology 
also emerged as a concept employed analytically by the populist actors themselves as 
a means for them to represent the ideological practices of elites. When I explore the 
claim at face value in this chapter I therefore interrogate the two populist parties’ 
portrayals of the current state of representative democracy and their ideas about what 
it ought to look like but pay particular attention to the role that they attribute to 
ideology. I then also analyse this claim as constructed, based on the conception of 
populist ideology that I developed in the preceding chapter. To put it briefly, I consider 
populist claims about ideology as ideological. 
In the analysis of populist ideology as a communicative construction I consider its 
foundation in mass perceptions of politics in combination with the relations between 
the core concepts that characterise populism. My contention is that, while the populist 
representative claim at face value differs across different democratic contexts, its 
social construction through communicative processes is comparable. I thereby also 
begin to address the question of how the comparison across different democratic 
contexts adds to our understanding of populist communication. Another ideological 
process that I argue is similar in the two case studies is the constitution of the people 
as a totality. While I consider this an ideological function I otherwise mostly leave the 
constitutive aspects of the communication of populist ideology to chapters seven and 
eight, where I consider the performance of populist ideology. This is, of course, a false 
dichotomy, as I have argued in chapter two, but it serves an analytical and pragmatic 





representative claim when taken at face value and to analyse how this claim is 
constructed through communicative processes. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. I first explore the populist denunciation of politics 
overall as a dirty, self-referential game that is inward looking and ignores the people it 
claims to serve. In the populist claim, it is the elite who have polarised Us and Them, 
not the populists. Yet an analysis of this claim as an ideological construction suggests 
that a similar antagonism is inherent in populism’s own ideological structure that 
enables them to constitute the people as a totality and speak on behalf of them. I then 
move on to consider the specific function attributed to ideology in the populist claim 
but also how this claim simultaneously legitimises populist intervention in mainstream 
politics. For central to the populist claim is that the elite disguise their true beliefs (or 
lack of them) behind an obfuscation of reality designed to conceal democratic 
shortcomings and blind the people to the truth. The populist argument culminates in 
the claim that only populists have access to the truth and are able to expose the elite’s 
deceptive acts. The role of truth teller involves self-sacrifice, and the martyrdom of the 
populist is a moral and democratic imperative. Throughout my exploration of these 
claims, I develop the argument that the relationship between democracy, political 
value systems and truth in populist representations of the elite and of themselves 
betray a deeper coherence and logic than otherwise claimed by the literature on 
populism (see e.g. Aslanidis, 2016; Freeden, 2016; Moffitt, 2016). Yet it brings with it 
problematic implications for democratic politics, which gradually emerge as we 
progress through the coming chapters and which I address in the conclusion to this 
study. 
Before I begin, a brief note on the use of the concept of ideology: my foci in this 
chapter are the populist conceptions of this concept and populists’ ideological 
practices in the process of claim-making. The meanings attributed to the concept by 
the populist cases are, however, at times reductionist and epistemologically 
problematic. In developing my own theoretical concept, I do not subscribe to populist 
conceptions of ideology. Rather, I consider how the uses and meanings of the 
corresponding populist concept relate to and manifest populist ideology. In the 





consciousness’ to denote populist conceptions of ideology, in order to distinguish 
them from my own use of the word. 
6.2 DIRTY POLITICS 
Both UKIP’s and the EFF’s representative claims are based on a portrayal of politics as a 
dirty game, as strategic manoeuvring for self-serving ends. Their central claim is 
therefore to do away with the world of dirty politics and reintroduce a purer and truer 
means of representation. As EFF leader Julius Malema states, “SA, your problems need 
courageous leadership. A leadership which has interests of the people above self-
interest” (EFF_tweet1). The representation of politics as self-interested underlies 
populists’ portrayal of the elite and of their own contrasting role as representatives. In 
this claim, the mainstream political environment is an elite construction that at once 
limits populists’ ability to act and creates an imperative to do so for the sake of the 
people. In this section I first develop the argument that the different levels of 
democratic consolidation and paths to democracy in the two countries lead the 
populist parties to aim their anti-elitism at different types of targets: in the preceding 
quote, Malema targets the government’s leadership, not the institutions, as UKIP does. 
Second, I look at how these different sources of ‘dirty politics’ in the two claims lead 
the two parties to attribute different meanings to their central promise of sovereignty. 
Third, these situated meanings of sovereignty are then used by both parties in similar 
processes of constituting the people as a totality by placing them in a Manichaean 
relationship with an elite who engage in dirty, undemocratic politics. 
6.2.1 ANTI-ELITISM OR ANTI-INSTITUTIONALISM? 
The target of UKIP’s anti-elitism is both the EU elite and the EU’s institutions, and their 
representation of these changes over time. In 2014 a recurring metaphor for the 
institution of the European Parliament is that of a school: formalistic, grey and tedious. 
UKIP’s self-representation is then of their MEPs as naughty schoolboys who are ready 
to shake up the dull proceedings by injecting a bit of fun. The cheeky style of Farage’s 






…the avian featured Van Rompuy and the bulldoggish Barroso preside 
over the new class as austere Headmaster and Deputy at school 
assembly. But with 24 Union Jacks fluttering on a spread of desks in one 
corner of the chamber, it was clear who would be the disruptive 
characters among the amassed. (UKIP_col1) 
After the British EU referendum is won, and the proverbial finger-sticking to the EU has 
become less proverbial, UKIP’s claim becomes more self-assuredly aggressive and their 
representation of conditions more acute, as the actual conditions have also become. 
They accuse the EU of being “unreasonable” in negotiations, of acting inconsistently 
with treaty law, of “behaving like the mafia” (UKIP_live2). 
These accusations are based on UKIP’s representation of the institutions of the EU as 
the product and project of the European elite who give the EU itself precedence over 
the people in a manner entirely antithetical to what democracy ought to be: “The EU 
are putting the interests of their failed project above that of their own citizens” 
(UKIP_tweet1). UKIP link this culture of self-obsessive, inefficacious “big politics” – 
which is characterised by “stitch-ups, slanderous accusations, voters’ wishes ignored 
by the establishment and backstabbing from the political groups” (UKIP_press1) – to 
the institution of the EU. The elite render their institution dysfunctional by an 
obsession with their own internal squabbles while the people are forgotten; yet they 
are self-serving in a collective sense, joining forces only to support the misguided and 
nonsensical goal of the EU for the EU’s sake. Instead of representing the people, the 
EU has become a bureaucratic and self-sustaining eternity machine that traps and 
confines the people, prompting UKIP to “work for the freedom of people from EU 
legislation and waste” (UKIP_press2). Not only does UKIP equate the European rule of 
law to waste; they also directly oppose it to a vague notion of “freedom”, arguing that 
it distances representatives from the people. It is this dismissal of the people from the 
elite’s minds that is undemocratic in UKIP's claim and that delegitimises the 
institutions of the EU and its rule of law in the same sweep as the elites. 
The EFF share UKIP’s view that the elite’s mode of representation has lost sight of the 
purpose of democracy and that their corrupt and immoral practices are not only those 





corruption as a “sub-culture” (EFF_press1) that is being practised by elites and that 
subverts the democratic culture of the institution of parliament. The new post-
Apartheid black elite are portrayed as traitors of their own people, enriching 
themselves through positions of power: “The ANC is an organisation and association of 
self-seeking corrupt individuals and fraudsters who are always planning on how much 
they should steal from the money that is supposed to help the people” (EFF_press4). 
Both parties then view politics as an immoral, dirty and undemocratic practice. But 
rather than pointing to the tedium of bureaucracy and the need for injecting some 
energy into proceedings like UKIP, the EFF represent the elite’s practices as 
authoritarian and the conditions they create as outright dangerous. In doing so, they 
evoke collective memories and fears of the authoritarian Apartheid regime. In 
anticipation of their planned disruption, they tweet, “Reliable Sources tell us tht 
whoever raises a point of order during #SONA will be taken into a parly secret dungeon 
tunnel by riot police” (EFF_tweet2). And as he likens the speaker’s attempt at quelling 
his interruption of the president’s speech to Apartheid-like oppression, an EFF MP 
protests, “Don’t be intimidating. We finished that”. Such accusations and dark 
portrayals of political conditions are not entirely without foundation. After the 2015 
event, the EFF were able to provide visual evidence of their claim that “the police were 
assaulting women, breaking their jaws and fracturing their chins, pulling us by our 
private parts” (EFF_press3). 
But, unlike UKIP, the EFF distinguish between elites and institutions in their claim. They 
argue that the elite should not be allowed to denigrate the institution of parliament as 
“Parliament must be respected as sacrosanct” (EFF_live1). The democratic institutions 
are thus distinct from the elite who undermine them. The EFF portray the speaker, 
Baleka Mbete – who occupies a dual role as impartial Speaker and Chair of the ANC 
that has been criticised in South Africa’s political system – as part of the elite. They 
claim that she corrupts the sacred institution of parliament: “Baleka acts in an 
irrational manner and forgets her own rules of parliament that she is supposed to be a 
custodian of” (EFF_tweet3). “Because she is partisan and is unable to listen to the logic 
of the EFF, she collapses parliament” (EFF_tweet4). The EFF portray the institution of 
parliament as a space for the practice of democratic principles, which must be 





about it” (EFF_live1), the speaker is unfit for this task. The EFF, in contrast, self-
represent as ‘logical’ and painstakingly refer to the rule book: “Madam Speaker, I rise 
on Rule 14(c) and (l) on the Rules of the Joint Sitting of Parliament on points of order. 
[…] Point us to the Rule which gives you the power to deny us points of order” 
(EFF_live1). As members of the opposition, the EFF thus take it upon themselves to not 
only hold the government to account but also those who preside over democratic 
institutions. 
Their self-representation as champions of the constitution and of parliamentary rules 
goes hand in hand with their separation of the immoral and undemocratic practices of 
the elite from the democratic institutions of parliament and the rule of law. While they 
state their concerns about the degeneration of the rule of law – “We’re concerned 
about the judiciary. Everything in SA has been corrupted” (EFF_tweet5) – they are, 
unlike UKIP, keen to demonstrate their own support of, and compliance with, the 
institutional principles of the rule of law. In advance of their disruption of the SONA 
2015, the EFF insist in a tweet, “There is nothing we’re going to do that is outside the 
rules of Parliament” (EFF_tweet6). The EFF’s performance is indeed carefully planned 
to comply with the rules, even if it disrupts institutional norms. And EFF MPs keenly 
point this out by waving copies of the constitution every time they seek to speak in 
Parliament (EFF_live2). 
Indeed, such compliance with and championing of institutional rules becomes a key 
form of legitimisation of the EFF’s representative claim. Unlike UKIP, the level of elite 
corruption that characterises the EFF’s democratic context means that they are able to 
represent themselves in direct opposition to the elite by demonstrating such 
compliance. Adherence to the rule of law therefore enables them to retain a coherent 
expression of their anti-elitist ideology; and imposing the rule of law upon a delinquent 
elite is consistent with their democratic quest. Yet their slogan of “radical and militant” 
action also insists that the political conditions created by the elite are such that 
extreme action – within the confines of the rule of law and hence legitimate – is 
required. 
While both cases denounce the elite and define politics in general as a dirty game from 





representative democracy. This is consistent with the notion of populism as a thin 
ideology. Wirth et al. (2016, p. 51) argue that the target of populism’s anti-elitism 
depends on populism’s host ideology. In the literature, this argument usually applies to 
a distinction between political and economic elites in right-wing and left-wing types of 
populism; but, as we saw above, it also applies to institutions. Indeed, UKIP’s right-
wing and the EFF’s socialist host ideologies go some way towards explaining their 
different positions on the role of intermediating institutions. However, the differences 
between the two cases with respect to institutions are also consistent with their 
respective political contexts. The established democracy of the UK may be associated 
with institutional fatigue, especially in the case of the EU, which has often been 
commonly perceived to provide an additional and unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. 
UKIP do not necessarily denounce the rule of law and democratic institutions on a 
national level. Their established democratic context where elites are obeying the rule 
of law means that they can only achieve coherence in their anti-elitist claim by also 
denouncing the EU rule of law as undemocratic. Their accusations of the elite’s 
unrepresentativeness are therefore based on a denunciation of institutions that serve 
to remove representatives from the people. 
In the transitional democracy of South Africa, in contrast, the institution of the 
democratic parliament itself is sacrosanct, expensively attained in living memory by 
the people themselves through bottom-up protest. The constitution, which is based on 
the Freedom Charter, is closely associated with liberation from the Apartheid regime. 
The constitution itself and its institution are to be cherished and protected at all costs 
from those who threaten it. The EFF’s championing of the institution of parliament 
contradicts positions in the literature that hold that populists always favour 
disintermediation in the form of anti-institutionalism (see e.g. De la Torre, 2014; Kriesi, 
2014). The South African case suggests that democratic institutions themselves can be 
imbued with the symbolic meaning of ‘government by the people’ as they were 
created by the people through bottom-up protest in the course of democratic 
transition. They thus become emblems of victory for the silent majority. 
Moreover, the EFF’s claim regarding the authoritarian behaviour of the elite 





perceptions of the extent of democracy in the country amongst South African citizens 
is surprisingly low at 48 percent, over ten percentage points below the Afrobarometer 
mean across African countries (2009, p. 9). This measure is clearly at odds with expert 
opinion. For instance, Freedom House’s democracy rating for South Africa is far higher 
(Afrobarometer, 2009, p. 10). As a mass ideology, the EFF’s populism represents the 
conditions of South African democracy on the basis of public perceptions rather than 
expert opinion. Given the Manichaean element of populist ideology, the illiberal and 
illegitimate practices and actions of the South African elite invite the EFF to self-
represent as upholders of certain principles of liberal democracy. As a consequence, 
they support democratic institutions, stand up against corruption and demand 
increased responsiveness of representatives to the people (Zuma has, of course, now 
been removed from his position as president and the EFF’s claim finds other related 
vehicles). 
6.2.2 THE MEANING(S) OF SOVEREIGNTY 
The differing sources of ‘dirty politics’ in the two cases result in slightly different 
representative claims. While both centre on the notion of sovereignty – the central 
concept in populist ideology (Wirth et al., 2016) – the concept is given different 
meanings by the two parties as their mass ideologies build on different public 
perceptions in their given contexts. In his particular interpretation of sovereignty, 
Farage constructs a binary between democracy and EU membership while establishing 
equivalence between democracy and the nation state: “And we are the ones that want 
democracy, we are the ones that want nation states… not to be trapped inside this 
museum” (UKIP_live3). He sustains this chain of equivalence between democracy and 
the nation state in his claim also after the EU referendum. In an address to the EP in 
April 2017 after the triggering of Article 50, he further develops it by adding 
independence and self-determination to the chain: “…last Wednesday was a great 
historic day when the United Kingdom announced that we were gonna become an 
independent, self-governing, democratic nation once again… We believe in national 
self-determination” (UKIP_live2). This is UKIP’s claimed motivation: “We will do 
everything we can to free ourselves from this corrupt institution” (UKIP_press2). In 
establishing democracy as national self-determination, UKIP attribute corrupt and 





equating the two. In this claim, the EU is not only seen as a supra-national institution 
but as an institution that interferes and comes between the British people and their 
national government and thereby weakens responsiveness. The claim’s central 
component of the nation state and its obstructed relationship to the people retains 
coherence with the context of UKIP’s right-wing host ideology and its opposition to the 
supra-national institutional context of the EU.  
UKIP further equate this notion of sovereignty with freedom. A contested concept in 
itself, freedom in UKIP’s discourse is attributed only a loose meaning. It pivots on 
freedom from the institutions of the EU in which the British people are “trapped”. The 
institutions’ disregard of the people, combined with wasteful legislation intervening in 
the representative relationship between people and their national government, 
equates EU membership to a form of “servitude” (UKIP_press2). UKIP’s 
conceptualisation of freedom is then consistent with their notion of sovereignty as it is 
based on the nation state, rather than on the individual; it is not a liberal 
understanding of freedom. Rather, it is freedom from, a negative representation. It has 
its roots in the binary structures of populist ideology and in its backwards-looking 
imagined “heartland” as the residence of the virtuous and unified people, rather than 
in a forward-looking notion of an ideal society or a utopian vision (Taggart, 2000, p. 
95). The vaguely defined freedom from delivers the similarly vague ‘interests of the 
people’ and speaks to simplified popular conceptions of democracy and sovereignty as 
‘freedom for the people’ and ‘government by the people’. These in turn build on a 
moral contrast to the dirty “big politics” that Farage claims “the little people…, the 
ordinary people” rejected in the EU referendum (UKIP_live1), as we saw in the opening 
to this chapter. In other words, sovereignty is a concept that is defined on the basis of 
popular myth and the populist constituency’s understanding of politics; and it is 
reconstituted as such in Farage’s claim in a cyclical process of reinforcement between 
mass ideology and populism’s constitutive function of representing the people as a 
homogenous, unified totality. 
The EFF decontest the concept of sovereignty in relation to an economic and a political 
dimension. The economic dimension creates coherence between the populist 





the context of their self-professed Marxist-Leninist brand of populism, their claim 
centres on “economic freedom” for the people from dominant capitalist elites. As we 
have already seen, the EFF represent the new post-Apartheid black elite as corrupt 
traitors of their own people, enriching themselves through positions of power instead 
of serving the people. In addition, their claim is directed against a second, distinct elite: 
the white minority. The claim against this white elite is a charge against their 
continued ownership of property – through the trope of “white monopoly capital” 
(EFF_tweet8) – confiscated from the local black population during Apartheid: “White 
arrogance is as a result of ownership of property. They will never respect us until we 
own means of production” (EFF_tweet9). Yet these two elites are also constituted as a 
homogenous totality in repeated accusations against the black elite that their 
“whiteness” comes out (EFF_tweet10); “whiteness” denotes not skin colour but 
immoral behaviour, which allows the EFF to combine white and black elites into one 
totality. 
While the economic dimension of their decontestation of the term inheres in their 
Marxist host ideology, it is also born out of South Africa’s economic conditions having 
the most unequal income distribution in the world (World Bank, 2017). It is therefore a 
logical adaptation of the meaning of a central concept in populist ideology to its 
external context. Moreover, this decontestation of sovereignty is consistent with South 
African citizens’ perspective on democracy. Surveys and interview studies demonstrate 
that socio-economic rights and the concept of liberation are inextricably linked to 
democracy in the national psychology (Bratton and Mattes, 2001, pp. 454–5; Zuern, 
2011, p. 67). 
This focus on liberation in public conceptions of democracy forms the political 
dimension of the EFF’s decontestation of sovereignty. It refers to the realisation of the 
Freedom Charter and is portrayed as a direct continuation of the struggle against 
Apartheid. The EFF represent themselves as “freedom fighters” (using the term that 
has previously been reserved for those people that fought against Apartheid). This 
label is so intrinsic to their identity that it is part of their party name. They portray 
themselves in direct opposition to the elite to whom they attribute the characteristics 





betrayed their own people (that is, black South Africans) when they violently quelled 
the miners’ strike at Marikana in 2012. Like UKIP, the quest for freedom is a quest for 
freedom from oppression. The EFF’s notion of freedom does not share UKIP’s 
nationalist connotations but rather remains consistent with the EFF’s representation of 
the current regime as a continuation of Apartheid, their support of democratic 
institutions and a rule-based notion of democracy, as well as their Marxist host 
ideology. In the case of both parties, the central populist concept of sovereignty is 
decontested in ways that are consistent with their respective brand of anti-elitism, 
host ideology, local political context and mass perceptions of it. 
The centrality of the concept of sovereignty is evident in the two cases’ claims: the 
elite deprive the people of sovereignty while populists restore it. This is consistent with 
Wirth et al.’s (2016) model of populist communication25, on which I build. Moreover, 
the parties’ different decontestations of sovereignty reflect Freeden’s (1998a) 
theoretical argument that the meaning attributed to political concepts in an ideology 
differs according to democratic context and the (host) ideology of the party. The 
comparison across left-wing and right-wing host ideologies and different democratic 
conditions therefore sheds light on how these differences manifest themselves in 
different types of populist democratic claims. However, it also helps us to identify the 
common populist ideological core of the two claims. The two parties’ ideological claims 
to democracy signify a notion of sovereignty that is consistent with other aspects of 
their representative claims, including their respective attitudes to institutions and the 
rule of law. Yet these claims are only as specific and coherent as they need to be for 
communicative purposes. They take popular myths about freedom and sovereignty as 
their starting point and explain their claims by othering visible social groupings, 
especially the elite. The goal is to minimise the discrepancy between the projected and 
the received claims as recipients’ processes of contextualisation and interpretation are 
anticipated within the construction of the claims. 
This, in turn, demonstrates the construction of populism as a bottom-up mass 
ideology. In UKIP’s case, the referendum on exiting the European Union serves as the 
ultimate confirmation of their conception of sovereignty as national self-determination 
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and freedom from the oppression of EU bureaucracy. Farage’s constituency had 
voted26. In his speech on referendum night, as the result was becoming clear, a 
triumphant Farage announced the UK’s “Independence Day” to a cheering audience 
(rtrumble, 2016). He was affirmed an hour later – when the projected, mediated and 
received performances collided – by the Scottish Daily Mail releasing their referendum 
special edition describing the UK as being “free from the shackles of EU” on the front 
page (Sutton, 2016)27.  
6.2.3 THE TOTALITY OF THE PEOPLE 
Given the populism literature’s insistence on the centrality of the people in populist 
discourse – for instance, both Jӓgers and Walgrave (2007) and Rooduijn and Pauwels’ 
(2011) primary measures of populism rely on counting instances of ‘the people’ – 
references to the people were strangely scarce in my data. Yet on closer inspection, 
they were less absent than implicit and taken for granted in data that focused on 
representation of the elite and of populists themselves who, for instance, would often 
impersonate the people. This is partly explained by the nature of the disruptive events 
which, with their institutional focus, claim to address elites rather than constituents 
and enhance vertical rather than horizontal forms of antagonism. As the people are 
often negatively defined through ‘the others’ in populist discourse, they may be less 
present in disruptive performances. The implicit presence of the people in the data 
highlights a methodological risk in the study of populism and the analytical benefit of 
sensitising concepts in combination with a multi-modal interpretive approach. It also 
highlights an important aspect of populist ideology, which I now explore.  
In the aftermath of the EU referendum, UKIP adopt a peculiar position in the EP of 
antagonising Britain’s new negotiation partners. They intimate that Spain has made a 
declaration of war on Britain immediately following the referendum by allowing the 
“incursion” of a “warship” to “illegally enter British sovereign territory” (UKIP_press3) 
in the waters of Gibraltar28. By thus invoking the central theme of sovereignty, and by 
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juxtaposing Spain and the EU on the one side with the UK on the other, UKIP portray 
the people of Britain as a totality that is opposed to the EU elite. The 48 percent who 
voted to remain are annexed into this implicit evocation of the people under attack. 
UKIP simultaneously appear to assume the position of official EU withdrawal 
negotiator on behalf of the entirety of the UK, reinforcing their constitution of the 
people as a totality and themselves as representatives of the UK as a whole. In a 
speech to the EP, Farage thus describes the EU negotiating position of Spain having a 
veto on Gibraltar as a “deal breaker” (UKIP_live2). This he immediately follows by yet 
another antagonising provocation, accusing the EU of “behaving like the mafia” 
towards the British people in EU withdrawal negotiations. He also undertakes to 
respond directly to the EP on the EU’s suggested settlement payment by the UK upon 
leaving the EU, which is the current topic in negotiations, terming it “bizarre” and 
“plucked… out of the air” (UKIP_live2). He thereby continuously evokes his 
constituency as the totality of the British people through antagonism aimed at the EU 
elite. Later in his LBC radio show he sets out the EU position and their demands as 
“unacceptable” and “virtually impossible” (UKIP_radio1). 
What UKIP’s claim demonstrates is the structural element of populist ideology (the 
juxtaposition of the concepts of the elite and the people and the way they structurally 
relate to each other) serving the ideological process of constituting the people. UKIP’s 
evocation of the people as a totality is always achieved negatively by antagonising the 
elite. In other words, UKIP can evoke the people as ordinary, as Farage does when he 
describes the new UKIP MEPs as representatives who have the lived experience of 
those whom they claim to represent: 
There's a tough talking, no-nonsense ex commando with a passion for 
patriotism and the lessons of the front line tattooed on his heart. The 
steelworker's daughter side by side with the miner's daughter. The 
umbrella maker of Gypsy extraction joins forces with the gentle Welsh 
Mormon… (UKIP_col1) 
But Farage is only able to constitute this constituency as a totality by contrasting it to 





done a proper job in your lives” (UKIP_live1). He thus invokes the opposition between 
the ordinary people and the politicians. The ideological structure that the constitutive 
process of populist ideology relies on also explains why the people are often implicit in 
populist discourse: they are defined in negative terms. 
The EFF implicitly evoke the people in a very similar way. Like UKIP, they use a 
representation of political conditions at crisis point as a means of constituting the 
South African people as a totality. In doing so, they also explain their motivation as 
representatives and the underlying logic of their claims against the elite. Upon being 
expelled from the SONA following their disruptive action, they express their concern 
for the state of South African democracy: “This is a direct threat to democracy, that 
those who don't agree with the state they are subjected to the harsh treatment of the 
security institutions. Police are used to settle political differences. This has put our 
democracy in a serious danger” (EFF_conf2). As representatives, an attack on the EFF is 
an attack on democracy and on the people: “We’ve been elected to represented them 
in parliament,” insists Malema (EFF_tweet12). The EFF then link their function as 
representatives to the act of liberation: “Whatever it takes, and however long it takes, 
by whatever revolutionary means, we will take over this country with the aim of total 
liberation and emancipation… on behalf of the people”(EFF_press3). 
Their insistence on acting to uphold democracy on behalf of the people performs a 
similar ideological function to UKIP’s by constituting the people implicitly as a totality 
whom they are standing up for in the face of authoritarianism. Just as UKIP portray 
their MEPs as ordinary workers, the EFF also achieve this through identification with 
the people by dressing in the clothes of domestic workers (I explore this feature of 
performed embodiment of the people more in the following chapters) and by 
establishing antagonism between the people and the elite: in contrast to the EFF, who 
are of the people, Zuma “doesn’t know them” (EFF_tweet13). 
Both parties juxtapose antagonism against the elite with self-representation as one of 
the people and evocation of the people as a totality. The latter serves the ideological 
function of constituting the identity of the community as a coherent whole (Laclau, 
1997, p. 303), which I outlined in the previous chapter. UKIP portray the EU in contrast 





South African elite as a totalitarian threat to the entire people. These grand, sweeping 
claims about threats to democracy allow them to portray themselves as 
representatives of the totality of the people. What is less visible in my data is that 
these totalities are confined to particular population groups. In UKIP’s case ‘the 
people’ excludes immigrants, and in the EFF’s case the white population in South 
Africa. The exclusionary argument against the elite is then mixed with nationalism in 
UKIP’s case, and with race as a dividing line in the EFF’s case. The two parties perform 
the ideological function of homogenising the people on the basis of culturally 
persistent background symbols and public perceptions of politics in their respective 
constituencies. UKIP rely on a nation-state-based notion of sovereignty as perceived by 
their constituency, as we noted in the previous section; the EFF allude to the 
deprivation of freedom by the South African government, which we saw was a central 
component of public conceptions of democracy. Both parties thus base their evocation 
of the people as a totality on mass perceptions by the people. This brings the 
constitutive function of populist ideology into dialogue with its construction as a mass 
ideology as it assumes a ventriloquising function of the people’s voice. In this sense, 
the mass ideology of populism constitutes the people whom it claims to be constituted 
by. This is a cyclical process that reinforces the populist claim. 
6.3 VALUE SYSTEMS AS MORAL SYSTEMS: THE POPULIST CONCEPTION 
OF IDEOLOGY 
As we have seen, UKIP’s claim envisions their democratic principles to be executed by 
sidestepping mediating institutions, EFF’s to work through them. But both claims 
represent these principles as untainted by partisan positions. The populist parties 
instead represent themselves as impartial and as harbingers of truth. Their positions 
on political value systems are nuanced but important. They underlie the populist 
epistemological claim to truth and impartiality that legitimises their representative 
claim and the right it bestows upon them to speak on behalf of all the people. There 
are significant differences between the two claims, however. The EFF attack the ANC 
for their lack of belief and values underlying their rhetoric. UKIP, in contrast, claim that 
the EP elite are “fanatics” (UKIP_press4). In this section I explore these contrasting 





contradiction between the two cases’ contentions against the elite, their claims share 
the same epistemological foundation, which is a natural extension of populism’s anti-
pluralist ideology. I first examine how the two parties portray their respective elites’ 
political value systems. I then go on to consider the parties’ conceptions of ideology 
more generally, including how they align with their respective claims relating to 
democratic institutions, politics in general, and morality. 
6.3.1 POPULIST CLAIMS ON IDEOLOGY 
UKIP’s approach to political value systems is pejorative. They portray partisan world 
views as direct threats to ‘British national interests’. Paul Nuttall, for instance, 
comments on Labour MEPs’ lack of support for UKIP’s motions on EU withdrawal 
negotiations tabled in the EP in April 2017,  
For once it would have been nice for British MEPs to put aside petty 
party political differences to ensure Britain’s best interests would be 
served. Needless to say Labour MEPs just couldn’t play nice… I always 
expected an anti-British attitude from the Euro-federalists but to see it 
from British Labour is disappointing… why don’t we all start playing for 
Team GB (UKIP_press5).  
The binary that Nuttall constructs between “party political differences” and acting in 
Britain's interests portrays party political values as an immoral quality in British 
representatives and equates them with acting against the people. In this claim, there 
can be no differences in opinion on how to serve Britain’s best interests. Instead there 
is an essentialist divide between “petty” positions that serve the party and those that 
serve the people.  
UKIP then expand their argument by attaching the term “cabal” to the Labour MEPs in 
the above-mentioned vote: “Britain betrayed by Labour MEPs and their federalist 
cabal on Brexit vote” (UKIP_tweet2). In doing so, they equate Labour’s “party political 
differences” with the dirty games of mainstream politics, denoting intrigue and a lack 
of openness and transparency. The attached accusation of ‘federalism’ is a threat to 
democracy more generally, as understood by UKIP. In their communications, 





“fanaticism” (UKIP_press4). It serves to link UKIP’s pejorative notion of value systems 
to the supra-national institution of the EU as well as to the culture of dirty politics that 
permeates it: Farage accuses the ‘federalist’ MEPs in a speech at the EP, “Your aim and 
ambition is to destroy nation state democracy.” (UKIP_live2). 
UKIP’s conceptualisation of ideology is thus neither that of neutral value systems (such 
as that proposed by, for instance, Freeden, 1998a), nor a pejorative approach to 
ideology as focused on the processes of deception associated with false consciousness. 
Rather, it combines the two: political value systems are in themselves 
misrepresentations of reality and webs of deception that politicians intentionally 
impose upon the people through underhand means and with moral ill intent. 
Moreover, the portrayal of ‘federalism’ as such a false consciousness implies that the 
EU is a manifestation of self-interested motives. The implication of UKIP’s stance is 
that it is possible to occupy an objective position outside of such imaginaries, and that 
such a position is required to act in the people’s interests. UKIP therefore represent 
themselves as standing outside of ‘politics’, for within that realm value systems are 
constructed to serve the party and not the people. Instead, their position is one that 
objectively works ‘in Britain’s interests’ – not just in the interests of their constituents 
or according to a given set of partisan values but in the interests of all the people. This 
claim to objectivity thus follows close on the heels of their constitution of the people 
as a totality. It also suggests that UKIP’s denunciation of the EU elite and institutions, 
and of political value systems in general, adopts a moral dimension, which they apply 
to politics in general. Value systems are, when represented in such moral terms, not 
about party political choice and the personal views and preferences of voters but 
about right and wrong. The Labour MEPs simply voted the wrong way on UKIP’s 
motions in the EP. 
The EFF’s approach to political value systems contrasts with UKIP’s, for the EFF happily 
flout their ‘red’ credentials, self-representing as full of ideological conviction and 
positioning themselves very clearly on the left of the political spectrum: “Capitalism is 
inherently exploitative and unequal. It breeds inequality…” (EFF_tweet14). Their 
approach to explicit political value systems is non-pejorative, unlike UKIP’s. In fact, 





(EFF_press4) and accuse them of ideological “plagiarism” (EFF_press3). In contrast to 
UKIP’s accusations of extremism, the EFF’s charge against the elite is instead 
concentrated on their lack of true belief and their self-serving and corrupt behaviour 
for personal gain, which undermines democratic institutions. In UKIP’s case, the 
equation of elites and institutions means that self-serving behaviour is in the interests 
of the institutions and hence ideological – the values of ‘federalism’ rather than 
personal greed are the problem. 
Despite these differences, the EFF share with UKIP a representation of their own 
partisan position as the only moral one in South African politics and, although 
ideologically coloured, as the only true representation of reality. They substantiate this 
claim by portraying their (host) ideology as a direct continuation of the liberation 
struggle against Apartheid: their programme “is fundamentally about the attainment 
of all Freedom Charter objectives” (EFF_press3). Their party political work is therefore 
a matter of realising the objectives of the original freedom fighters, a quest which is 
morally unquestionable in South Africa’s political culture. On the anniversary of 
Mandela’s release from prison, they establish this equivalence between democracy 
and their morally based value system, where the latter even takes on the 
characteristics of a religious vow: “We vowed that we will defend his legacy, the legacy 
of the basic democratic freedoms” (EFF_press5). 
Through this argument the EFF establish consistency between two seemingly opposing 
self-representations. First, they represent themselves as motivated by their value 
system, in contrast to the ANC and their “hollow recitals of the Freedom Charter…that 
are not genuine” (EFF_press2). Like UKIP, they therefore also contrast themselves with 
the elite by stressing their sincerity and their genuine belief in their programme; and, 
like UKIP, they legitimise this belief with their own identification with the people. 
Political values, to the EFF, are genuine and therefore benefit the people while the 
elite use them rhetorically as a form of false consciousness to disguise self-serving 
ends. The EFF’s second and contrasting self-representation is as impartial upholders of 
the constitution and as non-partisan in relation to the Speaker of Parliament. 
Criticising the speaker for her partisan support of Zuma, they champion the 





impartial, their “logic” (EFF_tweet15) is objective; they are “an organisation that 
always tells the truth and claims no easy victories, the EFF will state the facts as they 
are” (EFF_press1).  
These two contradictory aspects of their self-representation – one as partisan and one 
as impartial – manifest their populist ideology by contrasting themselves with 
differently positioned elites: the speaker who does not live up to her role’s required 
impartiality and the ANC as a party that is dishonest about and unimaginative 
(EFF_press2) in the conception of their partisan values. The apparent contradiction 
between these self-representations is resolved through the mediating background 
symbol of the Freedom Charter. The South African Freedom Charter was the 
foundation of the Constitution in 1994 but in addition contains clauses on 
nationalisation and other socialist policies (which were left out of the Constitution). 
The EFF thus use it as a bridge to establish equivalence between their role in upholding 
the principles of democracy and their fervent left-wing commitment to free the people 
from economic oppression. This in turn is consistent with the primacy of liberation in 
public conceptions of democracy in South Africa (Zuern, 2011). In this claim, then, their 
partisan position is not partisan at all: it is a representation of objective reality, for 
“our programme is the only programme that finds true resonance with the people of 
South Africa” (EFF_press2; my italics).  
Once again both parties then develop their claims through an ideological process of 
grounding them in popular conceptions of politics, as a cartel in the UK and as 
threatening the highly prized liberation in South Africa. Both parties retain internal 
consistency within their claims, and this results in different conceptualisations of, and 
attitudes to, ideology. Yet they share the claim that the elite impose a false 
consciousness upon the people and that their party is the voice of objective reality. 
The preceding conception of populist ideology can then be seen at work in both cases, 
grounding these claims in mass perceptions of politics and constituting the people as a 







6.3.2 ESSENTIALIST POLITICS 
The replacement of political value systems with morality as a guiding line in 
democratic practice results in an anti-pluralist, essentialist politics as a divide between 
Us and Them. Representing the people’s interests requires certain credentials that 
signify the in-group, which the elite do not possess. I have already noted how Farage 
provocatively attacks his fellow MEPs in a speech for never having “done a proper job 
in your lives ….” (UKIP_live1). While in UKIP’s representative claim, the role of 
representatives is to stand up for the people unencumbered by institutions, partisan 
values and the international rule of law, politics within such an undemocratic 
framework is self-serving and not “a proper job”. The role of the representative 
requires him or her to also be like the people and to have a felt understanding of their 
lives. This is what makes UKIP MEPs “the real voice of Britain”, a “passionate, 
conjoined family from all walks of life, bound by the quest to restore democracy, and 
truly represent the people of Britain” (UKIP_col1). Their credentials as representatives 
are to be like the people they claim to represent. And this is also what makes them 
truthful, sincere: “We want a team who believe in what they say. Who have lived the 
arguments they are going to sell” (UKIP_col1). 
In this respect, the EFF’s claim is similar to UKIP’s. They follow suit (pun intended) by 
creating a stark visual contrast between themselves and mainstream representatives 
in parliament. Dressed as cleaners in bright red overalls, they identify with ordinary 
South Africans and stand out from the mass of grey suits of the mainstream elite in 
parliament. The plastic miners’ helmets of some EFF MPs is a not-so-subtle insinuation 
of the betrayal of their own people that the new post-Apartheid black elite exercised 
at Marikana and is a moral theme that runs through the EFF’s representative claim. 
The essentialist representation of politics as a moral divide between Us and Them is 
thus shared by UKIP and the EFF. In the case of the EFF, the divide between right and 
wrong is equivalent to a black-and-white distinction (again, pun intended) between 
democracy and authoritarianism that builds on the historical legacy of colonialism. 
We have seen so far that the two cases differ in their explicit positions on political 
value systems and on the role of institutions. They remain internally coherent and 





structure and employ the same ideological processes of decontestation and 
constitution of the core concepts within this structure. UKIP’s claim equates 
institutions to the elite who are driven by self-serving motives in the name of 
‘federalist’ extremism. UKIP therefore equate institutions with partisanship. This 
notion of partisanship follows a different cleavage line than the traditional left-right 
dimension of the political spectrum. It is ordered along a moral dimension that is 
determined by representatives’ close and direct relationship to the people, which 
stands in contrast to ‘politics’.  
In contrast to UKIP, the EFF champion democratic institutions as non-partisan spaces 
that ought to be operated by rationality and impartiality. And they represent 
themselves as encapsulating such principles in the form of their own ideological 
position. UKIP and the EFF then both self-represent as impartial. UKIP, however, see 
the only possibility of realising such democratic principles outside the institution of the 
EU and obstinately reject having a partisan position. The EFF instead advocate their 
own partisan position (that is, their host ideology) as the only morally acceptable and 
true value system. By establishing equivalence between, on the one hand, a rule-based 
system of right and wrong and, on the other, their own partisan position, the EFF 
evoke a similar moral cleavage in the political spectrum to that of UKIP.  
Despite their respective internally coherent claims, the ideological critique that both 
parties engage in comes with an epistemological pitfall. They both critique the elite’s 
value system (or lack thereof) as immoral and position themselves as the only moral 
and objective guardians of representative democracy. Their world view is the only true 
reality. In assuming this role, they claim an epistemological privilege that implies the 
possibility of “truly objective knowledge about the social world, and this itself seems to 
be ‘ideology par excellence’” (Humphrey, 2005, p. 231). 
6.4 THE POPULIST CLAIM TO TRUTH-TELLING 
So far I have explored the populist conception of politics as dirty and how this informs 
a differentiated conception of ideology in the two cases. I have also queried how the 
populist notions of politics and ideology are themselves ideologically constituted based 





chapter. Through this analysis I found that the two parties’ differences in attitudes to 
ideology build on a common epistemological assumption about the existence of 
objective truth. Two further claims follow from populists’ self-representation as truth 
tellers: they represent themselves as martyrs, and they justify the necessity of this 
sacrifice with the people’s ignorance. 
6.4.1 TRUTH-TELLING AS MARTYRDOM 
Truth-telling requires courageous self-sacrifice through the role of martyr, which 
attains a moral status in the populist claim: populists are sacrificing themselves for the 
sake of the people, unlike self-serving mainstream politicians. This is how 
representative democracy ought to operate. The level of sacrifice is determined by the 
political conditions that the populist party claim to face. In the case of the EFF, the 
party can realistically declare that the risks they face are relatively severe. In both the 
2015 and 2017 events, they claim to be subject to “brutal violence” (EFF_press6) by 
security personnel in the parliament precinct who are equipped with not only cable 
ties but also arms and syringes containing “biological contents that are going to 
deactivate [EFF MPs] for the rest of the day” (EFF_live2). They have reasonable 
grounds for some of these claims: seven of their MPs end up in hospital following their 
eviction from the SONA in 2015 (see Figure 4.2). Despite such perilous conditions, the 
EFF state their readiness to fight for the people: “we remain fearless in the conviction 
that our government must be held accountable” (EFF_press5). They introduce 
hashtags on Twitter such as #NoRetreatNoSurrender (EFF_tweet16) in advance of their 
disruption of the SONA 2015. After the event they insist, “No amount of conspiracy 
theories, intimidation, usage of violence or threats of assassination will deter us from 
holding this corrupt ANC government accountable” (EFF_press6).   
The risks faced by UKIP are somewhat less severe. At most they involve jeering and 
reprimands by the EP chair. With his usual sarcasm Farage makes a point of the 
opposition that is there, posting on Facebook, “Just spoke in the European Parliament, 
they were pleased to see me as you can tell”. The impact of the comparatively minor 
risks, however, is relative to the actual political conditions and to the level of 
disruption that would retain legitimacy for the populist party. In other words, where 





noteworthy when the normal state of affairs is highly regulated. Disruption is a relative 
act. In a reply to Farage’s Facebook post, a member of the public29 thus applauds his 
“courage” and “determination” in a situation where “truth hurts” the EP 
(TwitterUser1). Truth-telling, then, upsets the normal order of politics, and this, 
indeed, is its purpose, given the deceptive nature of politics. 
These small-scale symbolic disruptions of norms are given added impetus by their re-
presentation in other UKIP communications. After his speech in the EP is met with 
heckling and an official reprimand, Farage tweets a video of the event with the 
comment, “Just gave both barrels to the unelected EU commission. These guys have a 
problem with the truth” (UKIP_tweet3). As in the case of the EFF, UKIP claim to be 
ready to fight for the truth. In the context of the strictly norm- and rule-bound 
conditions of the European Parliament, verbal provocation and a reprimand are 
sufficient to signify disruption of norms. And UKIP’s claim to truth legitimises their 
disruption. UKIP thus portray their position as impartial representatives while they 
base their status on the claim that the norms they disrupt hide the partisan nature of 
the institution of the EP. This status of norms in the populist claim, and the act of 
disruption to expose their deceptive nature, is a theme I return to in chapter eight. 
6.4.2 OPENING THE PEOPLE’S EYES 
The second implication of populists’ status as truth tellers is the assumed need for the 
people to be freed from the elite’s veil of false consciousness. The populist’s self-
sacrifice is undertaken in order to enable the people to see through the lies of the 
elite, to finally become cognisant of reality. Both the EFF and UKIP make it abundantly 
clear that the people would be unable to see the truth were it not for their 
intervention. Farage tweets, “If I’ve helped the British people understand how 
ridiculous the EU are behaving, I couldn’t give a damn who I upset” (UKIP_tweet4). His 
self-sacrifice and disruptive action are necessary to help a misguided people 
understand the truth behind the masquerade of politics.  
The EFF match this sentiment when they criticise the elite for “playing with South 
Africans” (EFF_tweet17). They even go so far as to attack the people for living with a lie 
and not wanting to face up to the truth: 
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Parliament continue to violate the constitution. And every South African 
is happy, every South African is celebrating that and condemning those 
who are saying this is wrong. Those who are saying this is wrong get 
condemned, they're disruptive, they're disrespectful, you're so 
comfortable to live with a lie, you're so scared of the truth! (EFF_conf3) 
In making this claim, the EFF represent themselves very defensively as victims of 
accusations of disruption, a term they refuse to lay claim to despite their actions. 
While representing themselves as on the moral high ground, they imply that the 
people are being taken for a ride, are being too compliant, are lacking revolutionary 
spirit and are themselves acting hypocritically. This accusation undermines not only 
the elite’s authenticity but also the people’s feelings of efficacy, for they are shown to 
be based on deceit. The EFF thereby at once explain the ANC’s continued popular 
majority and monopoly on power, undermine it and legitimise disruptive action. This 
relates to Krӓmer’s argument (forthcoming, p. 8) that claims such as this cross over 
into the counterfactual. The claim is based on the premise that the people would be 
populists if they had not been indoctrinated. The community called into being by such 
references to the ‘silent majority’ (cf. Canovan, 1999) is based on “mythical thinking 
that does not accept the fact-value distinction” (Krämer, forthcoming, p. 8). In other 
words, this is an ideological process that constitutes the people as a totality and, in the 
course of doing so, assumes a position of objective truth for the populist actors 
themselves: they equate the populist value system with truth and the elite’s with 
obfuscation. 
UKIP and the EFF then share the claim that the act of norm-breaking is a democratic 
necessity to enlighten a hoodwinked people. The internal logic of the populist 
representative claim builds on the representation of populist democratic principles as 
questions of morality: populists represent acts of disruption as doing “what is right” 
(EFF_press7; my emphasis). Such an essentialist claim to morality is founded on a 
particular evaluation of elite ideology, which gives rise to populists’ own 
representation as truth tellers and their rendering-present the people through the 
evocation of an empty signifier. This has important implications for how the political 





6.5 DISCUSSION: THE MORAL CLEAVAGE OF POPULIST IDEOLOGY 
In the preceding pages I have explored UKIP’s and the EFF’s representative claims on 
politics and ideology as they appear at face value. I have probed their inner logics, 
questioned their origins in the parties’ host ideologies and democratic contexts, and 
analysed the ideological processes of bringing them about. What emerged was a 
peculiarly populist conception of a moral politics built on a claim to truth-telling and its 
essential role in democratic practice. The notion of dirty politics – and of the two 
populist parties clearly defining ‘politics’ differently from mainstream parties – was an 
outcome of inductive analysis. In the course of dissecting the populist claim on politics, 
three central concepts emerged that contribute to the construction of this claim: anti-
elitism, sovereignty and a homogenous notion of the people. These concepts are 
indeed the pillars of most ideological definitions of populism and of the one I adopted 
in the introduction to this study. An additional inductively discovered aspect of the 
claim was populists’ self-representation as truth tellers, and this is a theme we will 
return to as we progress through the following chapters.  
The ways in which these core populist concepts were decontested by the two case 
studies differed substantially, resulting in dissimilar claims. In each party’s claim, the 
concepts were given meaning by the parties’ host ideology, the context they respond 
to, and mass perceptions of sovereignty and politics in that given context. This lent 
internal consistency to the parties’ claims. Despite these differences, I found that the 
processes of constructing these claims through context and mass perceptions of 
politics and of constituting the people as a totality were common features of populist 
ideology. They cut across the right-wing case of UKIP in an established democracy and 
the left-wing case of the EFF in a transitional democracy. In the following I first briefly 
summarise the two parties’ respective claims at face value. I then return to their 
commonalities in the form of the populist cleavage discussed in the preceding chapter 
as one that cuts across the political spectrum. I posit that this cleavage relies on 
conceiving of populist ideology as a process that is intimately tied to communication.  
In UKIP’s claim to representation the nation state is the sole legislator and executive; 
the institutions of the EU are dismissed as unnecessary and obstructive mediators 





ought to have a real-life understanding of the people they represent. The claim is a 
denial of the multi-step mechanisms of political representation. Beyond these 
generalities, UKIP’s claim becomes even more abstract and takes the form of an 
epistemological argument which departs from the ways in which modern 
representative politics works. They argue for a politics that is not tainted by party-
political differences. In this view, politics should not be guided by competition amongst 
representatives seeking to represent different constituencies, interest groups or value 
systems but by morality. This would ensure that representatives speak ‘the truth’ 
instead of engaging in strategic game-playing and dirty politics. Such truth is always in 
the interests of all the people, which are constituted as a totality. The people thereby 
lose their plurality in an anti-liberal claim. Though the truth in fact resides in the 
people, they are unable to see it for themselves. Representatives attain the necessary 
qualities of truth teller by virtue of their inherent understanding of the people and 
simultaneous understanding of the game of deception that constitutes politics. In the 
given situation, only populists have this special ability: they are the media (in the 
clairvoyant sense of the word) between the people and the political world. 
The EFF’s representative claim is at face value in many ways closely aligned with the 
principles of liberal democracy. The EFF support the rule of law, the constitution and 
the legitimacy of Parliament. They stand up against corruption and support increased 
responsiveness of representatives to the people. In this respect they serve an 
important democratic function in a transitional democracy. Yet they flaunt the norms 
of liberal democracy, and the ideological processes of populism that they employ 
remain problematic and essentially illiberal. The EFF represent themselves as bridging 
three roles: party political representatives; personifications of ‘the people’; and 
impartial upholders of democratic principles. They perform each of these roles in 
antagonistic terms: as ideologists with creative solutions to the people’s problems, 
they contrast themselves with unimaginative plagiarist and self-serving elites; as part 
of the virtuous, ordinary people, they attack the elite for their practices of deception; 
and as impartial and principled democrats, they oppose a corrupt elite that is out to 
destroy the institutions of democracy. In performing all of these roles, they align 
themselves against the dominant power in a moral argument of democratic 





roles into one coherent identity by representing their values as fact. The moral 
essentialism of their claim is shared with UKIP and resides in a self-representation as 
the only political actors with access to truth and objective reality, willing to sacrifice 
themselves for the people by fighting the self-serving and undemocratic elite. 
The two parties’ claims differ substantially for they are grounded in different 
democratic contexts to which they respond. They contrast their own self-
representations to their respective contextual conditions, which also fuel them with 
culturally specific values and communicative symbolic resources. Yet both parties’ 
claims are founded on a proclaimed wish for a more substantive and moral politics. So 
where does this claim shift into populism as an illiberal ideology? Since the concepts 
that comprise populism are given different meanings in different contexts, we must 
look to the relations between them. These relations are communicative, and they 
involve processes of social construction and of the constitution of reality. In other 
words, the answer lies in conceiving of populist ideology as a process, and this in turn 
suggests a concern with populist communication. With this shift in focus, the 
similarities between the two parties’ representative claims start to emerge. 
To illustrate this, I revisit the model of the populist ideological cleavage I introduced in 
the previous chapter, and on which I am now in a position to build. In doing so, my 
focus is on the cleavage that populists construct in the ideological spectrum. The moral 
dimension to both parties’ claims results in an ideological cleavage that does not 
follow the traditional left-right divide (Figure 6.1). The concern with moral, rather than 
value-based, differentiation results in the cleavage being an essentialist one, not a 
gradational one, as Stavrakakis (2014) and Ostiguy (2009) suggest in their respective 
arguments on a populist cleavage. According to the populist representative claim, a 
representative is either right or wrong, good or bad, truthful or lying. The cleavage is 
constructed around the architecture of key concepts within populist ideology: it 
pitches the elite on the one hand in an antagonistic relationship with, on the other 
hand, the people and the populist who is able to restore their sovereignty. The 
populist cleavage, then, is chiefly concerned with relationships to ‘the people’, that is, 
with the iterative and intersubjective processes of constructing populist ideology and 





The social construction of ideology is in the case of populism based on mass 
perceptions of politics. The populist cleavage is therefore also based on a distinction 
between mass ideology and elite ideologies, where the latter are occupied with their 
own internal squabbles and all obfuscate the truth. It results in a simplistic dichotomy 
of ‘politics’ as bad and acting in the people’s interests as good. The latter involves 
identification between the people and their representatives through embodiment and 
lived experience. In this populist dimension the representative identifies with the 


























FIGURE 6.1: The ideological cleavage evoked by the populist representative claim 
The constitutive function of ideology can be seen in the populist side of the cleavage 
being characterised by truth. In their claim to truth, populists adopt the role of 
parrhesiastes (Foucault, 1983), truth tellers, who reveal the absurdity of the left/right 
distinction: all politicians are the same, for all their ideologies are false consciousness. 
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This assumes an epistemologically privileged position for the populist as truth teller 
and justifies populists’ self-sacrifice in the interests of an illiberal notion of the people 
as a homogenous totality. Populism famously resists compliance with traditional 
ideological cleavages by mixing elements from both the left and the right in their own 
policies (Germani, 1978; Giglioli, 2013; Ostiguy, 2009). Indeed, so does its voting 
public, many of whom do not perceive this inconsistency (Converse, 1964a). The 
political side of the cleavage is marked by the elite’s deception, which undermines 
sovereignty and democratic representation. The implications of this cleavage for 
democratic politics are problematic as it suggests an essentialist politics that is anti-
pluralist and undermines representative democracy’s foundation of a distinction 
between values and facts. This is a theme I return to in the following chapters and, in 
more detail, in the conclusion. 
The above similarities and differences start to demonstrate how comparative study 
across different democratic contexts adds to our understanding of populist 
communication. Taking the two parties’ representative claims at face value, we can 
clearly see how they have emerged from different contexts that shape both their 
content and form. However, the conception of populist ideology as a process aids 
comparison, and similarities start to emerge. We get to the essence of populist 
ideology. This resides in the mutually constitutive relationship between populist 
ideology and its context: in the processes of constructing populism as a mass ideology 
and of constituting the people as a totality. This in turn suggests that a communication 
perspective on populism is able to resolve many of the comparative difficulties that 
have held back the study of populism. It also suggests that we need to dig deeper into 
these communicative processes that underlie populist ideology. That is what I now 







7. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE POPULIST REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM: 
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 
7.1 INTRODUCTION:  
The analysis in the previous chapter occasionally strayed onto populism’s performative 
qualities: instances of both parties representing themselves as embodying the people 
and the constitutive function of portraying the people as a totality. While there is a 
certain overlap between populism’s ideological and performative qualities, an 
analytical perspective focused entirely on ideology was unable to fully engage with and 
explain these aspects of populist communication. Even a communication-oriented 
approach to populist ideology did not wholly account for the interaction between form 
and content in the processes of representation that I outlined in the conceptual 
framework in chapter two. I suggest that the performance of populism is an empirical 
entry point to the study of populist ideology as it manifests itself communicatively. 
Moreover, this analytical point is based on the conceptual assumption that the process 
of manifesting populist ideology in performance also contributes to its meaning. 
Approaching populism from a performance perspective recognises the social 
construction of populism; the performance happens in a dialectic with the audience 
and it draws on shared cultural resources and symbols that are familiar to the 
audience. The approach thereby reinforces the idea of populism as a mass ideology 
that is socially constructed on the basis of ordinary people’s perceptions of politics. It 
also engages with the constitutive dimension of meaning-making through the notion of 
performativity: a performance creates meaning that evokes an alternative reality, and 
this can have a political and ideological function. It therefore supplements and 
deepens my approach to ideology and recognises both its social construction and its 
constitutive function. 
I have suggested that populist meaning-making occurs in the mutually constitutive 
interaction between populist ideology and its performance. This communicative 
process is the very means of establishing the nature of the relationship between 
populist representatives and the people: the manifestation of populist ideology in 





performance perspective on populism that provides a bridge between populist 
ideology and representation, both conceptually and empirically. At the conceptual 
level I draw on the framework I outlined in chapter two and suggest that 
representation comes about through the interaction between form and content, which 
in politics occurs through performance and ideology. At the empirical level I approach 
populist ideology as manifesting itself in populist performance, often and most clearly 
so in disruptive performance. Such performances symbolically enact the relational 
nature of populist ideology as populists identify with the people in an attack on the 
elite in order to restore sovereignty. We can therefore empirically study the populist 
mode of representation through the process of manifesting populist ideology in 
disruptive performance. With this approach I lay the foundations for addressing the 
question, how does disruptive performance communicatively manifest a populist 
mode of representation? 
Importantly, the integration of populist ideology and performance enables me to 
recognise the meaning-making process that occurs in the interaction between them. 
This perspective links the manifestation of populist ideology in performance with an 
aesthetic approach to populist political representation. The approach enhances our 
knowledge of populism as it allows us to understand how populist ideology translates 
into a particular mode of political representation that is challenging the 
epistemological foundations of representative democracy. Closest to home this mode 
of representation has exposed a cleavage in the public based on their expectations of 
representative democracy that is demonstrated by the results of the British 
referendum to leave the EU.  
My decision to approach populist ideology through its performance – and through 
disruptive performance in particular – also has another advantage. It allows me to take 
the most remarkable and noticeable aspects of populism as a starting point and 
thereby recognise their importance, both in garnering support from a disaffected part 
of the electorate, gaining the attention of the media, and impacting on the political 
process. Rather than dismissing them as ‘mere performance’, I develop a solid 
conceptual foundation for analysing them. Populists have an ability to emotionally 





disruptive and unorthodox modes of communication, and to do so in spectacular ways 
that answer modern media’s invitation to politicians to deliver politics in increasingly 
stylised and spectacular form (Corner and Pels, 2003; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014, p. 
387). The range and hybridisation of media modes and formats of the modern 
mediated environment invite approaches that consider visual, performative and 
aesthetic elements of political representation (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014, p. 385). 
Acknowledging the manifestation of populist ideology in performance enables the 
analysis of the “mechanisms of representation – mediated enactments, televisual 
performances, rallies, speeches, riots, use of certain dress, vernacular and so forth – 
…[and it] stresses the very important (and sometimes forgotten) role of presentation 
in re-presentation.” (Moffitt, 2016, p. 49; emphasis in original). It thereby also 
constitutes a necessary link between populist ideology and the media in processes of 
meaning-making. It brings to mind the necessity of mediation in processes of 
representation, through institutions and technologies, as Moffitt suggests, but also 
through language and symbolic action. 
In the following I adopt a cultural pragmatics (Alexander et al., 2006) perspective on 
performance. This approach enables me to engage with the often spectacular and 
captivating modes of constructing meaning that explain populism’s appeal to both the 
media and its constituents. But it also reminds us that a concern with the means and 
modes of conveyance of meaning should not be at the expense of a simultaneous 
consideration of the central role of text and semantic content in performances of 
representation, nor of the role of context in constituting meaning. I outline this 
approach in the first section of this chapter and hone in on a few specific elements of 
Alexander’s model of social performance that are most relevant to the analysis of 
populism. I then connect these to the notion of disruptive performance. In the second 
section I establish the link between populist performance and political representation. 
Taking the performance of the populist representative claim as my point of departure, 
I develop its two dimensions: self-representation and representation of the people. I 
argue that approaching populism from a performance perspective brings out a 






7.2 SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND POLITICAL PERFORMANCE 
As I have suggested in the preceding chapters and above, I do not conceive of 
performance as simply form without substance. Rather, it is an essential and necessary 
means of manifesting ideology and enacting the representative relationship. In the 
following I develop this perspective further. I argue that political performance 
establishes the relationship between representatives and the people and, in the 
process of doing so, contributes to processes of meaning-making. In this section I 
outline those aspects of social performance theory (Alexander, 2006) that are most 
relevant to conceptualising the performance of populist representation: the means of 
symbolic production, background symbolic resources30 and social power. While these 
are analytical tools that I use in the next empirical chapter, they also conceptually 
connect the process of meaning-making inherent in representation to its democratic 
and socio-political context. Culturally specific background symbols are resources that 
populists draw on to anchor their performance in its context and create familiarity for 
the audience, while the social power exercised by elites in a given democratic context 
confines their performance. These performances in turn have a constitutive function 
that recreates in new form the context on which they are based. This mutually 
constitutive relationship between performance and context in the process of political 
representation is analogous to the perspective on meaning-making that I outlined in 
chapter two. 
7.2.1 THE CULTURAL PRAGMATICS APPROACH TO PERFORMANCE 
In the previous two chapters I developed a notion of populism as a mass ideology 
grounded in people’s conceptions of politics, recognising a distinction between 
ideology as experienced and understood by mass publics and as exuded by elites. The 
view that populist ideology is based on people’s lived experiences suggests that it has a 
material dimension (Eagleton, 1991, p. 14). Ideology interacts with the world through 
processes of representation that produce and reproduce meaning through institutional 
and social practices (Downey, 2008, p. 64). I conceive of such practices as cultural 
performance, which Alexander defines as: 
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…the social process by which actors, individually or in concert, display 
for others the meaning of their social situation. This meaning may or 
may not be one to which they themselves subjectively adhere; it is the 
meaning that they, as social actors, consciously or unconsciously wish 
to have others believe. In order for their display to be effective, actors 
must offer a plausible performance, one that leads those to whom their 
actions and gestures are directed to accept their motives and 
explanations as a reasonable account. (Alexander, 2004b, p. 529). 
An essential characteristic of a cultural pragmatics approach to performance is that it 
consolidates the semantics and pragmatics of communication – the meaning and the 
use of language, to put it plainly. As in the perspective I outlined in chapter two, it 
recognises that content and form interact in the process of representation. The 
pragmatics side of this perspective builds on the work of Goffman and Austin. Goffman 
(1959), with his focus on performance in everyday life, sought to define the person in 
terms of their behaviour in interactions with other people in a set of contingent 
circumstances. He was particularly concerned with the notion of impression 
management as a necessary and ubiquitous way to intentionally and strategically 
negotiate unpredictable social situations. For example, people express themselves 
differently in public-facing situations (frontstage) than in more private backstage 
contexts. Goffman’s perspective highlights the importance of context in defining what 
is deemed appropriate behaviour. It is therefore relevant to the analysis of disruptive 
performance as relative to the norms of a given context.  
Moreover, it is not only the form of disruption that is relative – the types of 
expressions given by the performance such as gestures, facial expressions, things said, 
and so on – but also its force, that is, its effect on reality. Butler notes that,  
[t]he force of the performative is thus not inherited from prior usage, 
but issues forth precisely from its break with any and all prior usage. 
That break, that force of rupture, is the force of the performative, 





Butler’s point that performance builds on established texts but also breaks from them 
is not specific to disruptive performance in the sense I use the term in this study. 
Rather, her argument highlights the constitutive function of performance: while all 
performances build on existing texts, they also reinvent them anew (although 
disruptive performances do so particularly explicitly). In this sense, performance does 
not simply re-present something without a change of meaning occurring through that 
process, just as the work of representation involves more than re-presenting.  
This perspective builds on Austin’s (1975) concern with the use of language. His notion 
of performativity denotes how language aims to get things done and not only to 
describe them. Certain types of speech acts – which I here extend to symbolic acts 
more generally (see for example Alexander, 2006) – have the ability to realise their 
semantic contents. Through what Austin termed their ‘illocutionary force’, they 
constitute reality, while they have consequences beyond the speech act itself through 
their perlocutionary force. Austin suggested that the evaluative standard of 
performatives be “felicity”, as opposed to truth or accuracy, since the latter do not 
necessarily denote whether performatives work successfully. Indeed, whether we 
deem one representation of reality or another truthful is a question of ideology rather 
than performance, as I argued in the preceding chapter in the context of populists’ 
ideological equation of their own world view with truth. 
The aesthetic quality of performance – its ability to constitute reality – explains one 
side of the relationship between performance and its context. Yet neither Goffman nor 
Austin account for the other side of this relationship, namely the “‘citational’ quality” 
(Alexander, 2006, p. 4) of performance also noted by Butler in the quote above. This 
relates to the conceptual framework in chapter two where we saw that Hall stresses 
the cultural situatedness of meaning. In the preceding discussion about ideology, I 
noted this feature in the shaping of the political concepts of an ideology according to a 
given socio-political context. These concepts are also received and interpreted 
according to personal schemas of meaning structures, which themselves are culturally 
situated. But I also noted the active work of performing ideological content to an 





[r]epresentation functions less like the model of a one-way transmitter 
and more like the model of a dialogue... What sustains this 'dialogue' is 
the presence of shared cultural codes, which cannot guarantee that 
meanings will remain stable forever – though attempting to fix meaning 
is exactly why power intervenes in discourse. But, even when power is 
circulating through meaning and knowledge, the codes only work if they 
are to some degree shared… We should perhaps learn to think of 
meaning less in terms of ‘accuracy’ and ‘truth’ and more in terms of 
effective exchange (Hall, [1997]2013, pp. 10–11; italics in original). 
Hall then agrees with Austin about the criteria for evaluating the ability of a 
performance to effectively constitute reality. The cultural codes that are the 
performer’s resources in this respect are what Alexander and Mast are concerned with 
when they seek to connect “the practice of language with its texts” (2006, p. 3). 
Alexander, for example, considers as cultural codes not only language but also the 
ways in which actors in political performances draw on background symbols that are 
culturally specific and collectively shared by the audience and that mediate – both 
ways – between cultural institutions and ideas. Such background symbols are then 
resources for social performers that they can use as a basis for their performative work 
of constituting reality. For, as Butler reminds us, any speech or symbolic act based on 
socially established meanings also reconstitutes and transforms them in the process of 
performing them. Isin and Ruppert sum up her argument well: “If a convention is to be 
cited to accomplish an act, a repetition of certain norms will be necessary. Yet each 
repetition will bring new circumstances to bear on the act, so much so that it is a 
resignification – a new deployment of convention” (2015, p. 56). 
In politics, this constitutive character of performance can be present even in seemingly 
descriptive statements about reality (Alexander, 2012, p. 286) as politicians attempt to 
evoke a particular view of reality and portray it as fact. Such performative 
representations include the evocation of the people, the representatives themselves 
and the political context they respond to (for instance, a crisis is often the vehicle of 
populism; Moffitt, 2016; Taggart, 2000). In this view political representation is a 





and that uses these to creatively constitute a relationship between a representative 
and the people through the aesthetic process of political representation that I outlined 
in chapter two. It thereby shifts from questions of the structural relations and forms of 
representation as addressed by, for instance, Mair, Pitkin and Kriesi, to the 
mechanisms involved in constituting such a relationship (Ankersmit, 2002; Saward, 
2010). It is a perspective that is founded on meaning-making as central to the process 
of political representation and builds on the analogy with communicative processes of 
representation that I outlined in my conceptual framework. In other words, 
communication – and, more specifically, performance – takes centre stage. 
Alexander’s theory of cultural pragmatics brings together “meaning structures, 
contingency, power, and materiality” (ibid., p. 527) in the notion of social 
performance. It thereby resolves the dualism between content and form, ideas and 
materiality, ideology and performance. Within this perspective, when the constitutive 
elements of a performance – systems of collective representation, actors, audience, 
means of symbolic production and mise-en-scène (Alexander, 2006, pp. 32–7) – 
become fused, the performance becomes convincing and effective and the actors 
appear authentic. If these elements remain – or are rendered – de-fused, the 
projected performance comes across as artificial and contrived. I now briefly go 
through the, for my purposes, most important analytical elements of Alexander’s 
model of social performance. 
Means of symbolic production 
The means of symbolic production are the material resources for the projected 
performance. This element of performance acknowledges the integrated relationship 
between meaning and materiality whereby “material things and their uses are shaped 
by meanings” and “meaning gets special power when embodied in materiality” 
(Alexander et al., 2012, p. 18). In the two case studies, they include Farage’s pint of 
beer, the UKIP MEPs’ sucker-pad Union Jacks31 and the EFF’s red domestic workers’ 
uniforms and miners’ helmets (see Figure 4.4). They further include the physical 
setting of a performance. In the case of disruptive performance, this is the institutional 
                                                     
31
 Farage’s most ubiquitous photo opportunity is being pictured with a pint of beer in a traditional British 
pub. In the European Parliament UKIP MEPs habitually stick a small Union Jack to their desks to signal 





setting of parliament, which symbolically contributes to the meaning that disruption 
projects by virtue of the norms and symbols associated with it. The (virtual) setting of 
social media likewise has both a mundane function as a resource for mediation to an 
audience and symbolically produces meaning, for instance in its circumvention of 
‘elite’ media. 
Background symbolic resources 
Background symbols in the form of myths and traditions, collective symbols and 
memories constitute symbolic resources for populist actors and establish the internal 
boundary for a performance (Alexander, 2006, pp. 33, 36). They are “the universe of 
basic narratives and codes and the cookbook of rhetorical configurations from which 
every performance draws” (Alexander, 2006, p. 58). They are therefore culturally 
specific but also to some extent media specific as they include, for instance, social 
imaginaries associated with specific social media platforms. In the case of populism, 
constructions of the ‘heartland’ (Taggart, 2000) hook into cultural investments made 
by the represented (the people) for the purpose of constructing myth anew. To do so, 
populists must make existing myths “walk and talk” through pragmatic action 
(Alexander, 2006, p. 33). We saw in the previous chapter that populists reveal the very 
contingency and contestability of the existing social order by claiming it is a false 
consciousness constructed by the elite. To increase the chances of making their 
projected performance resonate with the audience, they integrate existing background 
symbols to create a ‘fused’ web that is contextual and forms a basis for their own 
ideological demands and alternative construction of reality. That is, they incorporate 
background symbols into their own performative constructions of ideology. I argued in 
chapter five that background symbolic resources are important for the performance of 
populist ideology in particular. As a mass ideology that aims to resonate with public 
perceptions of politics, populism relies heavily on background symbols not only for the 
effective projection of their ideology but as its constitutional basis. Their 
representative claim to speak for the people is based on a representation of 
themselves as the (only) natural authority on key background symbols, such as 







“The distribution of power in society – the nature of its political, economic, and status 
hierarchies, and the relations among its elites” (Alexander, 2006, p. 36) – determines 
access to the means of symbolic production. While background symbolic resources 
constitute the internal boundary of a performance, social power establishes its 
external boundary; together they create the contextual conditions for performance. 
Both background symbols and social power are part of the socio-political context and 
are subject to challenge and change through populist disruption. In established 
democracies we might see more rigid legislative and institutional frameworks and 
norms confining populist disruptive performance. In transitional democracies we may 
see elites adopting authoritarian means of restricting access to the means of symbolic 
production, including the means of mediation, while institutional frameworks are more 
fragile. Social power also involves media ownership structures, political control of 
media, technologies and their affordances, and legal frameworks. 
7.2.2 THE PERFORMANCE AND DISRUPTION OF AUTHENTICITY 
A successful performance depends on the actor(s) re-fusing the elements of a 
performance into a convincing whole so that the audience accepts the actor’s strategic 
intention. As we saw above, this involves the performance creating new meaning but 
building on and referring to shared values inherent in background symbols. A political 
performance that wishes to appear constative whilst evoking a particular value system 
must link the presentation of such views to recognisable myths and collectively held 
beliefs. However, unlike a theatrical performance that relies on the audience’s 
suspension of disbelief, a social performance – and, in particular, a political 
performance – is evaluated on the basis of whether the acting is a true expression of 
the actor’s personality, values and beliefs (Giesen, 2006, pp. 354–5). Artful 
presentation is in politics not to be admired as it is in theatre but is to be distrusted. 
The audience wants to know if the actor is expressing their true inner feelings, for 
people’s real concerns and grievances are at stake. 
Alexander therefore identifies authenticity – as the moral ideal of staying true to 
oneself (Taylor, 1992, pp. 15–16; Trilling, 1972) –  as a criterion of a successful social 





intention of the actor (2006, p. 29,31). An authentic actor appears convincing and 
sincere and to be acting on the basis of honest intentions without ulterior motives of 
manipulation and deceit. However, having honest intentions and being true to their 
values, feelings and beliefs may require the actor to mask the existence of social 
powers that shape the performance and divert it from being a true expression of the 
beliefs that supposedly inspire it. While a performance must work within the 
imposition of social power, its authenticity is established by giving the impression that 
social power is mere means of conveying meaning. 
The notion of authenticity as a performed construct lends itself to practices of 
impression management in the mediated relationship between politicians and the 
public. Its importance has made it “a strategy in its own right” (Enli, 2016, p. 133) in 
attempts to build trust between politicians and the public (Pels, 2003). When 
considering authenticity in relation to the media and processes of mediation, we 
therefore become more concerned with the appearance of being authentic rather than 
with the moral ideal itself as it comes from within. Despite the seeming contradiction, 
authenticity, when aimed at a process of mediation, is a performed quality where the 
performer “seems as though he or she is true to his or her inner self” (Enli, 2015, p. 
111; my emphasis). 
Populist disruptions of political norms and rituals can be seen as attempts to de-fuse 
elite performances as inauthentic. In this sense, disruption is a form of meta-
performance, a performance in itself whose object is to dissect and de-fuse elite 
performances. The act of disruption suggests that the elite have ulterior motives: 
If authenticity marks success, then failure suggests that a performance 
will seem insincere and faked: the actor seems out of role, merely to be 
reading from an impersonal script, pushed and pulled by the forces of 
society, acting not from sincere motives but to manipulate the audience 
(Alexander, 2011, p. 54). 
Moreover, even if performed, authenticity remains imbued with the moral quality 
suggested by Taylor above; inauthenticity is perceived as an immoral quality in a 





the basis of a claim that sees elite authenticity as a cause for concern – for it is a sign of 
the elite successfully duping the people – it disrupts elite performance.  
An authentic political performance then relies on consistency between the 
performance and the actor’s underlying values. In a media climate characterised by the 
risks that ubiquitous visibility brings, a truly authentic political performance can 
therefore only be achieved if the politician’s public persona appears consistent with 
the private one: the performance of authenticity must never be seen to be performed. 
In Goffman’s (1959) terms, authenticity marks the point when frontstage behaviour is 
perceived as consistent with backstage behaviour. Managing visibility, and managing it 
well so as to provide an authentic performance, becomes so much more vital and so 
much more fraught with danger in the new media environment. Especially when 
populist disruptive characters are at play. The populist strategy of making visible the 
false authenticity performances by the elite feeds into a climate of public mistrust 
characterised by the precariousness of authenticity in mediated representation. But 
disruptive acts by definition also serve to construct populists’ own authenticity. In the 
words of Healey (2010, p. 530), “notions of authenticity… idealize the creative 
transgression of social norms”. Through this act of transgression of norms – that is, 
through disruption – populists render elite performances inauthentic while themselves 
evoking the moral ideal of authenticity. 
In addition to consistency with one’s values and beliefs, Enli adds two further criteria 
to the political performance of authenticity: intimacy and spontaneity (2015, chap. 6). 
Spontaneity can be signalled through unscripted moments and a lack of posing. 
Intimacy can be achieved by telling revealing anecdotes or demonstrating closeness to 
the people. In the literature on social media, intimacy is, for instance, connected to 
acts of self-disclosure and disinhibition (see, for example, Miller, 2011). Populists’ 
famous bad manners and breach of the norms of formal speech, dress and behaviour 
serve exactly this purpose. As forms of disruption that signal closeness to the people 
and distance to the political elite, they are inherently intimate and authentic. I posit 
that populists’ disruptive performances in combination with their performative 
identification with the people perform two simultaneous functions. First, they aim to 





scripted, distant from the lives of ordinary people, and intended to deceive. Second, 
they embody these very qualities of spontaneity, consistency and intimacy in populists’ 
own self-representations. Disruption thereby becomes a means for populists to assert 
their outsider status, communicate their ideology in a performance that is consistent 
with its values, and to stake their particular democratic claim to legitimacy through 
authenticity. As such, it is a symbolic manifestation of a specifically populist mode of 
representation. 
Goffman believed that the social world is best discovered in moments where norms 
and conditions fail and thereby expose the rules that bind together the social. In this 
spirit he studied situations of ‘role breaking’ such as embarrassment and inappropriate 
behaviour. The notion of disruption that I have engaged with transfers this argument 
into the world of the political while the perspective of cultural pragmatics bridges the 
theoretical division between ritual and Goffman’s focus on the everyday (Alexander et 
al., 2012). Disruptive performances forcefully create such moments of failure of elite 
performances of authenticity and of the established norms and conditions that they 
perform. In disruptive types of performance, the noncompliance with and challenge to 
norms and rituals, established power structures and their meanings puts a spotlight on 
the elite’s performance of their social power and questions their underlying motives. 
Social power constrains the projected performance by determining access to the 
means of symbolic production and mediation. In the case of the SONA 2015, for 
instance, the government (unsuccessfully) attempted to ban the EFF’s red uniforms in 
parliament, and they censored the public broadcaster. In the case of disruption, social 
power also constitutes the motivation and legitimacy for the performance; disruption 
is by definition an attack on social power. Therefore the physical manifestation of 
social power – in the form of the institutional setting of the disruption and the norms 
and practices that reinforce and constitute social power – are turned into means of 
symbolic production in disruptive performances. As I noted above, this conversion of 
social power into means of symbolic production is a means of achieving authenticity. It 
is in this sense that disruption as a meta-performance deconstructs social power as a 
performance in itself. It is discursive struggle made explicit and made spectacular. 





reproduction of the cultural norms and practices of politics (Spary, 2010). They 
constitute ideological expressions that present a contrasting view to the establishment 
norm in a given context as ideologies of resistance and reformation. Disruptive 
performances are therefore not only discourses that take place in conflict situations 
and thereby enhance ideological discourse; they also create and construct such 
situations and contribute to the meaning of the ideology that they embody. 
Given the central role that social power plays in disruptive performances, I approach 
disruptive performance as a relational concept, as I briefly noted in chapter three. In 
doing so, I build on Moffitt’s deliberately loose term of “bad manners”. These manifest 
themselves in different ways as displays of contempt for the ‘usual’ practices of 
‘respectable’ politics since “considerations of what constitutes appropriate behaviour 
are themselves culturally specific” (2016, p. 58). This relational nature is, for instance, 
evident in different institutional settings having established norms that accept 
different levels of disruption. The South African case exemplifies a context in which 
democratisation has come about through disruptive acts from below and in which the 
political culture is characterised by public protest. This attributes a certain legitimacy 
to acts of disruption from below as a vehicle for the establishment of new norms and 
conditions. In the case of UKIP, in contrast, the European Parliament is a more rule-
driven political culture, with relatively unyielding social powers in the form of 
institutional structures. It is dominated by a mode of elite representation in which 
both norms and conditions are more rigidly adhered to.  
I consider a further relational aspect of disruptive performance in the context of 
mediated as opposed to ‘live’ disruptive performances. Different modes of mediation 
involve different material conditions and imaginaries that in turn enhance or subdue 
the force of disruption and contribute to the meaning-making process. For instance, a 
certain form of speech that would be heavily disruptive in the European Parliament 
would hardly cause a raised eyebrow on Facebook. As I discuss below, disruption from 
below in social media is proscribed by different norms and in some forms is even part 
of the social imaginary of social media, which has become popularly known as a tool of 
democratic revolution (e.g. Diamond, 2010). Social media communication may thus 





7.3 PERFORMANCE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM 
The study of performance in the context of populism has only very recently started 
gaining ground (Ekström et al., forthcoming; Ekström and Morton, 2017; Moffitt, 2016; 
Nolan and Brookes, 2013; Schoor, 2017; Wodak, 2015, chap. 6). Few conceptual 
approaches engage with populism as a mode of representation (Mastropaolo, 2017; 
Roberts, 2017). Even fewer connect populist performance and political representation 
(Moffitt, 2016), and this intersection has yet to be studied empirically. On the basis of 
the preceding discussion about social performance, in this section I consider how the 
two dimensions of the representative claim – self-representation and the evocation of 
the people – are performed in the populist claim. In the course of doing so, I reflect on 
these two dimensions as performances – specifically as performances of populist 
ideology – and on what they tell us about populism’s relationship to representative 
democracy. I therefore engage further with the aesthetic theory of representation that 
I introduced in chapter two. The discussion also builds on the preceding analysis of 
ideology and how populists view its role in representative democracy. 
The first dimension of the populist representative claim, self-representation, rests on 
an ambiguity inherent in populism: the populist as one of the people and as an 
exceptional representative. I noted above that an important aspect of an authentic 
performance is to retain consistency with one’s values and beliefs. I posit that, despite 
the apparent contradiction, this is what populists seek to achieve with their ambiguous 
self-representation as ordinary-yet-extraordinary. Populists’ self-representation as 
ordinary, sees the populist performer embody the people. This is the function that De 
la Torre refers to when he speaks of the populist mode of representation as seeking 
“its unity in the embodiment of the people in the figure or in the name of a leader” (De 
la Torre, 2014, p. 18). Such self-representation of ordinariness is evident in a variety of 
modes of populist performance. Populists keep arguments simple and accessible and 
deliver them in everyday language that often dismisses political correctness. 
Ordinariness also manifests itself in a variety of means of symbolic production that 
draw on shared background symbols, such as Nigel Farage usually being pictured with 





helmets because they are there to work and to signal their identification with the 
Marikana miners. 
Self-representation as ordinary requires the transgression of the norms of formal 
political speech, appearance and behaviour. As a form of disruptive performance, it 
signals intimacy and exposure of the populist’s underlying values and thereby performs 
authenticity. It is a means of bridging the representative gap. Ankersmit (2002) 
suggests that the power imbalance inherent in the representative relationship 
whereby the representative is relatively free to both re-present and construct the will 
of the represented has become too inflexible and should indeed be bridged. Yet 
populists’ performance of the people through embodiment goes one step further. It 
symbolically erases the gap altogether by claiming that no power imbalance exists 
between themselves and the people. Intuitively most people would approve of this 
normative idea of political representation: “the opinions of the electorate’s 
representatives should be exactly the same as those of the electorate itself” 
(Ankersmit, 2002, p. 109). This view of representation is based on the resemblance 
theory (mimesis), which I touched on in chapter two. Ankersmit perceives this 
interpretation of political representation to be incomplete. For representatives are 
more than mere mouthpieces of public opinion. But let us first consider how populists 
might perceive it. I build on my argument from chapters five and six of populism as a 
mass ideology that speaks directly to the majority’s intuitive understanding of politics, 
and I suggest that it also assumes the resemblance theory as a normative position in its 
claim to representation.  
Ankersmit poses the question to resemblance theory of how to identify those most 
suitable to represent the people. What he sees as the obvious response is that “the 
kind of identity at stake in political representation is an identity of opinions and not of 
persons” (2002, p. 110). Therefore the elites deemed most worthy, educated and 
capable should be chosen. What would populists answer to this question? Populist 
ideology manifests itself in a denial that the elite are able to adequately represent the 
people; their use of social power is illegtimate. As I demonstrated with the 
construction of the populist cleavage in the preceding chapter, the elite’s inherent 





inauthentic performances (which populist disruptions expose). When combined with 
populism’s anti-elitism, resemblance theory therefore takes the form of a conflation of 
the people’s opinions with the persons having them. Only those on the ‘right’ side of 
the cleavage can represent: the people and the populists, who are part of the people. 
This conflation speaks to what Ankersmit characterises as a “politically naïve electorate 
[that] will see all difference between itself and its representatives as an impermissible 
distortion” and political misrepresentation (ibid., p. 113). Though we might not like to 
think of our electorate as politically naïve, we saw in the previous chapter that both of 
the populist parties construct such a gap between the people and the elite and portray 
it as what Ankersmit termed “impermissible distortion” in the performance of their 
representative claims. 
To overcome this naivety, Ankersmit argues that the substitution theory ought to 
coexist with the resemblance theory. The former posits that representatives must 
indeed incorporate the political opinions of voters but ought not to determine their 
decision making on them alone and should rather filter them through their 
“enlightened conscience” (Burke, quoted by Ankersmit, 2002, p. 111). This is the 
aesthetic gap that is at the heart of Ankersmit’s normative theory of representation. At 
its core lies a tension between the two theories in the practice of representation. The 
process of representation involves walking a tightrope between direct mimesis – “the 
claims of the represented to become present on their own terms” (Coleman, 2011, p. 
40) – and the elitist aesthetic act of constituting such claims as an alternative reality. It 
must be at once faithful to the wishes and identity of the represented and reconstruct 
them in a way that expresses the representative’s own identity and unique claim. In 
the words of Laclau, “…it is the essence of the process of representation that the 
representative contributes to the identity of what is represented” (quoted in Coleman, 
2011, p. 39). In this sense, full mimesis is an empirical impossibility in both 
communicative and political representation (as Magritte famously points out in his 
painting of a pipe, ‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe’), as we also saw in chapter two. In politics, 
the political representative can never transmit unfiltered the will of the people; nor 





Yet the aesthetic gap between resemblance and substitution is absent in the populist 
claim to be one of the people. Let us consider how this mode of representation is 
performatively achieved. The claim results in the populist mode of representation 
being performed through embodied identification with the people. The people’s 
representatives have to look like or have a shared experience of the lives of the people 
in order to qualify as representatives. Such a mode of representation naturally requires 
symbolic performance that signals identification, and this performance in turn 
constitutes the people (and in doing so, it also legitimises and encourages political 
naivety). Populists reproduce the people in their own image by symbolically 
embodying them 
In doing so, their portrayal of the people through embodiment is in fact not purely 
mimetic (as I initially suggested above). Populists do not look exactly like, or even try to 
look like, the people they claim to represent in such performances. Farage drinks pints 
but his similarity to blue-collar workers does not go much beyond that. The EFF’s chief 
means of symbolic production, their domestic workers’ uniforms, are the communist 
red of their party colour, matching their plastic miners’ helmets in a mishmash of 
symbolic statements, and they clash somewhat with EFF leader Julius Malema’s Gucci 
sunglasses. Rather than attempting pure mimesis, the populist embodiment of the 
people is a token, an invitation for constituents to enter their “representation-game” 
(Csigo, 2009). This invitation is delivered through a performance that relies on iconic 
means of symbolic production, such as clothing and pints, and simultaneously draws 
on shared background symbols. It constitutes the people in an implicitly antagonistic 
relationship to the elite: the British people drink pints, the elite claret; the South 
African people are honest, hard workers, the elite grey-suited traitors enriching 
themselves at the people’s expense. I consider this process of representing the people 
in more detail below. What populists’ self-representations aim for is a full merging of 
their projected performance with the received and mediated performances in which 
the aesthetic gap is absent. 
The elite have now been excluded as appropriate representatives and I can briefly 
address the other side of this ambiguity in populist self-representation, namely 





begins. Populists’ exceptionalism qualifies them and no other ordinary people to be 
representatives, for they have the ability to challenge the social power of the elite. 
Where ordinariness serves to reinforce the authenticity of the populist performance, 
extraordinariness augments the audience’s feelings of efficacy. This extraordinariness, 
however, is unlike that of ‘normal’ representatives’ enlightened conscience as 
suggested by Ankersmit (or so it claims to be). It is derived from populists’ ability to 
see through the veil of deception that is the chief weapon of the establishment and 
inheres in the claim to truth-telling that emerged from my analysis in the previous 
chapter. Populists’ exceptionalism lies in their supposed privileged epistemological 
position where only they have access to the truth. This claim is symbolised by 
disruptive performance as an act of exposure. 
We have already seen in the previous chapter that a feature of populist ideology is the 
portrayal of the people as a totality and as homogenous. This unity of the people is not 
ontologically given. As I argued above, pure mimesis is an impossibility, for in the 
performative act of representation “political practices do not express the nature of 
social agents but, instead, constitute the latter” (Laclau, 2005b, p. 33). This makes the 
idea of the people inherently flexible and socio-politically specific. It is a constructed 
entity, often ambiguously defined to suit the democratic context and ambitions of 
populists. We also saw in chapters five and six that this constitutive function is in 
populism accompanied by a second one whereby the populist representative claim kills 
off ideology and constructs an alternative political spectrum wherein the people is 
unified. With reference to established liberal democracies, Ankersmit fears such a 
state of affairs where “all our individual (long-term) interests lose their specific 
contours and are dissolved into one comprehensive public interest”. Then, as he 
reflects, “it is hard to see what work will be left for democratic politics in the absence 
of conflict” (2002, p. 127). He suggests that such a “plebiscitary” democratic politics 
would only require two non-ideological catch-all parties that citizens can choose from 
in their judgment of competency (ibid., p. 128). The mode of representation offered in 
the populist claim is even less welcome than the scenario painted by Ankersmit. The 
reality that the performance of this claim constitutes does indeed involve two such 
parties: the elite and the populists themselves. But the latter are the only true 





Before we are mired in cynicism as a result of this analysis, let us note the nature of 
the populist claim as a performance. As such it is constructed as a result of a dialectic 
between the populist representative and the represented. While it may be 
performative in its constitution of the people, such a construction is partly based on 
interaction with the audience. The representative and the represented are mutually 
constituted. The populist claim therefore speaks to people’s real needs and concerns. 
As a mass ideology, this is especially the case with populism. Its constitutive function, 
meanwhile, inspires genuine feelings of empowerment, where there was little before, 
and can be a step towards democratic change and even improvement. And, of course, 
the projected performance of the populist representative claim, its essentialist 
cleavage and anti-pluralist evocation of the people is there for audiences to accept or 
reject, to receive on their own terms, or to ignore. 
7.4 DISCUSSION 
The cultural pragmatics approach to social performance reminds us that social actors 
are concerned with conveying meanings to others, and they do so through 
performance. To encourage their audiences to believe these meanings, they attempt 
to create an authentic performance by creating a shared understanding of their 
intentions. In other words, for the performance to be successful, the audience must 
believe that the content and intentions of the performance are honest and truthful so 
that they establish identification with the actor. Performers draw on a repertoire of 
collectively shared background symbols and texts to aid such identification, yet in re-
presenting these texts, they necessarily add to and change their meaning in the 
process of performing them. We can therefore see a parallel between performance 
and the two notions of representation that I integrated in chapter two – aesthetic and 
political – for both performance and representation involve more than mimesis. This 
‘more’ is developed through a mutually constitutive process with external context. In 
Alexander’s model, we can see context playing into the process of performance 
through three functions. First, background symbols are context-specific resources for 
actors. Second, social powers constrain performances but are in authentic 
performances converted into part of the performer’s symbolic repertoire. Third, 





through their enaction effect consequences upon their context. This is enlightening as 
to how comparative study might add to our understanding of populist communication. 
As I found was the case with ideology, it suggests a focus on process as the comparable 
element in different contexts. 
In this sense the form and content of every performance are unique, and every 
performance potentially has a political function. Moreover, such a political function – 
the manifestation of ideology through performance – implies an intention to represent 
reality in the form of a distortion. As I argued in chapter five, such a distortion is a 
necessary and ubiquitous function of ideology and so does not necessarily signify an 
intention to misrepresent or mislead. When we apply this perspective to the 
performance of political representation, the intention that lies behind the creative act 
of an ideological (re-)constitution of reality should be to represent the people’s 
interests and not those of the representative’s. The performance will be perceived as 
authentic if the political representative’s values and beliefs are consistent with their 
performance; that is, if the representative believes that his ideology serves the 
people’s interests and s/he faithfully manifests this ideology through performance. If 
the performance of representation is perceived as hollow and seen to be undertaken 
as a mere abuse of political norms and procedures with an intention to manipulate, it 
will come across as inauthentic.  
A social performance perspective on populist communication is then able to deepen 
our understanding of how populist ideology manifests itself performatively and 
provides a link between populist ideology and a populist mode of representation that 
enables a nuanced and critical analysis. As a particularly emblematic manifestation of 
populist ideology, disruptive performance can be seen as a kind of meta-performance 
that dissects and undermines elite performance and renders it inauthentic. To achieve 
this, populists represent the elite as scripted, as having values and intentions at odds 
with their performance and as being distant from the people. Such disruptive 
performances are of course themselves performances that aim to construct 
authenticity through spontaneity, consistency and intimacy. They achieve this 
particularly effectively by combining disruption with identification with the people by 





These two key aspects of populist performance in turn construct the populist’s 
relationships to the people and the elite and constitute a populist mode of 
representation. The latter aspect of their performance – identification with the people 
– suggests that the populist is simply a conductor of public opinion with no friction or 
transformation occurring in the process of political representation. Yet we have seen 
that this level of disintermediation in the form of pure mimesis is not possible, even if 
it is suggested by the populist mode of representation. Populist disruptive 
performances are themselves manifestations of populist ideology and, as such, they 
distort reality. The other side of a prototypical populist performance – exposure of 
elite performance through disruption and a claim to truth-telling – introduces a 
problematic essentialism that dismisses ideology and other differences of opinion as 
sources of disagreement in politics and establishes the populist representative as the 
only morally entitled one. In combination with the populist claim to identification with 






8. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE POPULIST REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM: 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Cape Town, 12 February 2015 
The hubbub in parliament falls silent as President Jacob Zuma and his highly 
choreographed ceremonial procession slowly enter. Behind him walk the Usher of the 
Black Rod, whose official role is to accompany the procession, and the Serjeant-at-
Arms, bearing the mace, a decorated rod that symbolises the authority of parliament. 
A traditional praise singer, clad in tribal costume, is chanting a poem. All MPs in the 
chamber and invited members of the audience and the press in the gallery rise. They 
know their designated roles. It is a well-established ritual and its form is rigidly 
adhered to; proceedings have not deviated once since its inception at the abolishment 
of Apartheid in 1994. Until today: members of the EFF refuse to rise. The focus of the 
ritual on the single purpose of the occasion – the president delivering his annual State 
of the Nation Address – they describe in a tweet as “that state of the nonsense” 
(EFF_tweet18).  
Strasbourg, 1 July 2014 
The official flag-raising ceremony opens the European Parliament for the season. A 
chamber orchestra is set up in the parliamentary chamber. As it starts playing 
Beethoven’s Ode to Joy, the European anthem, all MEPs in the chamber rise. Another 
well-established ritual, everybody here, too, knows the drill. But one group does not 
conform. Uncannily echoing their South African colleagues, the 24-strong team of 
newly elected UKIP MEPs turn their backs as the anthem plays. Such an act of protest 
is hitherto unheard of in the rigid practice of norms in Europe’s largest democratic 
institution. Yet to UKIP, this ritual is also “nonsense” (UKIP_col2), a celebration of a 
federalist “fanaticism” (UKIP_press4) under the guise of ritual. 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
UKIP and the EFF’s disruptions are acts of exposure that collide with ritual in 
symbolically mediated claims: to the populist parties, the elite are deceiving the 





disguise it. UKIP and the EFF’s claims about the role of political performance in 
representative democracy are closely tied to their respective attitudes to ideology and 
shaped by their available background symbolic resources. Both deride the elite for 
their impression management practices as such attempts at managing visibility result 
in inauthentic performances that, in turn, establish a false foundation for the public’s 
feelings of democratic empowerment. In this chapter I explore the populist attitude to 
political performance and the role they attribute to it in representative democracy. Yet 
I do not just take these claims at face value but rather analyse them as performances 
in and of themselves. With this analysis I address the research question, how does 
disruptive performance communicatively manifest a populist mode of 
representation? My contention is that the two populist parties’ claims about 
performance contribute to their shared epistemological assumption of the existence of 
objective truth that I demonstrated in chapter six. Through the performance of this 
claim, it translates into a populist mode of representation that redefines truth as 
authenticity. 
In my exploration of the above question I focus on norms and rituals as sites that lend 
themselves to symbolic action through disruption. In all the disruptive events that I 
have analysed, norms and rituals emerge as sites of performative and discursive 
struggle between the elite and the populist parties. To the elite, their norms and rituals 
are endowed with a concrete purpose that is necessary to the functioning of 
democracy. To the populist parties, such elite practices are masquerades that cover up 
the self-serving intentions of the elite. Since a felicitous performance must lead “those 
to whom their actions and gestures are directed to accept their motives and 
explanations as a reasonable account” (Alexander, 2004b, p. 530), undermining the 
motives that underlie elite performances renders them inauthentic. The populist 
parties’ claims do exactly that. By portraying the elite as immoral and self-interested 
performers, they de-fuse elite performance and offer an alternative mode of 
representation based on authenticity and shared identity. At the same time, the 
disruption of ritual is particularly noteworthy and spectacular for questioning a 
performance that is usually taken for granted. The populist disruption of ritual is a 
form of meta-performance that seeks to expose the ritual as 'mere performance', a 





I approach the question above by investigating the dimensions of the representative 
claim: self-representation and representation of the people. We saw in the previous 
chapter that these two dimensions are not easily disentwined in the case of populism 
in particular since populists often evoke the people through embodiment and 
identification. Moreover, both the people and the populists themselves are often 
implicitly defined in negative terms through evocations of the elite. I therefore start 
out by exploring the populist claims about elite performance. As was the case in 
chapter six with respect to ideology, the populist conceptions of political performance 
are often reductionist and do not correspond to my own. In the following I therefore 
use terms such as ‘rhetoric’, ‘theatrics’ and ‘masquerade’ to denote the populist 
parties’ conceptions of performance and retain the term ‘performance’ for my own 
analytical use. I then turn to more direct references to populists’ self-representation 
and evocation of the people: claims about their own lack of impression management 
and their self-representation as authentic, their embodiment of the people in claims to 
ordinariness and their extraordinary status as truth tellers. I conclude with a discussion 
about the populist mode of representation that has emerged from the analysis and the 
implications for the representation of the people. 
8.2 ELITE PERFORMANCE IN THE POPULIST REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM 
Political rituals have an unquestionable status as successful elite performances. 
Disrupting them can consequently be particularly forceful in performative terms and 
garner great attention. A core argument in UKIP’s and the EFF’s claims about the deceit 
inherent in elite performance and ritual is the ways in which the elite use them as 
image management tools to present a front that hides reality. When the ulterior 
motives of such elite performances are exposed by populist disruptive action, they are 
rendered inauthentic and the elite’s performances of representation are undermined. 
In the next three sections I explore, first, the two parties’ claims as to the elite’s image 
management practices; second, their claims of the inauthenticity of such 
performances; and, third, UKIP’s and the EFF’s claims that the lack of closeness 





8.2.1 THE ELITE’S IMAGE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: POLITICAL THEATRE AND 
OPPORTUNISM 
Strategic self-representation – the application of a filter between, on the one hand, 
their real intentions and beliefs and, on the other, their outward performance – 
epitomises the populist representation of the elite’s performance of their value 
systems (or lack of them). But it is also the currency of politics. In both the EFF’s and 
UKIP’s claims, political norms and rituals are the elite’s ultimate means of constructing 
and exercising power and maintaining their hold over the people through practices of 
false consciousness: they are performances of deception designed to satisfy the media 
and dupe the people into compliance. UKIP and the EFF therefore portray institutional 
rituals as masquerades that undermine the democratic function of parliament. They 
see such elite performances as carefully staged events designed to control the elite’s 
front and hide the unpalatable reality by offering naturalised spectacle. 
The moments in a ritual where its orchestration works so visibly, where the audience 
know exactly what to expect and all assembled actors perform in perfect unison, are 
the ideal points of disrupting it. When the highly choreographed and very formal 
procession of the president enters the parliamentary chamber (EFF_live1), all 
participants – except the EFF – unquestioningly perform their parts and rise for the 
president. But the EFF remain sitting. Their symbolic act signifies a refusal to conform 
to norms based on the premise of visibility management, especially where, in the case 
of Zuma, the ritual serves to gloss over deeper democratic and constitutional issues. In 
Alexander's terms, by pointing to the ritual’s nature as a performance of social power 
through a refusal to act out the script assigned to them, the EFF’s symbolic actions turn 
social power into a performative resource. In doing so, they de-fuse the elite’s 
performance of the SONA ritual and reveal it as inauthentic because it is inconsistent 
with the underlying reality and values of the elite.  
In the case of the South African elite, the importance that the elite lend to the occasion 
of the SONA is such that the adherence to ritualised practices and norms carries 
greater weight than rules and laws in the conduct of politics. As the chair of the 
proceedings of the SONA, the speaker's focus is on the purpose of the occasion and its 





MPs’ many interruptions: “It is important that this sitting focuses on the business of 
the day, and that is for the president to deliver the state of the nation address” 
(EFF_live1). This to the EFF is an abuse of social power and an excuse to keep tight 
control of the government’s managed front. By portraying the ritual of the SONA as a 
masquerade, the EFF seek to burst its felicity bubble. Their symbolic actions of refusing 
to conform to the formalities of the ritual point to its meaninglessness and discrepancy 
with political reality. It does not represent the real state of the nation: “…many live in 
homes they do not own, they drive cars they do not own, and use household furniture 
they do not own… This is the state of the nation” (EFF_press3). Such accusations of 
misrepresenting reality feed into – and constitute – the perception that Ankersmit’s 
(2002, p. 113) “politically naïve” electorate have of political representation. 
The EFF refuse to accept such hollow norms and ritual as a legitimate foundation for 
social power. In response to the speaker’s insistence on the purpose of the ceremonial 
occasion of the SONA, Malema champions the rules of parliament as the manifestation 
of democratic principles and attributes them value above norms and ritual: “it is within 
my right to speak as a member of this House, and remind you that it is incorrect of you 
to want to suggest that when the President speaks, you suspend the Rules” 
(EFF_live1). In doing so, he directly challenges and reattributes meaning to the purpose 
that the speaker lends to the occasion: “…we are doing the business of today” 
(EFF_live1; italics indicate verbal emphasis). The EFF’s “business of today” is the 
pressing question of Zuma evading corruption charges and of fulfilling their duty as 
opposition of holding him to account. 
A discursive struggle over the meaning of the SONA ritual and over the government’s 
exercise of social power more broadly is taking place. It is norms against rules. When 
the discursive struggle heats up after a series of challenges by the EFF and dismissals 








Speaker: I am not allowing you honourable members because I have 
explained to you that you are actually abusing... 
Malema: - Which Rule are you using, my honourable Speaker? Which 
Rule are you using to deny members to raise a point of order? They are 
protected by the Rules. You cannot be emotional about it. Point us to 
the Rule which gives you the power to deny us points of order. 
(EFF_live1) 
In denoting the EFF’s rule-bound behaviour an abuse of the rules, the speaker suggests 
an important analytical point: where rules and institutional frameworks usually 
constitute the external boundaries of a performance in the form of social power 
(Alexander, 2006, p. 36) – that is, they restrict and confine the performance – the EFF 
turn them into a resource; they become part of their script. In response to the speaker, 
Malema challenges the foundation of her social power. He constructs a binary 
between rules and the speaker’s “emotional” behaviour and creates a chain of 
equivalence between the elite, irrationality and ritual. In this claim, the rules 
championed by the EFF are logical, rational and the means of conducting democratic 
business and are being undermined by the ritual of the SONA. 
When the speaker finally expels all EFF MPs from the House, the EFF turn their legal 
argument into a moral one by referring to the speaker's lack of moral superiority: 
“Honourable Speaker, you are not a bishop! I am appealing to your conscience!” 
(EFF_live1). Not only does the speaker have no legal foundation for her use of social 
power, neither does she have a moral one. Taking the chain of equivalence one step 
further, an EFF MP adds, “Hopefully you still have a revolutionary conscience! 
[Interjections]” (EFF_live1). He thereby associates revolutionary politics and the 
background symbol of the freedom struggle against Apartheid with moral behaviour. 
The irrationality and illegality of ritual become equated with immorality and 
deprivation of freedom. The binary that the EFF construct through this struggle is no 
longer simply norms versus rules; it is now norms, immorality and authoritarianism 





The discursive struggle reaches a new level when the speaker’s use of social power in 
her attempt to confine and set the boundaries of the EFF’s performance also, like 
institutional rules, becomes part of the EFF’s script. In her attempts to impose 
discipline by reference to norms and procedure, the EFF claim, the speaker is intending 
to shut down opposing voices in a partisan and authoritarian manner. She therefore 
uses a strategy of masquerading behind procedure. In the performance of this claim, 
the EFF constitute the imposition of discipline as an illicit performance that they liken 
to the behaviour of the Apartheid regime. By implication, their own position is 
associated with the background symbols (Alexander, 2006, p. 33) of liberation and 
freedom fighting. Liberation, as we saw, is a central element in the public’s 
understanding of democracy. The interpretation of the central populist concept of 
sovereignty as liberation is then the foundation for the EFF’s performance of their 
mass ideology. As the EFF turn the limiting, constrictive qualities of social power into 
the central background symbol that their ideology builds on, they gain a resource for 
the expression of their mass ideology and for the constitution of a moral cleavage on 
its basis. They “defend and stand for what is right” (EFF_press7; my emphasis). 
The argument of the elite’s immoral use of ritual as an image management tool is part 
of a broader claim about the role of performance and its relationship to ideology in 
South African democracy. The EFF berate the “hollow recitals of the freedom charter 
by the ANC”, which are “pure farce” (EFF_press2). Their proof of the elite’s 
inauthenticity lies in the inconsistency between the strong South African background 
symbol of the Freedom Charter and the ANC’s actual world views. In fact, the EFF 
claim, the ANC is “implementing a neo-liberal, right wing and capitalist programme... 
and any talk of the Freedom Charter is meant to mislead the people of South Africa” 
(ibid.; my emphasis). Such behaviour is immoral, and the ANC’s motives are not 
genuine, for “we know… that the ANC will never nationalise Mines [as stated in the 
Freedom Charter] because majority of its senior leaders are privately benefitting from 
privately owned Mines” (EFF_press2). With such disingenuous motives, their 
performance is exposed as inauthentic. Moreover, in South African politics, such false, 
empty evocation of the Freedom Charter equates to democratic blasphemy, a betrayal 
of the ideas underlying the struggle for independence, which in turn is a betrayal of the 





portray their own mass ideology as having sole ownership of the background symbol of 
the freedom struggle and the associated notion of liberation. In other words, in the 
EFF’s claim, the elite are democratic pretenders while the EFF themselves 
performatively constitute their ideology as the only right one. 
Like the EFF, UKIP expose European Parliamentary norms and rituals as staged image 
management events that are detrimental to democratic representation. At the EP’s 
opening ceremony, UKIP’s act of protest of turning their backs to the chamber 
orchestra playing the EU anthem is a striking echo of the EFF’s refusal to stand for 
President Zuma. With their symbolic act, UKIP not only denounce what they perceive 
as the hidden meaning of the ritual – the fanatic federalism that I found in UKIP’s claim 
in chapter six – but also the ritual performance of the anthem as a “stiff and stagey 
ceremony” (UKIP_col2). Their disruption reveals it as a spectacle designed to manage 
and control the elite’s image at the expense of “stand[ing] up for our people” 
(UKIP_tweet5).  
In UKIP’s claim, the relationship between the elite’s ideology and their performance as 
a means to image management is a complex one. In a newspaper column, Farage 
describes the EP opening ceremony as “this rampant EU nationalism, with its clear 
disregard for the recent Euro election results [which saw a record number of 
Eurosceptic MEPs elected]” (UKIP_col2). He portrays the EP's performance of ritual as 
presenting ideological “fanaticism” (UKIP_press4) in palatable form to an unsuspecting 
public. The nature of ritual helps the medicine go down. Farage’s bone is with the false 
consciousness that is being imposed through the EP ritual and the way the elite’s 
performance of ritual is used to hide EP fanaticism in plain view. This ideology is an 
absurd form of “anti-democratic zealotry” (UKIP_live4). Its “nationalism” is on a scale 
of extremism comparable to Nazism, as he suggests in a supposedly offhand comment 
to a fellow MEP: “If this were carried out in Germany it would be considered too 
nationalistic” (UKIP_vid1; see also Figure 3.7). The background symbol of Nazism 
clearly communicates the value system underlying the EP ritual as deeply immoral. 
Yet in UKIP’s claim their disruption does not only aim to reveal the ritual as a 
performance of fanaticism by the elite. Indeed, Paul Nuttall points out the emptiness 





ceremonial military parades, playing of the European anthem. UKIP representatives, in 
contrast, are true representatives of the people: "We stand up for our people, not the 
EU flag and anthem" (UKIP_tweet5). ‘Proper representation’ and the ritual of the EP 
opening ceremony and its symbols are here portrayed as mutually exclusive, for the EP 
symbols do not correlate with reality as symbols ought. In fact, their nationalism is 
“faux nationalism” (UKIP_press1): the EU has no national people to celebrate and 
hypocritically condemn others’ shows of nationalism (UKIP_col2). While the EU’s 
extremist ideology is portrayed as immoral and nonsensical, it is also directly 
detrimental to “our people” (UKIP_tweet5). The means of symbolic production it is 
performed through are not symbols of democratic representation; nor do they 
conform to the requirements of communicative representation, for their signifier and 
signified are incompatible. Federalist rituals are therefore consciously misleading, a 
guise for extremism and a means of portraying unpalatable values as innocent through 
the misuse of symbolic action. The purpose of UKIP’s disruption is to reveal this 
inauthenticity. 
8.2.2 THE ELITE’S LACK OF AUTHENTICITY: “HOLLOW WORDS SPOKEN IN STRATEGIC 
ORATION” 
In a climate where new weapons of visibility make self-representations increasingly 
fragile, it is politicians’ authenticity that is at stake. We have seen that the moral 
opposition between elite and people that forms the basis of populist ideology makes 
the authenticity of the elite a prime target of populist attack. Populists expose elite 
performance as unspontaneous, calculated and aimed at mediation. They thereby 
engender mistrust of the elite’s intentions and a suspicion of inconstancy and 
fabrication in their mediated fronts, which prevents intimacy with the public. These 
are the very qualities – spontaneity, intimacy and consistency – that I argued in the 
preceding chapter comprise performances of authenticity. I now interrogate this 
claimed inauthenticity of the elite’s practices of image and impression management in 
more detail. 
UKIP’s and the EFF’s representative claims about the calculated fronts of elites are 
founded on the view that a politician’s performance must accurately and consistently 





use of background symbols and their value system, their pompous posturing, and the 
rehearsed nature of their performance. Again and again the two parties point out how 
the elite’s scriptedness and concern with image management above sincerity mislead 
the people. A UKIP MEP in an interview I conducted put it that, elite politicians have: 
…a clear message that has been tested and distilled over a period of 
time and it is – it is as though everything that is said is rehearsed… 
politicians by definition apply filters to what they say before they say it, 
they think about how a newspaper will report the words that they are 
using… they deliver a speech that is very scripted and they are the ones 
putting on an act quite often (UKIP MEP, 2017; italics denote verbal 
emphasis). 
The UKIP MEP associates scripted behaviour with filtering. The implication is that the 
purpose of the elite’s communication with the public is persuasion and gaining media 
attention, not keeping citizens adequately and truthfully informed. Scripted 
performances – when exposed as such – create distance between representatives and 
people, a lack of intimacy and trust, because they suggest that the representative is 
not performing his or her true self. In UKIP’s claim, their exposure of the scriptedness 
of the elite’s image management practices is therefore undertaken for the sake of the 
people. When UKIP claim that Nigel Farage “exposes EU hypocrisy and faux outrage” 
(UKIP_press10), they are pointing to the elite’s inauthenticity. This is part of ‘the truth’ 
that populists seek to expose. In other words, insincerity in the form of inconsistency 
between the elite’s performance and underlying values and motives does not only 
amount to inauthenticity in the populist claim. Given the moral nature of the populist 
claim to impartiality and representation, an inauthentic performance amounts to 
deception and untruthfulness. It erodes the foundations of representative democracy. 
Like UKIP, the EFF criticise the scripted nature of Zuma’s SONA in implicit contrast to 
their own spontaneous performance: “Zuma [must] not read but must speak and only 
refer to notes. He must not read to us. We're not in Sunday school” (EFF_tweet25). 
The lack of spontaneity in the elite’s scripted behaviour signals an attempt to hide 
their real selves, their backstage behaviour, in an attempt at impression management. 





prevents any kind of intimacy with the public. In this respect, however, the EFF’s claim 
differs from UKIP’s. The elite do not lack shared experience with the people. Rather, 
the new black elite in South Africa have enriched themselves at the expense of their 
own people, that is, black South Africans. In the EFF’s claim, the socio-economic gulf in 
South Africa and the high levels of institutionalised corruption go to the extent of the 
elite literally robbing the people of their rights and of their resources. In the next 
section I consider the different representations of the elite’s distance from the people 
in the two parties’ claims. 
8.2.3 THE ELITE’S UNREPRESENTATIVENESS: MISLEADING MISREPRESENTATIONS 
So far we have seen that both UKIP and the EFF suggest that the elite’s representative 
relationship to the people is constructed through inauthentic image management 
practices. In making this claim, the two parties de-fuse the elite’s performance of 
political representation. If the populist parties’ own performances of de-fusion are 
felicitous, they undermine the elite’s relationship to the people. I now consider how 
the two parties supplement this performance with the claim that the elite are 
unrepresentative because of their lack of closeness to the people. Understanding this 
claim gets us closer to pinning down the nature of the populist mode of 
representation. 
In chapter six I demonstrated how both UKIP and the EFF accuse the elite of being 
removed from the people, in UKIP’s case due to a cultural schism, and in the EFF’s case 
due to betrayal. As we have seen, UKIP’s anti-institutionalism means that they link the 
culture of self-obsessive “big politics” (UKIP_live1) to the institution of the EU itself. 
They see it as unnecessarily mediating the relationship between the people and their 
national representatives and, in doing so, weakening responsiveness and efficacy. In 
UKIP’s claim, the European Parliament is characterised by “hyper-controlled and 
fastidiously regulated dreary procedures… [and the] bleakly beige and militaristic 
exercise” of rules and norms (UKIP_col1). Not exactly the epitome of listening and 
responsiveness. This is the meaning projected by UKIP’s disruptive performances when 
they turn the social power embodied in the institutional setting of the EP into a means 





In UKIP’s claim, the EU’s structural lack of closeness to the people also takes the form 
of a lack of identification between the people and the elite that disqualifies the elite as 
representatives. For instance, we saw previously Farage provocatively accuse his 
colleagues of living in a “bubble” (UKIP_press6) and not having any shared life 
experience with the people they claim to represent. In Farage’s claim the elite’s lack of 
familiarity with the lives of ordinary people results in a chasm that entirely separates 
the EU elite and their project from the interests of the people and prevents the elite 
from seeing their own lack of representative capacity. In this claim, the elite’s lack of 
resemblance to the people is a sign of a representative gap that cannot be bridged – a 
diagnosis that Farage shares with Ankersmit, as I discussed in the previous chapter. But 
Farage demands identification between elite and people in terms of life experience – 
and not just opinions – as a solution. This is a particular interpretation of the 
resemblance theory that departs from Ankersmit’s argument as it conflates the 
people’s opinions with their identity. He wants representatives to ‘perform the 
people’, so to speak, not to act on behalf of them. 
When Farage further connects the lack of resemblance to deceit, he represents the 
elite’s interests as entirely at odds with those of the people and as morally tainted. The 
elite are set on pursuing their interests “by stealth, by deception, without ever telling 
the truth” (UKIP_live1) at the expense of democratic representation. UKIP MEP (and 
very-short-lived party leader) Diane James makes this behaviour explicit in her 
portrayal of elite performance in a comment to the chamber as a, 
total misrepresentation of facts and issues… and misleading 
interpretation of history, UK economics and EU evolution… political 
theatre, histrionics and political opportunism at full throttle by the 
Europhiles, and all because the United Kingdom has chosen to leave the 
European Union. (UKIP_live2) 
The issue here is not only that the elite’s performance of representation is based on 
deceit. They are deliberately misleading the people. 
While UKIP connect the problem of inadequate elite representation with political 





through authoritarian abuses of social power rather than through institutional 
bureaucracy. Unlike UKIP, the EFF champion institutions as means of achieving 
responsiveness and empowerment; democratic institutions are strong background 
symbols in the South African context. Malema claims, “We’re not going to bus people 
to parliament. We’ve been elected to represented [sic] them in parliament” 
(EFF_tweet12). He critiques the ANC’s practice of constructing false impressions of 
public support for parliamentary debates by transporting busloads of cheering citizens 
into parliament for the sake of appearing popular in media coverage. Instead, he 
claims, he will rely on the institution of representative democracy to deliver the 
people’s wishes. In the EFF’s claim, it is not representative democracy as an institution 
that is inefficacious; the root of the problem is that the elite are corrupting it by 
pandering to the media.  
A further difference between UKIP’s and the EFF’s claims as to the elite’s lack of 
representative capacity lies in where they locate the problem of the elite’s lack of 
closeness to the people. Both parties strengthen their claims to the elite’s distance 
from the people by pointing to a missing bond of trust as well as of communication. 
However, in UKIP’s case, this non-existent bond is, as we have seen, based on a 
combination of immorality and a cultural schism: the elite live in a bubble and have no 
experience of the lives of ordinary people, neither do they wish to have it. In the EFF’s 
case, in contrast, the bond has been broken by a betrayal of their own people – that is, 
black South Africans, “those who fought… for political freedom so abused by Zuma and 
company today” (EFF_live1). 
In the EFF’s claim, ritual is the elite’s means of using social power to conceal 
authoritarian behaviour and ill-gotten gains. Yet it is not necessarily ritual in and of 
itself that they are opposed to. It is ritual being used as masquerade or as a disguise for 
ideology, when the performance of ritual is inconsistent with the values and principles 
that underlie it. This becomes evident when Malema argues for the importance of the 
presidential oath by reference to the rituals surrounding it: he attributes the oath 






And that oath of office, the way it is so important. There is a special day 
where people get convened throughout South Africa to gather, on the 
south lawns of the Union building. Where a president on that day 
specially takes an oath of office. That's how important it is. Everything 
stops. (EFF_conf3) 
In the EFF’s argument, if ritual denotes such import, it is crucial that it is performed 
with integrity, that its meaning is honoured; in other words, that it is authentic. 
Otherwise the efficacy it inspires is established on false premises. As is the case with 
President Zuma in their claim. 
In the two parties’ claims, this status of ritual differs so that the claims retain their 
internal coherence. Malema’s comment above associates the sacrosanct nature of the 
oath with the office of the president as a democratic institution and contrasts it with 
Zuma’s sacrilegious behaviour as an individual member of the elite. Rituals are 
institutional and thus manifest central democratic principles, and the South African 
elite abuse them, just as they do ideology. UKIP denounce any ritual undertaken on 
behalf of the institution of the EU by virtue of the illegitimacy of the institutions 
themselves and the ideology they espouse. Despite their differences on the role of 
institutions, the two parties then share a view of performance as not bad in itself but 
as abused by the elite as a way to disguise their real motives and manipulate the 
people into subscribing to a false consciousness. In both cases, the elite’s performance 
of institutionalised political ritual is therefore undemocratic and should be exposed as 
inauthentic. 
Much of what I have explored so far – the two parties’ claims that the elite are more 
concerned about managing their image than with serving the people – centres on the 
inauthenticity of the elite’s performance of representation. We have seen that UKIP 
and the EFF share a representation of the elite as deceitful performers whose 
frontstage behaviour is inconsistent with their backstage values and whose motives 
are not what they appear to be. As is the case with the EFF, UKIP’s distrust of ritual is 
symptomatic of a more fundamental view of the relationship between performance 
and ideology in representative democracy where elites engage in political theatre for 





false consciousness, any sense of efficacy residing in the people is based on false 





8.3 PERFORMING THE POPULIST REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM: SELF-
REPRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE 
Populists’ self-representations are evoked in stark contrast to the elite’s inauthentic 
pandering to the media through image management practices. Their evocation of the 
people is in turn constituted largely through identification and self-representation. The 
populist mode of representation is thus performed through an intricate web of 
relational identities, roles and motives. I now look at how populists in their own self-
representations – and thereby representations of the people – refute each of the 
charges they have levied against the elite, yet somehow perform these claims in ways 
that achieve what the elite had ultimately set out to do in the first place. First, they 
deny all practices of image management, yet they obtain control of their visibility. 
Second, they acquire such visibility management through inherently authentic 
performances. Third, they justify their roles as representatives through two 
contradictory claims. These form an ambiguous yet effective form of self-
representation that is united by the theme of disintermediation: on the one hand, a 
claim to embodiment and self-representation as ordinary and, on the other hand, a 
claim to truth-telling and self-representation as extraordinary. 
8.3.1 POPULIST IMAGE MANAGEMENT 
We have seen so far that both populist parties express concern about the effects upon 
representative democracy of the elite’s impression management, inauthenticity and 
misrepresentations of reality. Given that the two parties represent themselves as 
transparent truth tellers, they deny any impression management of their own. Yet, as 
Goffman (1959) holds, everyone performs. Moreover, their own performances are, by 
the very nature of performance, oriented towards an audience where impression 
management and visibility are essential qualities. 
Deriding the elite for their false performances of social power aimed at controlling 
visibility, both parties deny any practices of visibility management themselves: “We’re 
not there to impress you (media)”, tweet the EFF (EFF_tweet23). They even portray 
any kind of pandering to the media as incompatible with principled democratic 





must stick to the principle” (EFF_tweet24). Freedom from the artifice of mediated 
politics, in this claim, creates the opportunity to deal with pressing political issues and 
pursue democratic principles.  
Indeed, it is such principles of democratic accountability and truth that both parties 
claim are the motivation for their disruptions. While political norms mask the 
undemocratic intentions of the elite, the disruption of norms is an act of truth-telling. 
Farage makes a point of paying homage to truth, not norms, when he is reprimanded 
by the EP chair for breaking the norms of acceptable political speech: 
Tajani: This Parliament has institutional functions, as does the 
Commission. Out of institutional respect for the Commission, but also as 
a result of the Commission's precedent, we need to be polite please, so 
thank you [shouts from chamber]. 
Farage: And out of institutional respect, President, to the truth, perhaps 
you will understand and agree with me that within the European form 
of law-making it is the unelected Commission that has the sole right to 
propose legislation. If I’m wrong in saying that, you can throw me out of 
this Parliament right here, right now, this afternoon [scattered 
applause]. 
(UKIP_live4) 
As Farage champions the ‘institution of truth’ and himself as its voice, he dismisses the 
undemocratic institution of the EU. Its norms and rule of law are an illegitimate basis 
of its social power, and the chairperson and his reprimand give an inauthentic 
performance of this power. He thereby turns the chairperson’s attempt at exercising 
social power into a resource in a move that echoes the EFF’s utilisation of the 
speaker’s attempt at discipline. This strategy is inherent to disruptive performance and 
manages to communicate a sophisticated and complex democratic claim in very clear 
and accessible symbolic terms. It simultaneously overcomes the restrictions put on the 
performance, symbolically communicates the illegitimacy of the elite’s power, and 
makes a claim to perform on principled grounds and be motivated by principles rather 





While the two parties deny practices of image management that compromise their 
principles for the sake of capturing media attention or complying with institutional 
norms, they do attract media attention and garner visibility. Their silent, simple acts of 
turning their backs or refusing the stand are at once symbolically clear statements of 
protest and challenge the established structure of meaning-making. On the morning 
after the EP opening ceremony, most newspapers feature a large image of the quietly 
protesting UKIP MEPs. Likewise, the simple, visual symbolism of the British flags 
planted on UKIP MEPs’ desks in the EP rarely fails to get them pictured in the press 
(UKIP_news6, UKIP_news9). Farage’s provocations are designed around memorable 
phrases and metaphors that break norms and thereby trigger a reprimand and 
subsequent media coverage: accusations of a “stitch-up” at the election of Martin 
Schultz as EP chair and the various denigrating digs at his MEP colleagues that we have 
seen in the past chapters all feature prominently in media coverage (UKIP_news2; 
UKIP_news4; UKIP_news8; UKIP_news10; UKIP_news17). In the South African case, 
the EFF’s initial symbolic act of refusing to stand up is only one small element of a 
large-scale production, and newspapers’ focus is therefore on the even more dramatic 
“chaos” and “pandemonium” (e.g. EFF_news1; EFF_news2; EFF_news3; EFF_news4; 
EFF_news5) that occur upon their forced expulsion from parliament, which I return to 
shortly. First, however, I consider the importance of authenticity in the two parties’ 
self-representations. 
8.3.2 AUTHENTIC SELF-REPRESENTATION: “THEY ARE THE ONES PUTTING ON AN ACT” 
The attempt to hide their real motives and values is at the heart of the elite’s duplicity 
that populists seek to expose while they claim that their own performances are based 
on principle, not pretence. In both parties’ claims, the lack of consistency between the 
elite’s performance and their actual values and ideology betrays their inauthenticity. In 
contrast to these accusations of disingenuous and deceiving performances, the two 
populist parties claim that their own performances are unscripted and thus authentic. 
Yet their performances are pre-planned and highly orchestrated. So how do they 
achieve the impression of innate authenticity? This question is central to the ways in 
which populists use disruptive performance to project their mode of representation. 





intimacy and consistency which together comprise acts of authenticity (Enli, 2015, 
chap. 6). 
Staged spontaneity can at times seem more spontaneous than ‘real’ spontaneity (Enli, 
2015, p. 10; see also Goffman, 1959, pp. 8–9). Indeed, the EFF’s disruption of the SONA 
is planned months in advance, even, as we have seen, to the extent of anticipating the 
moves of the ANC and building them into the performed narrative. Yet their 
performance comes across as entirely spontaneous. Though UKIP’s performances are 
less elaborately planned, they are also obviously staged. They reuse key phrases to 
build up their performance through different modes of communication, such as their 
description of the EP opening ceremony mentioned above as a performance of 
“rampant EU nationalism”, which is repeated by Farage (UKIP_col2), UKIP MEP 
Jonathan Arnott (UKIP_press1), UKIP’s Twitter account (UKIP_tweet10) and a UKIP 
promotional video (UKIP_vid1) over a period of a week. In both UKIP’s and the EFF’s 
cases, however, disruption as a mode of performance has an inherently spontaneous 
quality that overcomes its staged nature: it suggests that the breaking of norms is a 
worthwhile sacrifice to express oneself in accordance with one’s true self (Enli, 2015, 
pp. 10–11; Healey, 2010, p. 530), that is, to be authentic. The two parties’ disruptions 
are therefore often accompanied by claims to martyrdom and self-sacrifice: “No 
amount of violence and harassment will stop us from taking over this country on 
behalf of the people”, state the EFF (EFF_press3), while Farage describes UKIP’s 
“People’s Army” as “combatant” (UKIP_col1). These appearances of dedicated 
spontaneity are enhanced by their contrast with the scripted and calculated 
performances of the elite in the two parties’ claims. 
Both parties achieve moments of intimacy by showcasing backstage behaviour on the 
front stage. They purposely do not clean up their acts. Indeed, the performance of 
backstage behaviour is integral to both disruption as a norm breaking act and to the 
performance of ordinariness and intimacy. Moreover, such backstage behaviour at 
once achieves authenticity and media attention. Malema’s speeches are often charged 
with emotion. And what could be more intimate than his complaint against the 
security guards who evict them from parliament that “the bastard is squeezing my 





through an act of self-disclosure and disinhibition in similar ways to social media 
performances (see, for example, Miller, 2011, pp. 178–80). The performance of 
backstage behaviour at once creates a sense of intimacy with the people and 
demonstrates consistency between the populist parties’ real selves and their public 
performances. Bringing backstage behaviour to the front stage thus signifies 
consistency between a politician’s truly held values and beliefs and their public 
performance. Where we saw above that both parties berate the elite for their hollow 
rhetoric and its lack of consistency with their beliefs, and that they claim to exhibit 
such consistency themselves, their disruptive acts achieve this performatively: 
disruptions are performative manifestations of populist ideology. 
The two parties reiterate this consistency between their performance and ideology in 
their claims. UKIP portray their own performance as sincere and consistent with their 
values: UKIP MEPs claim to be “a team who believe in what they say”, not changing 
their “accents and grit” for the sake of impressing the media (UKIP_col1). Rather, their 
own charisma is “innate” (UKIP MEP, 2017). The populist case for authenticity hinges 
not so much on a lack of performance as on demonstrating consistency between a 
performance and the world view and identity that underlie it. In describing their 
disruption of the EP opening ceremony, UKIP thus admit to performing symbolic 
action, but, crucially, it is sincere: “Our actions were at once symbolic, and one 
hundred per cent sincere.” (UKIP_col1). They deny that their disruption is motivated by 
the desire to create visibility and rather claim that it is a genuine expression of their 
beliefs. They contrast this consistency between their values and their performance 
with the “hollow words spoken in strategic oration by a Prime Minister desperate to 
garner votes” (UKIP_col1). 
UKIP’s argument of the elite’s “hollow words” is echoed by the EFF, almost word for 
word, when they criticise Zuma’s “hollow recitals” of the Freedom Charter 
(EFF_press2). The EFF’s expression of their own beliefs is pure and genuine, a direct 
view of their souls, as Malema suggests when sharing a meme and implicitly compares 
himself to Joseph (of Biblical fame): “…The tenbrothers looked at Joseph and saw a 
useless dreamer!... How wrong were all of them!... Be encouraged by what God sees in 





militant programme” which they “unapologetically pursue” (EFF_press2) through 
disruptive and protest action. They legitimise this belief with its “true resonance with 
the people of South Africa” (EFF_press2) and their own identification with the people. 
While the EFF portray their own ideology as resonant with the people, UKIP (who, as 
we saw in chapter six, claim not to be ideologically coloured) represent their values as 
actually being those of the people: UKIP are the “unadulterated” “voice of 
discontented Britain” and represent “what you believe in” (UKIP_col1). As 
representatives they claim to represent the unfiltered opinions of the people. This 
unfeasible claim is to resemblance, without the substitution theory component of 
‘enlightened consciousness’ that Ankersmit argues is necessary to mediate the 
opinions of the majority. Yet, as we have seen, UKIP justify their ability to serve by, 
first, not resemblance of opinion but identification through embodiment, and, second, 
their extraordinariness. I return to these themes as my argument progresses. 
The relative centrality of the EFF’s host ideology mitigates their populist component 
compared to UKIP’s mode of representation. They portray their host ideology as 
imaginative and inspirational. It is a value system that the people will aspire and 
subscribe to because it relates to their lives, rather than being intrinsic to it, as derived 
from the people, like UKIP claim their ideology is. Despite the different views on 
ideology, the EFF and UKIP both represent authenticity as a democratic and moral 
right, a normative demand; authenticity is what ought to characterise democratic 
representation. 
In the case of the EFF, mainstream media even explicitly note this consistency between 
ideology – The EFF’s “clear plan and a firm programme” – and performance – the 
“certainty in the mood and voice of the EFF” (EFF_news6). Moreover, the importance 
of such mediated consistency is also evident from the performative struggle between 
the ANC and the EFF over authenticity. In their respective pre-SONA press conferences, 
subsequently reported by the press, Zuma blames the EFF for having “nothing to offer 
but to disrupt Parliament” (EFF_news7). Zuma thereby disconnects the EFF’s pending 
disruptive performance at the SONA from any underlying ideology. Zuma’s portrayal of 
the EFF’s performance as ‘hollow’ strategically undermines the EFF's performance of 





playing. We are going to show him who we are”. Malema thereby not only weights the 
democratic importance of the EFF’s act but also connects it to their identity – who they 
are – to demonstrate that these values are deeply held. While this struggle over the 
signification of disruption serves the newspaper’s conflict frame well, it also highlights 
the importance of consistency between performance and values in the mediated 
performance of authenticity. 
8.3.3 REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE THROUGH EMBODIMENT 
As we saw above, the two parties accuse the elite of not only scriptedness and a lack of 
spontaneity but also of being distant from the people, either due to a cultural schism, 
as in the case of UKIP, or due to betrayal, as in the EFF case. For their own parts, UKIP 
and the EFF establish intimacy with the people performatively. I have already briefly 
noted how they embody the people in their disruptive performances. Such 
performances of embodiment symbolically make claims to identification and are the 
parties’ chief means of constituting the people. The EFF signal closeness through 
resemblance. They quite literally don the uniform of the workers they serve as 
representatives. UKIP perform their claim of resemblance by using the language of ‘the 
common man’. Farage, for instance, peppers his speeches with expressions such as 
“wanna” and “gonna” which are otherwise formally enunciated by elite politicians and 
addresses the chair of the EP with the colloquialism “mate” (UKIP_live4). 
UKIP enhance their resemblance to the people by contrasting it to the gulf between 
the silent majority and the elite who is “stuck in its own lavish bubble detached from 
reality” (UKIP_press6). We saw in chapter six how Farage, for instance, described the 
newly elected team of UKIP MEPs as having the lived experience of ordinary people. 
Even if few of us have ever met an “umbrella maker of Gypsy extraction” (UKIP_col1), 
UKIP’s evocation of the people is as ordinary, hard-working and leading individual lives 
with their own undisturbed identities, and UKIP MEPs are just like them. Moreover, 
their resemblance to – or rather, identification with – the people is unspoilt: “the 
people's army has not been carefully engineered by an imaginative press office” 
(UKIP_col1). This quib at ‘spin doctoring’ associates the elite’s lack of resemblance with 
the symbiosis between politics and the media, which UKIP portray as sacrificing the 





an ulterior motive that results in the political elite’s misrepresentation of their true 
identity and diverts attention away from what political representation ought to entail. 
UKIP MEPs’ qualifications as representatives therefore consist in identification with the 
people and a lack of artifice. Identification and authenticity are the two qualities that 
UKIP deem normatively essential to democratic and efficacious representation. The 
elite do not have them. UKIP do. 
We have already seen how the EFF similarly complain about the elite’s practices of 
image management through media events to the detriment of democratic principles: 
“Parliament which is supposed to fight corruption by holding the executive 
accountable has been turned into a fashion parade” (EFF_tweet19). At the opening of 
the SONA, politicians and their guests arrive on the red carpet dressed for the occasion 
in designer clothes, but the EFF stomp into parliament in their usual uniform of red 
overalls and miners’ helmets (Figure 4.4). While in the above-quoted tweet the EFF 
construct a binary between fighting corruption and wearing fashionable dresses, the 
EFF’s own attention-grabbing dress sense is a performance that is consistent with their 
underlying ideology: unlike the elite’s expensive costumes, it serves not to distract 
attention from pertinent political issues but to draw attention to such issues. It is the 
uniform of the silent majority, which is being suppressed in the political process and is 
now given voice through the EFF. As the EFF’s trademark means of symbolic 
production, it is a clear and simple performative manifestation of populist ideology.  
Both parties’ reliance on simple symbolic forms of embodiment has two implications. 
First, it conflates the opinions of the electorate with the persons having them through 
the embodiment of identity. Diverse opinions are thus conflated into a homogenous 
general will, and the populist representative in turn arrives at this through innate 
identification and authenticity rather than research and expertise. This is a particular 
interpretation of Ankersmit’s resemblance theory, which sees any form of 
intermediation as “impermissible distortion” (2002, p. 113). The two parties’ simple, 
visually distinct means of symbolic production are clearly projected as symbolic acts 
that enable them to retain a sense of closeness to the people. Their frequent breaches 
of the norms of political speech, appearance and behaviour all at once signal 





pages. Dress, gesture, slang and memes: such forms and modes of physical and virtual 
embodiment function as a means of performing populist ideology by claiming to be 
one of the people; as a tool of creating visibility by standing out from the formality of 
elite norms; as an expression of intimacy in the performance of authentic 
representation; as a means of lending a voice to the silent majority. If populist ideology 
rests on the central tenet of a Manichaean relationship between the people and the 
elite, it is performed by means of populists inserting themselves in the middle of the 
equation by embodying the people. In a bid to establish a closer and more direct 
relationship between the people and power, populists represent themselves as 
intermediaries, and as the only acceptable intermediaries. 
8.3.4 REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE THROUGH EXTRAORDINARINESS 
If populists are just like ordinary people, what legitimises their privileged position as 
representatives? They justify this position by their self-representation as truth tellers. 
As political intermediaries, they are oracles, clairvoyant portals to the truth whose 
mediation causes no friction or distortion. In this one respect they represent 
themselves as different from the people. Yet at the same time, their self-
representation as extraordinary, in contrast to the ordinary people, also constitutes 
the people in negative terms. If populists are truth tellers, the people are deceived, 
repressed by elite representatives and unable to discern objective reality. They are, in 
Farage’s words, “the people who have been oppressed” (UKIP_live1). As truth tellers 
the two populist parties are not only ordinary; they are extraordinary. They can 
achieve the will of the people for they alone see the truth. UKIP celebrate Farage’s part 
as oracle in a press release titled, “Nigel Farage exposes EU hypocrisy and faux 
outrage” (UKIP_press10). The term ‘exposes’ in this headline implies the role that 
populists see themselves as playing: that of exposing the truth behind the political lies 
of the elite. As we saw in chapter six, they claim to occupy a special epistemological 
position that enables them to achieve this act of revelation and impart the truth to the 
people. In their claim, disruption is a proof of UKIP’s extraordinariness and ability to 
fulfil the people’s wishes: “UKIP has not gone to Brussels and Strasbourg to be placid 
and inert. We made a promise to you to fight for what you believe in. And that is what 





that UKIP speaks to power equates to ‘what you believe in’: their mode of 
representation performs their populist mass ideology.  
In making this promise through direct modes of communication, they address their 
constituents directly to underscore their sincerity and the centrality of their 
relationship with the people to their actions in the EP. And they proudly showcase 
their norm breaking behaviour, as we saw in the opening to this chapter: “with 24 
Union Jacks fluttering on a spread of desks in one corner of the chamber, it was clear 
who would be the disruptive characters among the amassed”, Farage boasts 
(UKIP_col1). You can almost hear his naughty chuckle. While UKIP happily own the 
signifier of disruption, the acts it signifies are in reality rather tame. Farage insists that 
UKIP MEPs are in Brussels to shake things up a bit, yet he is describing action that – at 
least compared to the EFF’s – is in fact rather restrained and subdued: silently standing 
with backs turned to a chamber orchestra (see Figure 4.8), and a so-called March to 
Freedom that involves five UKIP MEPs with resolute expressions on their faces walking 
across the EP square while having their photograph taken. 
In the EFF’s claim, the elite’s lack of representativeness also legitimises disruptive 
action, but unlike UKIP, the EFF are careful to deny the signifier of disruption: “The 
Economic Freedom Fighters did not disrupt”, they maintain in a tweet (EFF_tweet28). 
Yet they engage in behaviour that enacts violence upon parliamentary norms and 
procedures, if not rules. Rather, in their norm breaking the EFF insist on explicitly 
complying with and upholding the constitution to legitimise their performance and 
define it as non-disruptive. Speaking of themselves, they complain, “those that say, we 
must adhere to the constitution, we must adhere to the oath of office are called 
names and are called disrupters by those who have become compatible with 
criminals” (EFF_conf3). In the South African context, disruption endangers the fragile 
institutions that are so strong background symbols in the transitional democratic 
context; it is an unjustifiable threat to democratic stability. The EFF therefore wrap 
their ‘bad manners’ in a cloak of legal compliance and insist, “that which we are doing 
is within the confines of the rules of parliament” (EFF_conf3). Consistently with this 
denial of disruption, they are then able to champion representative democracy as a 





signified are thus inverse. UKIP big up a subdued performance through signification 
while the EFF play down their destabilising behaviour. In their contrasting contexts of 
rigid institutional bureaucracy and fragile transition, the two parties achieve each their 
own balance of claims and embodied performances in bids for democratic 
representation. 
Moreover, the EFF’s denial of disruption is somehow at odds with their repeated calls 
for “[r]adical and militant” (for example, EFF_press4) action to democratise 
parliament, for they still self-represent as extraordinary. They tread a fine line between 
legality and potent action, a balancing act that is necessary given their exposure of the 
political and media elites as purveyors of false consciousness and as transgressors of 
parliamentary rules. To balance these disparate elements they therefore claim to 
“push the constitution to the limit” (EFF_tweet43). As we saw in chapter six, the EFF 
claim to be ready to make martyrial self-sacrifices to that effect: “There is only 25 of us 
and we fight in a manner that will make you think there is 200 of us” (EFF_tweet29). 
Such claims in turn lend a moral bent to their role as representatives, just like UKIP’s. 
Populists’ self-representation takes two chief forms, then: first, as ordinary and 
identifying with the people through embodiment and, second, as truth tellers and 
signifying extraordinariness. The former constitutes a particular version of the 
resemblance theory. The latter is where populists depart from the resemblance 
theory. Unlike the people who cannot on their own see through the elite’s fog of lies, 
they self-represent as imbued with agency to create change on the basis of their 
privileged epistemological position. By demonstrating their own agency in combination 
with morality and identification with the people, they perform a representative act of 
empowerment. Both UKIP and the EFF perform this forcefulness – for this is a claim to 
perlocutionary force – in their self-representations through disruption. While we have 
seen that the two parties signify their disruptive behaviour differently, they are both 
keen to project potency (this, no doubt, is also part of the reason behind Malema 
repeatedly drawing attention to his balls!). In other respects, however, their disruptive 
behaviour differs as much as their signification of it as it is confined by different forms 
of social power. This social power is in turn the very subject of the two parties’ 





false consciousness that, through ritual, norms and false elite rhetoric, is preventing 
the people from seeing the truth. In their unique position outside the sphere of politics 
– which, as we have seen, is infiltrated by a fog of lies, deception and 
misrepresentations of reality – only populists are able to see the truth and enlighten 
the people. 
8.4 DISCUSSION 
In this chapter I explored two aspects of UKIP and the EFF’s performances of 
representation in order to query how disruptive performance communicatively 
manifests a populist mode of representation. I enquired into the two parties’ 
conceptions of performance and its role in representative democracy, and I 
interrogated the ways in which these conceptions are performed through disruptive 
action and shape the parties’ mode of representation. The two parties’ concerns about 
the state of representative democracy are strikingly similar in both the established 
democratic context of the EP and the transitional democracy of South Africa. A 
widening gulf between elites and people result in both UKIP and the EFF diagnosing 
representative democracy in their respective contexts with a severe lack of 
responsiveness. The populist response to this situation is to lay bare the widening gulf 
between representatives and represented by bringing into view a false consciousness 
imposed by the elite through hollow performances and abuses of social power. In this 
claim the people are left powerless, in the grip of oligarchs. 
The stated populist cause is to remove the veil of deceit from the eyes of the people 
and expose the objective reality that elite performance is supposedly obscuring. This 
claim equates the inauthenticity of the elite with untruth and populists’ own authentic 
performance with truth-telling. Contrary to Goffman’s claim that impression 
management is inherent in everyday life and necessary to negotiate social interaction, 
populists portray impression management as an immoral quality in political 
representatives, especially when the media enters the picture. Impression 
management aimed at ensuring visibility of only the desired front to a ubiquitous 
media is deceitful and insincere since it results in a discrepancy between the elite’s real 





other. Such performance is inauthentic and hence immoral. Any sense of efficacy that 
the public feels is therefore based on false premises. 
The two parties’ own claims to empower the people are based on disintermediation, 
which takes two forms: identification through embodiment and truth-telling through 
disruption. Their identification with the people builds on closeness in terms of values, 
experience and sensibilities. Embodiment can in this way be seen as a means of 
disintermediation: it makes the path between the people and power appear as short 
as possible. In its breach of the norms of formal political speech, dress and behaviour, 
it is also a form of disruptive performance. The populist parties’ special capabilities as 
truth tellers legitimate their roles as representatives but also assume the need of the 
people to be freed from the elite’s veil of false consciousness. In the populist claim, the 
act of disruption is undertaken in order to enable the misguided people to see through 
the lies of the elite, to finally become cognisant of the ‘reality’ that hides behind the 
masquerade of ‘politics’. In this sense, truth-telling is also a form of disintermediation 
that makes the people’s access to power more direct. 
Given this ambiguous self-representation as at once ordinary and extraordinary that 
the two populist parties achieve through disruption, how can we conceive of the ways 
in which the populist mode of representation constitutes the people? Let us recall 
Ankersmit’s notion of a “politically naïve” electorate. Such an electorate understands 
any discrepancy between the elite and themselves as misrepresentation. We have 
seen that the populist representative claim is based on just such a portrayal of the gap 
between the elite and the people. Populists justify their own positions as 
representatives by attacking the elite for their misrepresentations and representing 
themselves as being able to see through them and close the gap. Such a claim both 
speaks to and constitutes the type of electorate that Ankersmit describes. This 
interpretation would suggest that populists are taking advantage of politically 
vulnerable subjects, are encouraging a simplistic attitude to politics and are actively 
creating an electorate that can be easily duped. However, this suggests a rather one-
sided and condemnatory conclusion. Let us therefore first consider the similarities and 
differences between the two cases and the ways in which their claims draw on their 





This exercise moreover demonstrates how the comparison across different democratic 
contexts adds to our understanding of populist communication. 
I draw out two main differences between the cases. First, the two parties’ exposure of 
social power as an illegitimate means of control by elites is based on different identity-
related problematics. These in turn result from the two countries’ respective paths to 
democracy and associated dominant modes of representation. The EFF’s claim builds 
on the background symbol of Apartheid and a notion of the people as black, 
indigenous and rightfully sovereign. Yet the ANC government’s physical resemblance 
to the people since the end of Apartheid complicates the EFF’s ideological portrayal of 
the elite as non-identical to the people. The EFF therefore focus on the new black 
elite’s behaviour, rather than their appearance and background, as comparable to that 
of the former white oppressors. They may be of the people, but they behave like the 
enemy: they are traitors who have failed to deliver on their promises and have morally 
betrayed their own ethnos. The people are therefore “within their right to demand a 
Government which will be closer to them” (EFF_press3). As we have seen, the EFF base 
their own representative claim on closeness, which they partly achieve by dressing as 
domestic workers and identifying with the people through language. The nature of the 
South African elite and its associated mode of representation contrasts with UKIP’s 
portrayal of the EP elite as living in a bubble and not having any shared life experience 
with the people. The lack of resemblance is structural in this case and has been 
institutionalised in the EP. The populist solution to the elite’s inauthenticity is 
therefore also different in the two cases: replacement of a corrupt, self-seeking elite in 
the EFF’s case, and a removal of intermediating institutional structures in UKIP’s case. 
Second, the ways in which the two parties attempt to engender empowerment 
through their self-representations are highly context dependent. The institution of the 
EP confines and restricts disruptive performance more than the less established 
structures of the South African parliament, whose attempts to gain control through 
authoritarian means turn counterproductive as the EFF use their social power against 
them. The populist claims are then diametrically opposed to these conditions. In the 
context of the European Parliament, UKIP’s solution to their diagnosis of a lack of 





intermediating institutions like the EU. Yet the very quality of bureaucratic and 
regulatory constraint of which they complain inhibits their performance of this claim. 
In the fragile and therefore malleable context of the transitional regime of South 
Africa, the EFF’s suggested road to responsive representation is to strengthen the 
institutions of political representation. In their case, however, their performance of 
this claim threatens the self-same institutions by disrupting the vulnerable norms and 
procedures that keep it upright and ensure its tenuous stability. 
The EP’s grip on social power demonstrates that it prioritises stability and the 
substitution theory’s filtering mechanisms above the enabling of unheard voices and 
identification. There is a general sense among the public of a moral void in 
representative politics, which is designed for winning votes, not for realising ideals. In 
the case of South Africa, the government’s use of social power transgresses the 
boundary of what is democratically permissible. The effects are similar to those in the 
EP: a lack of responsiveness and identification between representatives and citizens, 
and morality being lost as a guiding line in democratic politics. This in turn suggests 
that UKIP’s and the EFF’s claims are not without foundation and that their disruptive 
actions are the only feasible means of communicating them. While they introduce an 
undesirable essentialism and reductionism to the representative relationship, they also 
provide the means of opening up debate on existing fault lines in representative 
democracy that would otherwise remain obscured by entrenched practices of social 
power. The performances of the two parties have in this respect emerged as means of 
communicating complex arguments in restrictive and antagonistic environments. They 
are not communicating style over substance. Rather, they use innovative and flexible 
forms of communication and have through these initiated a symbolic dialogue with 
elites, citizens and media in circumstances where it is near-impossible to engage them. 
This populist claim is of course itself a performance, and it is performative, and so the 
conclusion must be a balanced one. As the claim avows to reveal the mechanisms 
through which the elite construct a false reality, it itself constitutes an alternative 
political reality. The essentialist moral cleavage, with the elite on one side and 
populists and the people on the other, forms the basis of this ideology. In both UKIP’s 





unconcerned with the interests of the people engenders and enhances feelings of 
inefficacy in relation to the current system: it makes people feel their voices go 
unheard in the political process. In this sense, the inefficacy that characterises modern 
representative democracy is to a large extent a populist construction, even if it 







9. THE HYBRID MEDIATION OF THE POPULIST REPRESENTATIVE 
CLAIM: CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The terms of mediation in established as well as transitional democracies are changing. 
These changes place new demands, opportunities and risks on the performance of the 
political persona (Corner, 2003). The increased visibility that new media engender has 
become a “double-edged sword” that leaves representatives vulnerable to the 
constant dangers of scandal, gaffes, leaks and exposed outbursts (Thompson, 2005, p. 
41ff); someone is always ready with a camera phone when you are eating a bacon 
sandwich. At the same time, we witness new types of actors who are able to make use 
of new technologies and speak to the changing media demands. They can now access 
power by garnering visibility – through the spectacular, the unexpected or the easily 
shareable – and by bestowing it upon traditional power holders when they least want 
it. Political representatives’ difficulties in negotiating the demands on the visibility of 
their mediated political personas render their armour of authenticity dangerously 
fragile (Thompson, 2005). And when it is pierced and deflates, public feelings of 
inefficacy are nourished. 
In the course of my analysis in the preceding chapter three criteria for the evaluation 
of elite performance emerged from the two populist parties’ claims: first, visibility 
management as an immoral undertaking that pushes aside principled democratic 
practice; second, authenticity as an essential quality in representatives; and third, 
efficacy as based on the false premises of inauthentic elite performances in the 
representative democracies of both the UK and South Africa. These criteria of visibility, 
authenticity and efficacy are in fact the very demands that the new media 
environment places upon mediated representatives (Coleman, 2011). Moreover, whilst 
criticising the elite for their preoccupation with pampering to the media, we have seen 
that populists’ own performances of these very claims meet the same criteria. In their 
attacks on the elite’s impression management practices they channel and control 
visibility, perform their own authenticity, and engender efficacy through performances 





In this chapter I pick up on these findings and relate them more explicitly to a media 
perspective. To do so, I consider from a theoretical perspective the symbiosis between 
populism and the new media environment suggested elsewhere in the literature (see, 
amongst others, Bos and Brants, 2014; Esser et al., 2016; Krämer, 2017; Mazzoleni et 
al., 2003; Moffitt, 2016; Stanyer, 2007, chap. 5) by developing a conceptual approach 
to address the question, how does populist communication harmonise with the 
demands on mediated representation in the new media environment? I build on the 
argument that populist ideology and performance have a certain affinity with the 
affordances and imaginaries of social media in particular (see also, for example, 
Bartlett, 2014; Engesser et al., 2016; Gerbaudo, 2014; Groshek and Engelbert, 2013). 
This enables them to use social media to occupy the ambiguous position of deriding 
the role of the media in politics whilst catering to their needs and wants. Before I reach 
this point, I first consider the notion of mediation in the new media environment and 
relate this to my perspective on political performance. In the course of this discussion I 
develop the notion of hybrid mediated performance to denote how populists aim their 
performances at and develop them within hybrid modes of mediation. I then turn to 
the above argument about how the populist performance of representation relates in 
turn to each of the three demands of visibility, authenticity and efficacy that the new 
media environment places upon political representatives. 
9.2 MEDIATION IN THE NEW MEDIA ENVIRONMENT 
To develop my argument on populists’ ambiguous use of the hybrid media 
environment, I first outline the social constructivist approach to the concept of 
mediation. In this approach I place less emphasis on the institutional dimension of 
mediation that is the focus of the extant literature on populism. Instead I conceive of 
mediation as a more fluid, multi-directional and less controllable process. Such a 
perspective will prove useful to address the complex communicative acts that populist 
actors undertake to relate to each other, to mainstream media and directly to the 
public in the hybrid media system. Second, I explore how such an approach to 
mediation integrates conceptually with the performance perspective on political 






9.2.1 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO MEDIATION 
The symbiosis between populist communication and traditional media has mainly been 
approached from an institutionalist perspective on mediation (see, for example, Esser 
et al., 2016). This tradition of mediation research approaches media as independent 
social institutions with their own sets of norms and rules. Studies have focused on the 
affinity between a populist communication style and ‘media logic’ – the norms and 
routines that govern the media’s operations (Altheide and Snow, 1979) – and have, for 
instance, identified specific news values such as conflict framing, strategic framing and 
personalisation that populism speaks to (Esser et al., 2016; Mazzoleni et al., 2003). The 
affinity is argued to be both stylistic and ideological. A populist communication style 
harmonises with the journalistic news values especially associated with tabloid formats 
(Esser et al., 2016, p. 7; Mazzoleni, 2003; Sorensen, 2017, p. 142). The ideological 
objectives of political populism meanwhile coincide with those of genres such as talk 
show journalism, for instance demonstrating anti-establishment positions and 
closeness to the people (Bos and Brants, 2014; Cranmer, 2011; Krämer, 2014). The 
institutionalist perspective on mediation has therefore highlighted the importance of 
format and genre of media in their affinity with populism. 
Yet the institutionalist perspective is challenging to integrate theoretically with the 
new and rapidly growing body of research on the affinity between populism and social 
media. The institutional norms and news values of professional gatekeepers as 
explanatory factors of populism’s symbiosis with the media do not apply here. In some 
studies this difficulty leads to a description of populist political communication on 
social media as “unmediated” (Engesser et al., 2016; Groshek and Engelbert, 2013; van 
Kessel and Castelein, 2016). At the same time, these studies do point to the 
importance of the material properties of social media technologies, such as technical 
affordances and associated practices of use (Lievrouw, 2014) in shaping – and indeed 
mediating – the populist message. Where the literature traditionally has focused on 
the role of agency as well as technology in constructing reality, technology takes 
centre stage in studies of social media where processes of (co-)construction differ from 
those of traditional media. In an attempt to align themselves with the institutionalist 
theoretical perspective, communication scholars have then identified a “network 





place on social media. Studies on populism and social media have used this approach 
to usefully explain how affordances and practices both enable and augment populist 
political communication. They have, for instance, identified the features of: ‘direct’ 
interpersonal engagement, non-elite access to production and circulation, the use of 
personal action frames and personification, polarisation, personalisation through the 
image of the leader, the short format of microblogs and competition for attention, and 
sharing among likeminded peers (Bobba, 2018; Bracciale and Martella, 2017; Engesser 
et al., 2017, 2016; Groshek and Engelbert, 2013; Pajnik and Sauer, 2018; Stier et al., 
2017; van Kessel and Castelein, 2016). 
Two unresolved theoretical issues remain in the wake of this new and rapidly growing 
body of research on populism and social media. First, studies tend to empirically 
investigate social media and its associated ‘logic’ in isolation from the rest of the 
hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013). This results in one-medium bias, a lack of 
recognition of the complexity of the media ecosystem (Bode and Vraga, 2018; Meyer, 
2002) and its hybrid nature where a single medium is rarely used in isolation, and a 
lack of theoretical coherence across studies of traditional and new media. Second, 
empirical studies repeatedly identify imaginary and mythical properties of social media 
– such as its techno-utopian myths of the emancipatory and non-hierarchical nature of 
the internet as a site for democracy to flourish (Gerbaudo, 2014, pp. 16–17) –  as 
central to the ways in which populists construct meaning on social media platforms 
(Engesser et al., 2016; Gerbaudo, 2014; Groshek and Engelbert, 2013). However, the 
notion of ‘media logics’ builds on a materialist perspective that is unable to fully 
account for such collective processes of symbolic meaning-making. How may we better 
reconcile the empirical study of the hybrid media system and its multi-faceted 
influences on populist meaning-making with a conceptualisation of mediation? These 
three interconnected sites of meaning-making – institutional agency, the materiality of 
technology, and the collective process of myth-making – have yet to be explored in an 
integrated manner in relation to populist political communication. I suggest that the 
conceptual framework I outlined in chapter two, with its integration of form and 
content, can also fruitfully be applied to an approach to mediation that overcomes the 
dichotomies of materiality versus content, and affordances versus imaginaries. The 





integrated perspective would provide a fertile avenue for investigating the mediation 
of populism.  
Within the broader social constructivist tradition, the concept of mediation describes 
“how communication has to be grasped as a process of mediating meaning 
construction” (Hepp and Krotz, 2014, p. 3). It is concerned with media’s role in the 
communicative construction of socio-cultural reality. The term mediation then refers 
to a more substantive operation than the act of transmitting something through the 
media. Mediation is a problematic process concerned with the media’s power to shape 
representations of ‘reality’ (Livingstone, 2009, p. 5; Strömbäck, 2008, p. 230), a process 
characterised by the media’s substantive intervention to the extent that it affects and 
changes the object of mediation. This includes how political reality is depicted, 
constructed and understood.  
This perspective allows us to understand mediation as a more complex process than 
the linear transmission suggested by approaches that limit themselves to an 
institutional focus (Couldry, 2008). In the hybrid media system, content is shared, 
circulated and interacted with across media types, formats and platforms in ways that 
go beyond interaction between the originators and their intended audiences. The 
flows and consequences of mediation are non-linear and multi-directional, to the 
extent that they involve a “process of environmental transformation” (ibid., p. 8). To 
paraphrase Livingstone’s (2009) famous expression, everything is mediated. The 
mediated and the media mutually shape each other’s conditions of production, 
understanding and use (Lievrouw, 2014) through interaction between a variety of 
actors, institutions and the environments that support them (Silverstone, 2005, p. 
189). With this complexity in mind, I follow Couldry in his definition of mediation as, 
capturing a variety of dynamics within media flows… flows of 
production, flows of circulation, flows of interpretation or reception, 
and flows of recirculation as interpretations flow back into production 
or flow outwards into general social and cultural life (2008, p. 8). 
The complex asymmetry and web of interconnections that this approach engages with 





overlapping with, the institutional focus that is dominant in the populism literature. It 
enables the examination of not only the difficulties political actors face in their 
attempts to manage their mediated self-representations by adapting to media logic. It 
also enables consideration of how certain actors have the potential to influence other 
actors and their mediated personas in struggles over meaning (which, as we have seen, 
is a central element in populism’s Manichaean relationship to the elite) within the 
process of mediation; how mediated representations travel and change within the 
media ecology; how different media platforms complement each other in hybrid forms 
of mediation; and the wider socio-political implications that result from the interplay 
between populist communication and the media in the hybrid media system. This 
perspective of the social constructivist tradition of mediation research has been less 
explored in relation to populist political communication. Yet it has the potential to 
provide a theoretical bridge between the dynamics of traditional and new media. It 
also offers the ability to capture the symbiosis of symbolic and material means of 
meaning construction that empirical studies have noted to be central to the mediation 
of populist communication. I also suggest that this perspective relates directly to the 
antagonistic relationship between the elite and the people and populists themselves in 
populist ideology and the way in which it is communicated through mediated 
disruptive performance. 
9.2.2 MEDIATION AND POLITICAL PERFORMANCE 
The above approach to mediation and its focus on non-linear and multi-directional 
meaning construction through form as well as content is consonant with a 
performance perspective on political communication. Before I move on to the specifics 
of populists’ use of social media, I integrate the social constructivist approach to 
mediation with Alexander’s (2006) perspective on performance as cultural practice 
that I outlined in chapter seven. I first discuss how an integrated perspective on 
mediated political representation recognises that political meaning and sense-making 
invokes cultural narratives, shared myths and symbols that originate within as well as 
outside of media. For instance, populists’ use of the “technologies of self” (Van Dijck, 
2013b, p. 201), as Van Dijck terms social media, can be a symbolic statement in and of 
itself that associates populists with the practices of ordinary people. Further, the 





processes of mediation operate in a mutually constitutive relationship with their 
context in similar ways to the processes of representation that I considered in chapter 
two. I go on to explore how performance relates to the material properties of media 
that shape and are shaped by such complex and multi-directional processes of 
meaning-formation. This in turn gives rise to a discussion of the performativity of 
media. 
In the context of populism, the relationship between mediation and performance is 
only just starting to be explored in the literature. Moffitt’s (2016) innovative approach 
adopts the concept of mediatisation for this purpose and explores how populist 
communication increasingly incorporates and adjusts to media logic over time. His 
perspective is highly relevant to explain the relationship between populism and the 
media and the recent rise in populism in mediatised democracies. In developing his 
approach, I adopt the broader and more flexible perspective on mediation outlined 
above. In doing so, I consider the creation of political meaning beyond the interaction 
between media institutions and political actors. Instead, I focus on the interaction 
between form, content and context in the formation of meaning within processes of 
mediation. This enables me to query how multi-directional processes of mediation 
affect the representation of (populist) reality. As Couldry (2008, p. 3) argues, building 
on Silverstone, 
We should not expect a single unitary answer to the question of how 
media transform the social, since media themselves are always at least 
doubly articulated, as both transmission technology and 
representational content (Silverstone, 1994) in contexts of lived 
practice and situated struggle that themselves are open to multiple 
interpretations or indeed to being ignored. 
I extend the focus on institutionalist media logic to consider the double articulation of 
media as material objects and as symbolic messages (Livingstone, 2007; Silverstone, 
1994) in keeping with my integrated communication approach developed in chapter 
two. Building on this perspective, the notion of co-production suggests that media 
technologies exist in a mutually constitutive relationship between the material and the 





which actually constitutes social life” (Lievrouw, 2014, p. 30). Co-production can then 
also be found in the process of making representations that convert concepts into 
material form (ibid.), a process that I suggest is analogous to performance as a 
manifestation of ideology.  
Based on this perspective on technology, I conceive of digitally mediated 
performances, such as social media posts, as embodied in technologies and practices 
(see also Bullingham and Vasconcelos, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2010; Enli, 2016). The 
material as well as symbolic properties of media form part of a mediated performance 
of representation. Moreover, these properties can be likened to the elements of 
cultural performance that I outlined in chapter seven. The material properties of media 
correspond to social power as the external boundary of a performance (Alexander, 
2006, p. 36), and the symbolic properties of media correspond to background symbolic 
resources. In a mediated performance they become part of the performer’s toolbox as 
symbolic resources for articulation. In this sense, I see media as fulfilling a variety of 
functions in social performance. They are means of symbolic production that are 
controlled by social power, for instance as authorities limit access to media. But media 
themselves also set boundaries for a performance in the form of social power, such as 
affordances that determine their use, and background symbols inherent in media 
themselves. Moreover, they are performative. As suggested by the notion of co-
production, they contribute to constituting the social world. They shape practices, 
construct, transform and recontextualise meaning. 
The process of mediation affects how reality is represented to citizens and is crucial to 
understand the media’s power in the naturalisation of ideology (Couldry, 2000; 
Silverstone, 2005). Yet media do not simply construct reality in a vacuum. Silverstone 





…think of mediation as extending beyond the point of contact between 
media texts and their readers or viewers. It requires us to consider it as 
involving producers and consumers of media in a more or less 
continuous activity of engagement and disengagement with meanings 
which have their source or their focus in those mediated texts, but 
which extend through, and are measured against, experience in a 
multitude of different ways. 
This view of studying the media incorporates aspects of both production and 
consumption as central to the process of mediation. It further acknowledges that such 
a process goes beyond the text. In doing so, the process of mediation is also in this 
respect conceptually aligned with the manifestation of ideology through performance: 
both processes operate in a mutually constitutive relationship with cultural practices, 
myths and social reality, with performers and audiences. Just as ideology is performed 
and interpreted with the actor and recipient’s understanding of “not only the situation 
but also the appropriateness of what can and must be said and not said in that 
situation” (Isin and Ruppert, 2015, p. 55), so is a mediated performance influenced by 
its context of reception. 
As we have seen, the performance of ideology relies on existing background symbols 
fluctuating in collective cultural memory that political communicators can employ as 
resources in their representations of reality. The construction of meaning that takes 
place within processes of mediation mirror this relationship with the social. Some of 
the background symbols employed in mediated performances are then associated 
specifically with media – such as the belief that technologies are deterministic, all-
powerful, along the lines of McLuhan’s determinism (Silverstone, 1999, p. 21) – and 
can achieve mythical properties whose power over our imagination is vast. We can 
thus start to see technology as culture (Carey, 1989). These myths are not mere 
falsehoods to be evaluated according to criteria of true or false but rather constitute 
reality (Flichy, 2007; Mosco, 2005). As in a performance perspective, they can be 
deemed felicitous or infelicitous. They can be employed by political actors; and they 
become part of the material manifestation and shaping of ideological meaning that I 





Not only the mythical and symbolic but also the material properties of media are 
relevant to the intersection between mediation and performance. Traditionally there 
has been a distinction in the literature between interpersonal (dialogical) and mass 
(dissemination) communication. With the advent of the internet, and social media in 
particular, processes of mediation combine both forms of communication. In this 
respect social media offer a different form of mediation from traditional media as it 
can take two forms. First, mediation can take the form of remediation (Bolter and 
Grusin, 2000) of another virtual or a real-life performance (such as a radio interview, a 
rally), where the material and mythical properties of digital media become relevant 
aspects of the remediated performance through a process of mediation. Second, the 
act of mediation can constitute an ‘original’ performance in and of itself that would 
not exist outside of social media (Somdahl-Sands and Finn, 2015). In the latter case, 
social media have the potential to mediate a performance where the ‘original’ would 
not be a face-to-face speech or even acting on a set, which is then transmitted by the 
television screen. Rather, it is a performance within and of a medium, designed for 
that purpose and unable to exist outside of that medium. As embodied “extensions of 
man” (McLuhan, [1964]1994), media technologies cannot be reduced to sites of 
performance or tools of transmitting a performance but form part of the embodied 
performance itself.  
From this perspective, media are constitutive elements in the mutual shaping process 
that occurs between ideology and performance. As such, they are also constitutive of 
the claim-making process; and their use can be a symbolic act that is a claim in and of 
itself (Isin and Ruppert, 2015). For example, UKIP’s frequently used hashtag 
“#PeoplesArmy” integrates the imaginary and material properties of Twitter in a 
digitally mediated performance: it constructs a community through the digital act of 
using a hashtag as an interactive device, it relies on the cultural context of symbols of 
community and bottom-up action on social media, and on a discursive level it denotes 
that community as the totality of ‘the people’, imbuing them with radical intent and 
the power of the masses. In more overt intersections between virtual and physical 
social realities, a synthesis of these two forms of digitally mediated performance can in 
addition form part of a ‘hybrid mediated performance’. In such cases a digital 





serving an interpretive and contextualising function that supports, comments on and 
interacts with the original performance. The two performances – the original and the 
digital – together constitute a hybrid mediated performance. 
The hybridity that characterises the modern media environment has implications for 
the embodiment through, and materiality of, live and digital performance. The 
approach to mediation that I have outlined above suggests a spatial transformation 
and asymmetry as a consequence of changes in the media environment (Couldry, 
2008, pp. 11–12) as social spaces change when new technologies become embedded 
in them. This transformation of social space affects “the social production of value and 
authority” (ibid., p. 12). I conceive of this asymmetry as both materially and 
symbolically generated. This enables the approach to capture the hybrid media system 
and the ways in which political actors use social media to complement, influence and 
circumvent traditional channels of communication. As entrepreneurial actors, 
populists generate and authenticate visible spaces for the authoritative voicing of their 
ideology through new digital channels. This perspective equally encourages the 
analysis of how populist disruptive performance symbolically transforms institutional 
spaces into effective sites for the mediation of their oppositional self-representations. 
Further, when integrating these two modes of performance – disruption and the use of 
social media – a flexible perspective on mediation that looks beyond the relationship 
between politicians and media institutions also encourages consideration of how 
populists use such hybrid modes of mediation to challenge existing power holders and 
represent constituents. By confronting institutionally embedded norms and 
procedures, populist hybrid mediated performances create new spaces and channels 
for the flows of production, circulation, interpretation and recirculation of political 
symbols and meanings; and in doing so, they set the conditions for the elite’s image 
management practices and their mediation. 
9.3 THE REQUIREMENTS OF MEDIATED REPRESENTATION 
Having outlined my perspective on mediated performance, I now move on to consider 
how populists perform representation in the new media environment through hybrid 
forms of mediation. Coleman (2011) identifies three primary criteria of mediated 





efficacy. The analysis in the preceding chapter confirmed the centrality of these criteria 
in populist claims as well as performances. We saw how the populist representative 
claim denounces the elite’s quest for visibility and thereby render elite performances 
inauthentic by revealing that they ultimately engender efficacy on false pretences. Yet 
populists’ performance of this claim itself seeks to meet the three criteria. Visibility 
and authenticity are most obviously related to the performance of representation. For 
instance, we saw in the preceding chapter that populists create spectacle, manage 
theirs and the elite’s visibility and perform authenticity through disruption. Efficacy, as 
a feeling that resides in the audience, sits on the borderline between performance and 
its outcome. With my object of analysis being the performance projected by the 
populist actor, I am less concerned with the feelings of the audience (which I do not 
study empirically) than with the relationship between the performing representative 
and the constituency-audience that the populist performance projects. We saw in the 
previous chapter that populists sought to enhance efficacy through performances of 
disintermediation that make the relationship between populists and the people appear 
more direct. I therefore focus on how they might achieve this in relation to processes 
of mediation. 
We saw in the preceding chapter that the two populist parties’ performances of 
visibility, authenticity and disintermediation were similar. Indeed, a strong argument in 
the literature on democratisation and the media suggests that the conditions they 
respond to share many similarities across established and transitional democracies 
(Voltmer, 2015). South Africa’s hybrid media system, which, like hybrid political 
systems, mixes authoritarian and democratic practices (Voltmer, 2011), may place 
more stringent conditions on oppositional actors like the EFF. Yet, in its own way, the 
system’s relationship to politics is dominated by the same demands of visibility, 
authenticity and efficacy as established media systems. I now explore each of these 
criteria in turn – efficacy, visibility and authenticity– and their intersection with the 
performance of populist ideology. As the primary aim of the mediated performances of 






The struggles of public representatives to deal with the changing conditions of 
mediation through impression management have fed disenchantment with politics in 
the public to the extent that ‘politics’ has become a dirty word. As Hay argues, “to 
attribute ‘political’ motives is now invariably to question that actor’s honesty, integrity 
or capacity to deliver an outcome that reflects anything other than his or her material 
self-interest” (2013, p. 1). The awareness of the deceit inherent in mediated 
representation and public communication therefore affects how people feel about 
politics and whether they feel properly represented (Bennett and Entman, 2001; 
Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). Efficacy is a subjective experience that resides in the 
represented. Internal efficacy, which will be my main focus here, refers to citizens’ 
perceptions of their personal political competence and influence. External efficacy 
relates to the perceived responsiveness of representatives. Both internal and external 
efficacy are based on a communicative relationship between representatives and the 
public (Coleman, 2011, p. 45). Heightening feelings of efficacy would then rely on 
making such a relationship appear more meaningful, and possibly more direct, less 
mediated (or, at least, less problematically mediated). 
Internal efficacy has recently been connected to the access to information afforded by 
new media technologies (Coleman et al., 2008; Halpern et al., 2017). However, a 
detrimental aspect of the easy access to information via internet-based mediation is 
the lack of interpretive clarity that was traditionally provided by television (Gurevitch 
et al., 2009, p. 174). We inhabit a climate of overwhelmingly abundant sources of 
information. Yet these offer limited civically useful political content. The result is 
uncertainty about which sources to trust about untrustworthy politicians. These 
arguments in fact chime with populist ideology. As we have seen, the mass ideology of 
populism is founded on public perceptions of politics, so perhaps it is not surprising 
that it responds to public perceptions of political understanding and influence. The 
provision of access to adequate and truthful information – to an objective 
representation of reality – is what we have seen populists attempt to monopolise in 
the preceding chapters. Populists offer a sense of certainty and clarity that engenders 
feelings of efficacy. This analysis is consistent with Krӓmer’s (forthcoming, p. 8) 





and therefore limiting the people’s access to truth. This, as the above-mentioned 
studies show, in turn weakens efficacy. 
Truth-telling, as we have seen, is one way in which populists seek to reinforce a sense 
that power runs directly from themselves as representatives to the people. They evoke 
a gulf between elites and people over which the representative bond cannot stretch 
and demonstrate the closeness of their own connection to the people. This evocation 
of efficacy on the basis of directness is consistent with the literature, which sees the 
denunciation of processes and practices of mediation – both in relation to political 
institutions and to communication – to be a central aspect of populism (see, for 
example, De la Torre, 2014; Krämer, 2014, forthcoming; Kriesi, 2014). Although we saw 
in chapter six that populist calls for disintermediation do not in the South African case 
equate to dismissing intermediating democratic institutions, these institutions are in 
that context perceived as attained by the people themselves through revolution and 
represented as an embodiment of the people’s will. Just like populist representatives 
who embody the people, they therefore do not stand between the people and their 
understanding of reality and of the truth. On the contrary, (like populist 
representatives) they enable access to the truth. This appears to be the central tenet 
in populists’ claim to disintermediation. 
Coleman et al.’s (2008) focus group study on new media and efficacy also reports a 
desire amongst participants for a more direct link to their representatives. New media 
technologies were one part of the suggested means. However, participants also 
articulated a sense of estrangement from the political world, which often resided in 
official language, uniformly referred to as “political correctness” (ibid., p. 779). In this 
sense, a populist communication style, characterised by ‘ordinariness’ and a disruption 
of the norms of political speech may serve to increase internal efficacy by removing 
the mediating barrier of formal language, especially when such an informal style 
remains intact in the process of mediation through media such as social media. The 
implications of Coleman et al.’s (2008) findings suggest that the combination of 
populist embodiment, such as through the performance of ordinariness, and a claim to 
disintermediation in the sense of giving people direct access to the truth, is a winning 





Meanwhile, Coleman et al.’s study suggests that external efficacy is decreased by the 
perception that representatives will only initiate an interactive relationship with the 
public for the purpose of garnering votes during election campaigns (2008, pp. 780–1). 
Sorensen et al. (2019) demonstrate that when the affordances of Twitter were used by 
the South African authorities to establish direct contact with citizens during a listening 
exercise, such digital acts inspired an extraordinary level of efficacy in some concerned 
individuals. Yet the opposite resulted from the government’s more pervasive failure to 
make use of available affordances and from the perception that they used them for an 
instrumental purpose. This is the lack of efficacy that the new media environment 
generates, argue Gurevitch et al. (2009, p. 174): 
A disorientating sense of being technologically connected, but politically 
disconnected, fuels civic disengagement; citizens come to believe that 
politicians are bound to resist the democratic potentiality of interactive 
communication technologies…  
Such relationships between representatives and citizens can therefore often be 
characterised by representatives’ lack of understanding of ordinary people’s everyday 
life and by practices of deception (Coleman et al., 2008, p. 782). The manifestation of 
populist ideology in acts of disruption can consequently be seen as aimed at 
undermining elite performances that inspire efficacy on false pretences through the 
exposure of such practices of deception. 
9.3.2 VISIBILITY 
The requirement of visibility in mediated representation refers to how far 
representatives can be seen to represent us (Coleman, 2011, p. 47). Thompson 
describes how communication media have engendered a new form of visibility in 
which the field of vision is shaped… 
…by the distinctive properties of communication media, by a range of 
social and technical considerations (such as camera angles, editing 
processes and organizational interests and priorities) and by the new 





Dayan (2013) even argues that changes in the media environment have fostered a new 
paradigm of visibility. From the perspective of public representatives, these new 
affordances, practices and norms have undeniably changed the art of managing 
visibility (Thompson, 1995, chap. 4). They provide opportunities for self-presentation, 
while the ubiquitous and multi-directional nature of mediation also makes visibility 
uncontrollable and public images inherently fragile. 
The fragility of mediated representation engendered by new forms of visibility can 
become a weapon in the hands of populists in their attempts to undermine the public 
images of elite representatives. Politicians are well-known for their constant attempts 
at impression management – sometimes better than for their engagement in policy-
making – in response to the need for visible representation. Feeding into growing 
public discontent with, and distrust of, practices of impression management (Norris, 
2001), coupled with the assumption that disclosure of discrete activities serves a 
democratic purpose, visibility has the potential to become not only a “weapon of the 
witness” (Coleman, 2011, p. 46) as wielded by the media, but also a weapon of 
populists in their efforts to pitch the elite against the people. 
The flows of production, circulation, interpretation and recirculation of symbolic 
content are more difficult to control with the advent of social media. Political actors 
are forced to compete in shows of spectacle and drama against celebrities and non-
elite actors who grasp the opportunity afforded by new media to become visibility 
entrepreneurs (Dayan, 2013). In Dayan’s terms, visibility has become a right where 
withholding visibility is equated to “a silencing process” (ibid., p. 150) by elites akin to 
‘old-school’ authoritarian attempts to control communication media. Such displays of 
social power are thus not only practically near-impossible in the new media 
environment; they are also deemed illegitimate. The entry of new actors into 
processes of mediation introduces an element of contestation over political symbols 
and meaning in both online and physical spaces (Parry, 2015, p. 423). In conferring 
visibility upon the elite through disruptive acts of exposure, populists are able to 
provide the public with what Meyrowitz (1986, p. 47) terms a “sidestage” view. They 





inconsistencies between the elite’s performances and their actual values and beliefs. 
They expose the elite’s professed authenticity as an act of deception. 
When populists take on the role of visibility entrepreneurs, they claim visibility as a 
right: “(1) the right to be seen, (2) the right to being seen on their own terms, and (3) 
the right of conferring visibility on others” (Dayan, 2013, p. 139). Populists legitimise 
their claim to visibility by attaching the right to be seen (and heard) to the people – the 
silent majority – rather than themselves. By embodying the people, populists 
themselves then performatively engender visibility through disruption in the making of 
their claim. In this respect, visibility is an inherent aspect of performance, which by its 
very nature is oriented towards an audience with visibility in mind. Performance is thus 
by definition a form of visibility management. Through disruptive performance, 
populists confer visibility on the elite and demand visibility on their own terms. But 
their disruptive acts, in claiming the right to visibility, also represent reality on their 
own terms and challenge the media’s “reality-pronouncing” function (Dayan, 2013, p. 
146). These acts are therefore not only constative, they are performative. If the 
illocutionary force of disruption is to represent the people and their right to be seen, 
the perlocutionary force is visibility for populists themselves, on their own terms. 
Populists’ visibility appropriation takes place in both offline and online spaces. While 
few ordinary members of the public ‘follow’ political representatives on social media 
platforms (Larsson and Moe, 2012), new political actors can use platforms such as 
Twitter to garner attention for online and offline acts since tweets are often the 
sources of more widely consumed media coverage (ibid.; van Kessel and Castelein, 
2016). Populists’ immediate audience may thus be legacy media rather than their 
constituents. In other words, there can be a distinction between who populists speak 
to and who they speak for (Moffitt, 2016, pp. 105–8; Saward, 2010, pp. 48–57). 
Opportunities for visibility appropriation on, for instance, Twitter allow ‘outsider’ 
actors – such as populists – to not only acquire visibility but also to “define the visibility 
of others, to become organizers of visibility” (Dayan, 2013, p. 143). They may then 
impede on the terrain of journalists as the sole guardians of the holy grail of visibility.  
As I argued above, the use of social media for performative purposes draws on both 





mythical and imaginary properties (see for example Couldry, 2015a; Flichy, 2007; 
Mosco, 2005; Taylor, 2002) as background symbols; that is, on aspects of both form 
and content (see chapter two). I noted, for instance, that Couldry (2015a) points out 
how “the myth of ‘us’” encourages the belief that social media use constitutes 
expressions of collectivity. This imaginary of non-hierarchical collectivity can then 
potentially be harnessed by populist actors, for example by constructing communities 
through hashtags and sharing of memes to enable new means of visibility and visibility 
management. 
Krӓmer (2017, pp. 1303–4) points out that populists’ use of social media can have both 
a strategic and a symbolic function (see also De Blasio and Sorice, 2018). We can see 
these two functions as corresponding to populists’ use of the material affordances and 
imaginaries of social media respectively, and again to the pragmatics of the 
performative act and its semantic function. In other words, the material affordances of 
social media and the pragmatics of the digital act enable populists to achieve a 
strategic objective. For example, they can gain visibility by circumventing critical 
gatekeepers in mainstream media or, conversely, attracting their attention through 
social media. For the symbolic function, populists draw on the imaginaries of social 
media and other background symbols to symbolically mediate the populist 
representative claim. For instance, the symbolic use of social media communicates 
populists’ denunciation of mainstream media as an elitist ‘lying press’ (see, for 
example, Holt and Haller, 2017, for a recent study on populism and the ‘lügenpresse’ in 
Germany) to whom they refuse to pander by engaging in the elite’s undemocratic 
visibility management practices. In this ambiguous digitally mediated performance, 
form and content interact to create meaning in accordance with the communication 
perspective outlined in chapter two. In this way, populists’ digitally mediated 
performances, like their live disruptions, can manage visibility while retaining their 
authenticity by keeping their claim consistent with their ideology. 
9.3.3 AUTHENTICITY 
I have already in some depth delved into the notion of authenticity as a moral ideal yet 
a performed construct in chapter seven. My discussion here will therefore be brief and 





that social media encourage a focus on identity and self–presentation (Coleman, 2005; 
Grow and Ward, 2013). Somdahl-Sands and Finn (2015, p. 812) even argue that, “in the 
twenty-first century, as mediated performance eclipses the live event, our perception 
of authenticity in performance also shifts”. How social media can be used to generate 
authenticity in hybrid mediated performances is therefore a key question in the 
exploration of the performance of the populist mode of representation. 
The literature on social media and authenticity outlines two aspects of social media 
relevant to this discussion. First, the affordances of social media – for instance, the 
ability to potentially interact with live individuals and with the machine itself – creates 
a kind of liveness and sense of intimate connection that inspires authenticity (ibid., p. 
816). We may compare this to the spontaneity and intimacy of live performances – 
even where such spontaneity is staged – which we saw in the previous chapter that 
populists use to perform authenticity. Second, authentic self-representation on social 
media is characterised by a close correspondence between the online and the offline 
(Marwick, 2005, p. 2). The authenticity engendered through the liveness of social 
media may then be undermined by “revealing the disagreement between private and 
public self–representation” (Grow and Ward, 2013). We can see this as a requirement 
for consistency within hybrid mediated performances. It resonates with the analysis in 
the previous chapter where I found that consistency between performance and 
ideology and between front- and backstage behaviour are key requirements for 
authentic self-representation.  
These criteria for authenticity in social media have two implications for populists’ 
hybrid mediated performances.  First, populists are arguably at an advantage in 
ensuring on- and offline consistency with their strategy of importing ‘ordinary’ 
language into formal institutional spaces. What in physical institutional contexts counts 
as disruptive behaviour through norm-breaking often has a natural affinity with the 
norms of communication on social media. As Bartlett (2014, p. 94) puts it, “The short 
acerbic nature of populist messages works well in this medium. Humour, 
outspokenness, pithy put-downs and catchy slogans: these are the DNA of cyber 
culture.” Second, simply transferring populists’ ordinarily disruptive performance to a 





symbolic action may not be conceived as disruptive in a virtual environment where this 
kind of behaviour is the norm32. Social media can therefore serve as a means of 
legitimising and normalising offline disruptive performance whilst simultaneously 
engendering authenticity. In offline institutional spaces, their ordinariness and political 
incorrectness disrupt norms, garner media attention and symbolically communicate 
populist ideology. In online spaces, the same discourse corresponds to the affordances 
and norms of social media use. It constitutes felicitous digitally mediated performance 
that is consistent with offline behaviour and works in symbiosis with their institutional 
disruptions in hybrid forms of mediation. 
9.4 DISCUSSION 
In this chapter I have argued that a social constructivist approach to mediation that 
considers in an integrated manner institutional agency, the materiality of technology, 
and the symbolic resources of social imaginaries is a useful conceptual framework that 
can inform an integrated communication perspective on populism. Such an approach is 
able to account for the complex, contextual and multi-faceted influences on meaning-
making as populist performances of representation journey within the hybrid media 
system. Being more comprehensive and flexible than approaches purely focused on 
media logic or affordances, it is better positioned to address the research question, 
how does populist communication harmonise with the demands on mediated 
representation in the new media environment? In particular, it can be applied to the 
ways in which the performance of representation is achieved through hybrid 
mediation by responding to the demands of visibility, authenticity and efficacy in the 
new media environment. 
I have also argued that such a perspective on processes of mediation can usefully be 
integrated with the conceptual framework on meaning-making that I developed in 
chapter two. It thereby aligns conceptually with the notion of political performance as 
the manifestation of ideology. Through such an approach, we can query how populists 
combine disruption with mediated performances that rely on emergent forms of 
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visibility, authenticity and efficacy in the creation of hybrid mediated performances. I 
demonstrated in the previous chapter that acts of exposure can take the form of live 
disruptive performances aimed at mediation. Yet in combination with digitally 
mediated performances that build up and support live disruption, the hybrid nature of 
these mediated performances enhances their force and legitimacy. Such hybrid 
mediated performances simultaneously expose the elite’s practices of visibility 
management – which in turn undermines their authenticity and their attempts at 
inspiring efficacy – and garner the attention of mainstream media for further 
mediation. Populists’ ability to take advantage of the features of a media environment 
characterised by complex, multi-directional and often uncontrollable flows of 
production, circulation, interpretation and recirculation of political meaning enable 
them to perform such ambiguous claims through hybrid mediation.  
Both performances that originate within social media and spectacular, provocative 
disruptions are likely to be mediated intact. Populists can thereby achieve yet another 
form of symbolic disintermediation to inspire feelings of efficacy. Mediation becomes a 
symbolic action in and of itself as populists signal disintermediation through their 
‘performance of mediation’. In this sense, mediation becomes part of the populist 
mode of representation. Moreover, the consistency between populists’ disruptive 
transgression of norms and their social media use serves to construct their own 
authenticity. While they can portray this as a moral quality, they denounce institutions 
of mediation as espousing false consciousness and obfuscating the truth. By virtue of 
their own professed morality and claimed right to visibility, and to conferring visibility, 
they can then usurp the role of the media and provide a sidestage view of the elite’s 
visibility management practices, exposing their performances as acts of deception and 
themselves offering a simplicity, certainty and clarity that engenders an efficacious 





10. THE HYBRID MEDIATION OF THE POPULIST REPRESENTATIVE 
CLAIM: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Cape Town, 12 February 2015 
A media event is in progress: photographers, prominent authorities and celebrity 
guests, designer dresses, swirls, photogenic smiles. But this year’s State of the Nation 
Address (SONA) is not only keenly mediated for its pomp and ceremony. The reason 
why the nation is glued to their television screens, and why the SONA becomes South 
Africa’s first real “social media event” (du Plessis, 2015), is the promise of that most 
exciting form of politics: disruption, controversy, possibly (oh glee!) even violence, 
democracy being put to the test and disintegrating in real-time before the eyes of the 
nation. Both the media’s and the public’s expectations are fulfilled. As EFF MPs 
continue to disrupt President Zuma’s speech, an increasingly impatient and frustrated 
speaker eventually breaks parliamentary rules and orders armed police to forcefully 
evict the EFF from the House. This, also, is part of the EFF’s performance, which has 
carefully provoked the authoritarian reaction of their antagonists and can now adopt a 
position of moral and legal superiority. The government “tamper with fundamental 
right of media freedom” (EFF_tweet44), they tweet. Fist fights ensue, to the delight, 
shock and awe of the tweeting broadcast audience. 
Strasbourg, 28 June 2016 
Then-leader of UKIP Nigel Farage excels at increasingly gleeful and explicit breaches of 
the norms of political speech and behaviour as the EU referendum draws near, is won 
and negotiations proceed. UKIP’s disruptions are confined by the stringent norms and 
rules of the European Parliament. Yet they have come to be expected, and Farage’s 
repeated minor breaches of institutional norms provide continuous challenges to the 
establishment. Dripping with sarcasm, they succeed in provoking regular rebukes from 
the EP chair and reactions from the floor so indignant as to cause reprimands of their 
own. Referring to a video of his speech in a Facebook post, Farage boasts of his own 
popularity and success, “Thrilled that 4 million people have taken the time to watch 





establish a counter-culture that seeps into UK mainstream politics, not in its responses 
to the issues that UKIP raise but in its attempts to outcompete them. 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
“Enemy agents” is how the EFF describe the media (EFF_press4). Populists like the EFF 
are famously antagonistic towards mainstream media, whom they perceive as part of 
the elite (Haller and Holt, 2018; Krämer, 2014). The demands on mediated 
representation can therefore be expected to grate with populists. Indeed it does, as 
we already saw in chapter eight, especially in claims against the elite’s too-close 
relationship to the media and their resultant preoccupation with impression 
management rather than the interests of the people. The two populist parties accuse 
their respective elites of designing their performances to cater to the media’s demands 
for visibility, authenticity and efficacy, rather than to the public’s demands for 
authentic and responsive representation. Yet, as we shall see, populist parties practice 
the old adage about keeping your enemies closer. And, of course, it is necessary to 
anticipate processes of mediation in modern representative democracy. From the 
analysis in chapter eight, it emerged that when we consider the performance of the 
claim, rather than the claim at face value, it is curiously symbiotic with the 
requirements for mediated representation in the new media environment: visibility, 
authenticity and efficacy (Coleman, 2011). So exactly how does populist 
communication harmonise so successfully with the demands on mediated 
representation in the new media environment?  
The situation that political representation has to contend with in the new media 
environment in both established and transitional democracies is this: Representatives 
need media visibility to perform authenticity (but not too much visibility!). 
Representatives need authenticity to inspire efficacy. And efficacy is the very fault line 
in representative democracy that populists make visible; where it is felt at all, it is 
based on deceit. Yet if representatives are seen to engage in practices of visibility 
management, their authenticity is undermined. It is a tricky situation. As we have seen, 
the populist recipe for success is to obtain visibility performatively through the act of 
subverting visibility. In other words, they engage in performances whose stated aims 





they design these performances as irresistible visibility magnets that are authentic by 
their very nature and ultimately aim to engender efficacy. 
The ingredients for this recipe are: disruption, direct mediated communications 
(chiefly Twitter, in the two cases in question) and embodiment of the people. Stir until 
fully emulsified. The delectable outcome is the notion of ‘hybrid mediation’ – live 
disruptive performance and social media fused in symbiotic ways to garner the 
attention of mainstream media and to appeal directly to the public. To investigate the 
hybrid nature of the mediation of the populist representative claim, I supplement 
interpretive analysis of disruptive performances with quantitatively based 
observations of the interplay between social media and offline events. I consider three 
particular aspects of the ambiguous populist claim about the new media environment 
in order to address the above research question. First, I explore the two populist 
parties’ portrayals of the media and its role in democratic politics. I contrast these with 
the parties’ own modes of mediation as performances of disintermediation that aim to 
inspire efficacy. Second, I interrogate how the parties use hybrid modes of mediated 
symbolic action, integrating digitally mediated performances with their disruptive 
action, to achieve visibility – But wait! Most of their constituents are not even on 
Twitter33; the parties are addressing a different audience altogether: their antagonists, 
the media and the elite. My focus with respect to this issue will therefore be on the 
function of generating visibility through mainstream media. – Third, I consider how 
these hybrid mediated performances contribute to the parties’ authentic self-
representation and how they, in the case of the EFF, enable the party to not only have 
their authenticity mediated but to usurp the role of mediator.  
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 Studies of the demography of UKIP supporters show them to be chiefly white males over the age of 55. 
They are mainly skilled working class or professionals though core supporters are working class. Few are 
educated beyond the age of 16 (Stanyer et al., 2016, p. 172). Surveys of British Twitter users show them 
to be mainly young, with very few above the age of 55 (Statista, 2017) and thus with little overlap with 
UKIP’s supporters. An Ipsos poll shows that EFF supporters are almost uniformly black and below the age 
of 50, chiefly male, single and live in rural areas, have middling educational qualifications but not 
university degrees, and are mostly out of work (Harris, 2014). Data on the demographics of Twitter users 
in South Africa was not available. However, it is to be expected that Twitter users do not overlap much 





10.2 ANTI-MEDIA POPULISM: ENHANCING EFFICACY THROUGH HYBRID 
MEDIATION AND DISINTERMEDIATION  
If efficacy is a subjective feeling of political agency that resides in the public, how do 
we investigate the ways in which politicians perform and mediate it? I noted in chapter 
nine that efficacy is based on a communicative relationship between representatives 
and represented. Returning to the notion of the representative claim, efficacy must 
then be inspired by performances that make the relationship between representatives 
and represented appear more direct and less troubled by friction in its mediation and 
intermediation. In this research I do not empirically investigate constituents’ feelings 
of efficacy, but I briefly consider how UKIP and the EFF mediate performances in ways 
intended to inspire feelings of efficacy. I argue that the two populist parties achieve 
this through a combination of anti-media populism and hybrid mediation. First, they 
use modes of mediation as a form of symbolic action that signals disintermediation. 
This complements the performances of disintermediation that we saw in chapter eight 
in the form of embodying the people and self-representing as truth tellers. Second, 
they use hybridity to, as far as possible, retain control of their visibility within 
processes of mediation. Third, their mediated performances are authentic and 
therefore inspire feelings of efficacy. I briefly address the first of these points in this 
section but focus on the latter two in the following sections. 
We saw in chapter eight how UKIP and the EFF focused their mode of representation 
on symbolic forms of disintermediation. These performances aim to make the path 
between the people and power appear as short as possible. Modes of mediation that 
avoid the gatekeepers of traditional media can perform the same function. UKIP and 
the EFF achieve this both through their claims about mediation and through the ways 
in which these claims are performed through mediation. In the claims about 
mediation, the two parties portray mainstream media as interfering intermediaries in a 
relationship between representatives and represented that ought to be more direct. 
Where UKIP and the EFF express concern about the elite’s imposition of a false 
consciousness upon the people, they also see the media as obscuring reality in a 
similar way. UKIP state in a tweet, “our media are guilty of double standards” 





aim of casting aspersions on [our] leadership and the organisation as a whole” 
(EFF_press4).  In these claims, the media’s practices of misrepresenting reality 
undermine the foundation for democratic representation, for the people do not have 
access to the truthful information they need to gain a proper understanding of and 
influence upon the political process. 
UKIP and the EFF’s performances of these claims of anti-media populism are – at least 
at first glance – consistent with the content of the claims. For both parties perform 
their claims in ways that symbolise disintermediation. That is, they use modes of 
mediation that avoid interfering media institutions and editorialising. Disruptive 
performances themselves achieve this. They are, in Blumler and Kavanagh’s words, 
“’must-see’ political spectacles and events that defy media intervention, aiming to take 
them directly to the people, unmediated by editors, producers, and reporters” (1999, 
p. 216). However, both parties also supplement disruptions aimed at mainstream 
media with other ‘direct’ modes of mediation. Farage’s communications, for instance, 
pivot on his own LBC radio talk show, regular newspaper columns and tweets.  
UKIP’s tweet quoted above is an example of a mediated performance that originates 
within the medium and forms part of a hybrid mediated performance. It relies on the 
affordances of social media to circumvent gatekeepers, in keeping with the content of 
its message. But it also draws on the nature of this form of mediation as a resource of 
symbolic action. It is an act of protest made by means of a performance of mediation. 
By virtue of being a tweet, the act of posting it in and of itself signifies UKIP’s refusal to 
partake in the competition over visibility in the media. The act of mediation via social 
media is an objection to, and circumvention of, the symbiosis between the political 
and media elites that characterises mainstream politics. UKIP thus make their claim to 
disintermediation both verbally and performatively. 
Malema and the EFF likewise use direct modes of mediation. They are avid tweeters 
and hold regular live rallies. Like UKIP’s, the EFF’s tweets use the affordances of social 
media to circumvent the mainstream conditions of political communication, which 
they see as undemocratic. But they also make a point of doing so. The EFF’s symbolic 
messages of disruption, exposure of the establishment’s deceit, and their anti-media 





symbolic act of using those affordances. In this sense, the mediated performance of 
posting a tweet is also a performance of mediation that draws on the social media 
imaginaries of emancipation, bottom-up revolution and opposition to dominant forces 
associated in the public imagination with, for instance, the role of social media in the 
Arab Spring (see, for example, Gerbaudo, 2014; Howard and Hussain, 2013).  
The parties’ use of direct forms of mediation as symbolic in and of themselves enable 
them to address their constituents directly, signal disintermediation and convey that 
they are different from the self-referential, inward-looking elite who have forgotten 
about those they are supposed to represent. They also enable the untainted mediation 
of ‘ordinary’, informal styles that signal a direct connection to the people. Such styles 
avoid people feeling alienated by the formal language of politics and constitute a form 
of virtual embodiment. As we will see shortly in the context of their performances of 
authenticity via social media, Malema’s frequent use of slang is, for instance, 
particularly well suited to the norms of social media (Bartlett, 2014). We will also see, 
however, that, as the two parties use hybrid mediated performances to gain visibility 
and perform authenticity, their performances of disintermediation circumvent the 
media in name only. Many of the parties’ such hybrid mediated performances are in 
fact aimed at legacy media with the goal of further mediation. I now look at the nature 
of UKIP’s and the EFF’s use of hybrid mediation to gain visibility and perform 
authenticity and thereby enhance feelings of efficacy. 
10.3 THE WEAPON OF VISIBILITY 
Disruptive performance is a show of spectacle that is bound to get media attention. 
Yet in the modern media environment, performances are conducted through complex 
assemblages of media, and the live disruptive climax is only a small part. I now 
consider how the hybrid nature of UKIP and the EFF’s mediation plays into the populist 
parties’ control of visibility in entrepreneurial ways. Hybrid mediation has a particular 
performative function. It creates dramatic structure (Freytag, [1863]2010) by building 
up the performance to its climax. Aimed at an elite audience, the use of Twitter as part 
of hybrid mediation not only meets the media’s desire for drama. As we will see later 
in the chapter, populist hybrid mediation also provokes responses by elites who fear 





of visibility. First, however, I explore the nature of UKIP’s and the EFF’s hybrid 
mediation and how it is constructed. 
10.3.1 GAINING VISIBILITY THROUGH HYBRIDITY: MEDIATION IN THE NEW MEDIA 
ENVIRONMENT 
At face value, we have seen that the two parties’ claims undermine the elite’s 
relationship to the media, establish populists’ own relationship to the media as 
adversarial and back this up with mediated symbolic performances of 
disintermediation. Shall we take their word for it? After all they are one of us! But no, I 
move on to query how the populists’ mediated performances themselves address the 
media, for they are designed and staged with mediation in mind. 
The EFF aim to maximise their visibility in the media. To do so, they elaborately 
orchestrate their disruption of the SONA through escalating promises and 
performances of drama in an extended phase of rising action. For this purpose, they 
make entrepreneurial use of digital media, adding a banner to their website with a 
clock counting down the days, hours, minutes and seconds to the big SONA 
showdown. They also make extensive use of Twitter to build up to the climax of 
disruption through provocations and responses to unfolding media stories on the 
upcoming event. In the early stages of the build-up, EFF leader Malema speaks to the 
media’s news values and thirst for action in a tweet: “For the first time in the history of 
the South Africa, something is going to happen in the #SONA” (EFF_tweet31). 
Continuing to build up tension in the period leading up to the big event, he posts an 
image of a smug-looking Zuma with the incendiary caption “We are ready for u boy” 
(EFF_tweet32) (see Figure 4.1). 
Through these tweets, the EFF use the affordances of Twitter to enhance the 
adversarial appearance of their relationship to President Zuma and to initiate 
hashtagged public conversation about the impending drama. They thereby both speak 
to mainstream media’s preference for conflict frames (Esser and Strömbäck, 2014, pp. 
144–5) and to the Twitter public’s interest in discussing politics – preferably using 
humour and irony (Freelon and Karpf, 2015; Wilson, 2011) – through hashtagged 
conversations (Bruns and Burgess, 2011). They push a frame that redefines the 





The mainstream press eagerly lap up the EFF’s irresistible drama and call the public’s 
attention to the impending entertainment (EFF_news8; EFF_news9; EFF_news10; 
EFF_news11; EFF_news12)34. The newspaper Business Day (EFF_news9) even imitates 
the EFF’s device of the ticking clock to introduce drama and suspense in their online 
version. The press frequently quote the EFF’s tweets, especially those that 
provocatively establish an adversarial relationship between the EFF and the elite (for 
instance, EFF_news13). This successful correspondence between the projected and 
mediated performances during the build-up to the disruptive climax results in an 
unprecedented public Twitter engagement during the actual broadcast event (du 
Plessis, 2015): as the SONA 2015 begins, the hashtags #SONA and #SONA2015 
experience a peak on Twitter of 348,755 tweets35 (and the volume is exceeded in 2017 
with 401,931 tweets on the day of the SONA). 
As the SONA 2015 gets underway and the climax nears, the EFF’s use of Twitter shifts 
from building up to the climax and becomes integral to the party’s live performance. It 
creates what I in the previous chapter defined as hybrid mediation where virtual and 
physical social realities overtly intersect as, for example, tweets remediate a live 
performance aimed at mainstream media, yet constitute original virtual performances 
in and of themselves. We saw in chapter eight that disruptive performances function 
as meta-performances that dissect elite performance. The EFF’s live tweets, as part of 
the party’s hybrid mediation, are in this sense a form of meta-meta-performance that 
observes and interprets the party’s own live disruptive performance in real-time. The 
EFF use Twitter to mediate aspects of the performance that no other medium can, in a 
way that at once forms part of and interprets the live broadcast event. For instance, 
commenting, “Tension as Zuma starts speaking” (EFF_tweet33), the EFF explicitly 
describe the tension, yet performatively engender it by promising drama to come 
through a sense of liveness that co-opts the audience and inspires authenticity. They 
simultaneously interpret the ritual of the SONA in a way that strains its fusion as its 
status as performance is made explicit. 
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 In this respect, the newspaper The New Age conspicuously stands out as it ignores the EFF and the 
impending disruption until several days after the 2015 SONA. Only an unwarranted level of partisanship 
can ignore such a spectacular media event. The newspaper is owned by the Guptas, an Indian-South 
African family who owns a business empire and is controversially known for their close relationship to 
Jacob Zuma. 
35





Yet it is also clear that the EFF’s mediation on Twitter is only effective when it forms 
part of a hybrid assemblage of mediated performances; it cannot stand alone as a 
means of managing visibility. The ways in which the EFF use digital mediation in an 
integral way highlights the hybrid nature of the media system – and its demand for 
hybridity. Despite elaborate staging on Twitter over a month in advance, Google 
search interest in the SONA does not pick up until a few days before the live event36, 
and neither does Twitter activity on #PayBackTheMoney and #SONA/#SONA2015. The 
EFF need their live disruptive performance to capture public and media attention; 
Twitter’s function is to build up to and complement a climax in the form of a live media 
event.  
An analysis of Twitter activity in relation to moments of the EFF’s live performance 
(Figure 10.1) demonstrates that it is their live provocations, humour and violence in 
parliament that generate the unprecedented public response rates on Twitter and 
highly retweeted tweets by legacy media Twitter accounts. Disruption is what 
engenders mediation. When the action kicks off with the first EFF MP, Gardee, 
interrupting the speaker, “May we ask the President as to when he is going pay the 
money in terms of what the Public Protector has said?” and jokingly asking whether he 
will pay “by EFT, cash or eWallet” (EFF_live1), Twitter activity shoots up 
instantaneously (Figure 10.1, 19:28hrs) with a spike of 2,403 tweets per minute 
commenting on the incident. This level of activity is then almost doubled in a new 
spike of excitement when the speaker predictably evicts Malema and his fellow EFF 
MPs from the House (Figure 10.1, 19:39hrs). 
                                                     
36
 Based on Google Trends analysis of the search terms “pay back the money”, “SONA”, “SONA2015” and 


































































































































































































































































































Total # of tweets+retweets
on #SONA or #SONA2015
Total # of tweets+retweets
on #bringbackthesignal
17:34: signal jam reported 
by @Abramjee 
18:02: #bringbackthesignal 
introduced by member of 
public 
19:00: SONA scheduled 
18:45: Signal jamming 
18:26: : Journalists chant 
"bringbackthesignal" in 
19:23: @AshrafGarda reports signal 
19:28: first EFF 
interruption; Gardee 
19:39: Speaker orders EFF 
MPs to leave the chamber 
19:59: DA walk out 
20:02: Zuma laughs and 20:08: Zuma's speech; EFF 
press conference outside 
20:19: Unofficial footage and 
images of scuffle emerge on 
19:08: EFF MP Shivambu 
suggests adjourning until 
19:41: EFF MPs removed by 





As I argued above, the EFF use the affordances of Twitter for symbolic purposes in 
their hybrid mediation. When security officers are called in to evict them, the EFF 
tweet simply, “#Asijiki” (‘No retreat’) (EFF_tweet34). The Twitter imaginaries of 
emancipation (Gerbaudo, 2014) and collectivity (Couldry, 2015a) evoked by their use 
of the hashtag sign augment the emotional force of the EFF’s rallying cry. The hashtag 
is less used for its affordances of organising conversation and archival indexing on 
Twitter than for its mythical properties. Indeed, no conversation takes place. Rather, 
this is a ‘performance of mediation’; that is, an act of mediation that is undertaken for 
its symbolic significance. #Asijiki is consistent with the EFF’s self-representation as 
fearless martyrs, with their use of the freedom struggle as a fundamental background 
symbol, and with their narrow conception of ‘the people’ as indigenous South Africans 
who speak local languages.  
Similarly to the EFF, UKIP make entrepreneurial use of the new media environment in 
ways that build up and complement live disruptions aimed at broadcast audiences. 
Farage takes to Twitter to warn that “Sparks will fly” (UKIP_tweet8) in a build-up of 
tension before his provocative EP speech on the UK’s triggering of Article 50 that 
commenced her exit from the EU. UKIP’s mediated build-up to individual speeches, 
however, is much less elaborate than the EFF’s. For instance, in the case of Farage’s 
momentous post-referendum speech on 28 June 2016, neither UKIP nor Farage send a 
single tweet or publish any press releases to gain media attention for the historic 
occasion. Farage’s EU referendum speech may be the climax of an extended media 
campaign that has been slowly built up through the media over years of rising action. 
Yet the speech itself is not a media event that is broadcast live directly to UKIP’s 
constituents, and legacy media is present as a matter of course. 
In addition to the structure of the performance, the hybridity of UKIP’s online and 
offline mediation is also of a different nature from that of the EFF. Unlike the EFF, UKIP 
chiefly tweet after, not during, their live performances. Most of their tweets direct 
attention to other communications, such as YouTube videos of Farage’s speeches, 
Facebook posts, press releases and columns in the press, rather than to live moments. 
Their audience is legacy media, not a live broadcast audience. Yet their tweets still 





supplement, comment on and interpret UKIP’s live symbolic action after the event. In 
fact, the tweets often spell out and enhance the symbolism of UKIP’s disruptive 
performances, such as when UKIP explicitly point out their character of protest – 
“@Nigel_Farage leads UKIP MEPs in a protest against the European Parliament at the 
opening of its new session” (UKIP_tweet13) – labour the metaphor of their turned 
backs – “UKIP MEPs turn their backs on the EU flag as the EU anthem played” 
(UKIP_tweet14) – or insist that such symbolic action is indeed rather disruptive 
(UKIP_tweet15). Such tweets feed a particular interpretation of UKIP’s live 
performances to the media. 
Another example of this interpretive function of social media takes the form of a 
promotional YouTube video (UKIP_vid1) that UKIP create of the EP opening ceremony 
(Figure 4.7). The disdainful video features Farage in a supposedly backstage moment 
having a conversation with a fellow MEP in which he sneers at the “nationalist 
militarism” of the ceremony. This supposedly private-conversation-made-public is 
portrayed as fully consistent with Farage’s frontstage behaviour, resonating with 
arguments he provocatively puts directly to the EP and in public newspaper columns, 
even using the same expressions and phrases. The mediation of Farage’s performance 
in the video thereby stands in contrast to the inconsistencies between front- and back-
stage behaviour that the elite exhibit in their attempts to manage visibility with 
pompous rituals. The privately revelatory nature of the moment is preserved by using 
the direct and personal interaction afforded by social media as a symbolic resource. It 
is thus also consistent with UKIP’s performance of ‘ordinariness’ by bringing backstage 
behaviour to the front stage and by exhibiting consistency between online and offline 
mediated behaviour in a manner that inspires authenticity. 
UKIP’s tweets, like the EFF’s, bring out the adversarial and norm-breaking 
characteristics of the live performance. Yet their asynchronicity with the live events 
reduces their opportunities for generating visibility and for engendering a sense of 
community and intimacy through live-tweeting to a present audience who share the 
experience of the event in real-time. The EFF’s live-tweeting, in contrast, utilises the 
potential of Twitter’s affordances for “calling networked publics into being and into 





p. 268), such as the volatile periods created by their own disruptions. The reasons 
behind these different compositions of and approaches to hybrid mediation by the two 
parties lie in their external conditions. Let us consider three such contextual 
explanations. 
First, one difference consists in the nature of the SONA as a prime-time broadcast 
event with a large live audience and a long enough mediated climax to sustain live 
tweeting. UKIP’s mediated performances usually happen mid-morning, in the 
supranational setting of the EP, and are not broadcast live. This results in a low 
number of live tweeters. These logistics, over which UKIP have no control, mean that 
their events are not national media events like the SONA, nor are they social media 
events that generate hashtags of their own. In the case of Farage’s climactic EU 
referendum ‘victory speech’ in June 2016, only 332 relevant unique tweets (4163 with 
retweets) are posted during his live 8-minute-long performance. Although a distinct 
relationship between live performance and Twitter activity is still discernible (see 
Figure 10.2 below), it is mainly media institutions and established actors who are the 
drivers of public reactions on Twitter. For their disruptive performances, UKIP’s main 
audience is not live on Twitter, nor are they natural Twitter users. Indeed, the small 
and select live Twitter audience is very partisan in their dislike of Farage, with 
adjectives such as “gloating”, “smug” and “embarrassing” recurring frequently. The 
main purpose of UKIP’s tweets is therefore to gain the attention of mainstream media 
rather than a live watching audience or select constituency. UKIP then use the climax 
of the symbolic action itself to make it appear newsworthy and representative of a 
large of constituency so as to persuade an audience of media institutions to extract 
clips that will reach their constituency. 
Second, the context of a transitional democracy conditions the EFF’s mediation. Their 
tweets may be the most effective means of getting their message through to the public 
as the government is pushing for control of mainstream media. While in the SONA 
2015, the government’s attempt to block the mobile telephone signal was quickly 
thwarted, they also censored the live broadcast, preventing the SABC from showing 





interviews, columns in the press, Farage’s LBC radio show – and use Twitter to direct 
public and media attention to these other more detailed communications. 
Third, the political context of the EFF’s mediation provides opportunities as well as 
constraints: the relatively fragile institutional norms of the South African parliament 
can easily be disrupted in quite spectacular and lengthy fashion; and, as we saw in 
chapter eight, the EFF can turn the government’s illegitimate use of social power into a 
valuable performative resource. The EFF are able to get their message clearly across 
through processes of mediation by means of extended and explicit symbolic action. 
UKIP, however, are restricted by rigid institutional norms and are forced to rely on 
much more sedate and implicit symbolic action. Their meaning instead needs to be 
established and enhanced through mediation. This is the interpretive function of their 
tweets, to pointing out that their performance is indeed relatively disruptive and 
extraordinary. This is necessary to underscore the less disruptive symbolic act and 
ensure their message is clearly mediated and its disruptive character properly 

















Farage's speech per hour
08:47: @LBC tweets 
interview with Farage 
08:07 - 08:43 @Leave.EU, 
@mrjamesob and @WestmonsterUK 
circulate footage of and comment on 
07:53: @SkyNews tweets 




jokes about speech 
09:51: Farage speaks 
again in EP 
13:00 - 14:00: Varied 
comments on Farage's speech 
18:00 - 19:00: Farage 
broadcasts his LBC radio 
show 
10:06: Debate on UK ends; 
voting on negotiations with UK 
starts 
08:09:Michel Barnier speaks; 




10.3.2 AUDIENCES AND CONSTITUENTS 
In chapter nine I noted that populists (like other representatives) at times speak to an 
audience that is distinct from the constituency they claim to speak for. Where their 
immediate audience is legacy media and the goal is getting their message unscathed 
past its gate-keepers, demonstrating constituents’ uptake of a populist performance 
through other modes of mediation can be an essential means of providing justification 
for media coverage. The two populist parties utilise the hybridity of the media system 
for this very purpose. Their careful assemblage of variously mediated performances 
constitutes a complex hybridity able to address different audiences with nuanced 
symbolic messages. 
UKIP are, for instance, eager to point out their constituency support when Farage uses 
Twitter to boast about his Facebook uptake, as we saw in the opening to this chapter: 
“Thrilled that 4 million people have taken the time to watch my speech in the 
European Parliament yesterday” (UKIP_tweet11). Farage’s tweet demonstrates the 
fluidity and complexity inherent in hybrid and cross-platform mediation. His tweet is a 
mediated performance that originates on Twitter; but it also remediates a Facebook 
post that is itself a remediation of Farage’s broadcast speech. Farage thus uses hybrid 
cross-platform mediation to demonstrate his representational qualities by giving 
evidence to a narrow elite audience on Twitter (that includes legacy media) of his 
constituency support demonstrated by his Facebook ‘Likes’. He thereby claims his right 
to mainstream media visibility. UKIP’s use of Twitter and other social media 
symbiotically interacts with their live disruptions in forms of hybrid mediation aimed at 
managing visibility. 
In his live performances Farage is clearly aware of his audience and his mediation 
potential. As he is about to start his Article 50 speech (UKIP_live2), he glances directly 
up at the camera (Figure 4.11), catching its eye and betraying his awareness of the 
wider broadcast audience that he may garner by provoking his secondary but 
physically present audience of MEPs. As his glance at the camera shows, these elite 
colleagues are in fact not the audience he is concerned with; they are his props, his 
means of symbolic production. As it is for his tweet above, the primary audience he 
must have in mind is legacy media, and his focus is on mediation. EP plenaries are 




UKIP’s constituents). Farage must therefore appeal to an audience of media 
institutions to extract newsworthy clips from his performance. 
The EFF also use Twitter to demonstrate constituency support to legacy media. 
Malema, for instance, provocatively challenges the ANC “to go fill the grand stand of 
Metlhareng and I will resign. Not the grounds, just the grandstands” (EFF_tweet35) 
because “Only 15 people came to their march” (EFF_tweet36). The EFF’s own uptake, 
in contrast to this representation of the elite’s, is amply demonstrated by their Twitter 
account profile picture and other frequently tweeted pictures of stadiums filled to the 
brim with fervent supporters and crowds chanting alongside them in the streets. 
The EFF’s use of Twitter, however, does not stand alone as a means to manage their 
visibility vis-à-vis legacy media. It is integral to an assemblage of smaller acts that 
together constitute a hybrid mediated performance. While the EFF push the hashtag 
#PayBackTheMoney on Twitter, they also print it on T-shirts they wear during a press 
event (EWN Reporter, 2015), thereby echoing the “nano-media”37 strategies of South 
African civil society groups who do not have access to mainstream media coverage 
(Dawson, 2012; Wasserman et al., 2018). This is another use of technology for 
symbolic purposes, a performance of mediation. Through media associated with the 
widespread bottom-up civil society protests against the government’s lack of 
responsiveness, the EFF identify themselves with the people. As ‘the media of the 
people’ media types such as nano-media – the EFF’s printed T-shirts and their red 
overalls – and social media are symbolic statements of resemblance. Media become 
means of symbolic production. 
As a result of the EFF’s mediated build-up to the SONA, on the day of the big event the 
hashtag is picked up by radio and TV personality Gareth Cliff who simply tweets 
“#PayBackTheMoney” as proceedings in Parliament are about to start 
(EFF_mediatweet2). With celebrities being some of the most influential actors on 
Twitter (see for example Cha et al., 2010), this tweet becomes the most popular 
(retweeted) tweet about the SONA on the day, successfully sealing the EFF’s definition 
of the occasion through mediation. By strategically distinguishing between elite 
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 The term ‘nano-media’ is coined by Pajnik and Downing (2008) in the context of social movements and 
their ability to create impact through nano-technologies. It refers to media such as popular song, dance, 




audiences and constituents in their symbolic communications and thereby 
demonstrating their representativeness to mainstream media, combined with media 
spectacle through disruption of elite ritual, the EFF’s hybrid mediation sets the agenda 
and shapes the mediated representation of reality across all media formats. 
10.3.3 CONSEQUENCES OF VISIBILITY MANAGEMENT AND STRUGGLES OVER 
MEDIATION 
We have seen that the two populist parties’ use of the hybrid media system at once 
expose the elite’s visibility management practices and manage the parties’ own 
visibility by appealing to the media. I now move on to consider the behaviour these 
acts of mediation bring about in the elite from the perspective of visibility. As elites 
respond to the populist parties’ threats to their visibility, both intended and 
unintended consequences arise, and they differ substantially between the two cases. 
The EFF’s elaborate build-up in the media to their climactic disruption of the SONA 
effects changes in the elite’s behaviour. It increases their anxiety over their threatened 
visibility to the extent that they prepare to – and do – transgress liberal democratic 
practice in a last-ditch attempt at control. The government escalate police presence in 
advance of the SONA. In attempts to control the mediated reality, they also block the 
mobile telephone signal in the parliamentary chamber to prevent journalists from 
using the affordances of internet-based media and report on the expected disruption, 
and they ban media from showing the ruckus of the EFF’s expulsion from the House. 
The day before the SONA the government allegedly cause the closure of Robben Island 
to prevent an EFF press conference from taking place (EFF_press10). While it is unlikely 
that the government would have undertaken these actions – some of which constitute 
outright authoritarian attempts at controlling visibility – without the EFF’s threats to 
their visibility, they also play directly into the EFF’s hands.   
Digital media, and Twitter in particular, play a central role in circumventing and defying 
such authoritarian attempts at controlling mediation but also of turning them into 
performative resources. Indeed, as we saw in the opening to this chapter, the EFF 
tweet, “They were obsessed with EFF and they tamper with fundamental right of 
media freedom” (EFF_tweet37). The government’s actions only feed the EFF’s 




by tweeting, “I refuse to wrestle with a pig in the mud because it will always emerge 
victorious” (EFF_tweet38). The EFF’s adaptability in incorporating the ANC’s dubitable 
reaction to their threatened visibility proves a success as Malema’s tweet becomes the 
most retweeted tweet by both Malema and the EFF in the entire sample period38. 
Instead of limiting the EFF’s options for mediation as they intend, the government 
ends up becoming part of the EFF’s hybrid mediated performances. 
By becoming a resource for, rather than an obstruction to, mediation, the 
government’s reactions also reinforce the cleavage in the political spectrum that the 
EFF have worked so hard to construct. Many journalists defy the government’s public 
disorder clause that is aimed at preventing the mediation of footage of the EFF’s 
disruption of the SONA 2015. They circulate footage on Twitter of the fight in 
parliament, and these tweets cause large spikes in volumes of activity (see Figure 10.1, 
at 20:19 hrs) as they are recirculated. Moreover, it is a member of the public who 
intervenes through Twitter, asking journalists in the chamber to chant 
#BringBackTheSignal (see Figure 10.1, at 18:02 hrs), which then results in the 
unscrambling of the mobile telephone signal in parliament. Media freedom proves a 
useful script for performing populist Manichaean ideology: it is the government 
against everyone else – the EFF, mainstream media and the public. In this context 
Twitter becomes a means of not only circumventing difficult conditions for visibility 
but of turning the government’s authoritarian weapons against themselves, thereby 
strengthening the EFF’s claim through its mediation. 
The success of the EFF’s hybrid mediation is evident in the focus of legacy media on 
the reactions by the elite that the EFF’s performances provoke. At a press conference 
(see Figure 4.3; EFF_conf2) outside Parliament after their eviction from the SONA 
2015, journalists lap up the spectacular conflict generated by the EFF’s disruptive 
performance and the ANC’s response. The first follow-up question after Malema’s 
statement to the press directly invites him to reinforce the justification for the EFF’s 
disruption by absorbing the ANC’s reaction into his narrative: “It must be a sad day for 
the South African Parliament that something like that will happen?” suggests a 
journalist. The question allows Malema to confirm how the ANC's actions have 
                                                     




degraded South African democracy. He portrays the government’s response as not 
only authoritarian but also unnecessarily immoral, using the beating of a female EFF 
MP as a case in point: “It's a sad day,” he confirms, “that elected representatives that 
can be beaten by police and eh including women eh Reneiloe Mashabela was held by 
not less than seven men. One of them was beating her on the face - with a shoe!” 
(EFF_conf2; italics denote verbal emphasis).  
Most newspaper headlines on the morning after the SONA 2015 and in the days that 
follow report the events with words such as “chaos”, “pandemonium”, “drama” and 
“protest” (EFF_news2; EFF_news14; EFF_news15; EFF_news16), avidly describing the 
government’s transgression of democratic rules and the tumultuous events they seek 
to hide. Few reports mention the contents of Zuma’s speech, except to note how it 
failed to reflect the true “state of the nation” (EFF_news14), as the EFF also point out 
in their official reply to the SONA (EFF_press3). As many members of the public 
cynically suggest on Twitter, the state of the nation was better reflected by the 
disorder in parliament (for example, TwitterUser2). The Twitter public may not 
unanimously endorse the EFF’s disruptive behaviour, but they agree with its projected 
claim against the government; there can be no doubt that the EFF have succeeded in 
redefining the purpose of the SONA. 
Unfortunately for the EFF, perhaps, their mediation success results in their monopoly 
on truth-telling being challenged in the SONA in 2017. Other opposition parties join 
them as uninvited participants in their disruptive performance, initiating interruptions 
that imitate the EFF’s in previous years, even before the EFF get a chance to begin the 
show (EFF_live2). The force of the EFF’s own visibility management and mediation 
potential is then weakened. Media coverage of their role in the event is significantly 
more limited than it was in 2015. The public on Twitter, as in 2015, react with peaks in 
volume to the extreme moments of the event in real-time. There is largely united 
condemnation of Zuma but no consensus around support of any one other party or 
voice. The infection of disruption amongst South Africa’s opposition parties is a success 
in terms of the EFF’s stated goal of pressurising Zuma. But it is also an appropriation of 





UKIP’s mediated disruptions also have consequences for the political process, if on an 
altogether different scale from those of the EFF. We have seen how Farage often 
manages to provoke reactions from his audience within the EP that are themselves 
norm-breaking: boos, catcalls and laughter. When met with loud shouts of protest and 
heckling at the start of his climactic post-referendum speech, Farage gives a satisfied 
grin (UKIP_live1). These intended reactions by the elite to UKIP’s disruptions certainly 
do not breach the Constitution, like the South African government, and are 
consequently rarely sufficiently disruptive to themselves attract mainstream media 
attention. The (very limited) mediation of such events on Twitter is accompanied by 
public criticism of both UKIP’s and other MEPs’ behaviour, which Twitter users deem 
degrading to democracy. 
As is the case with the EFF, however, UKIP’s attempts to meet the demands of 
mediation also have unintended consequences. Before Farage’s first speech in an 
institutional setting after the EU referendum – an emergency plenary in the EP on 28 
June 2016, called to discuss the controversial results of the UK referendum – the EU 
authorities allegedly look into removing the speaking rights of UK MEPs in a move to 
deny Farage a platform (Millar, 2017). While we have seen that the institutional rigidity 
of the EP restricts the level of disruption that UKIP is able to perform, on this occasion 
these same legal and political hindrances work to retain their speaking rights (ibid.) 
and consequent chance of mediation. Social power in the setting of the EP remains 
legitimate and does not unduly restrict UKIP’s means of symbolic production and 
mediation, as the government does in the case of the EFF. At the same time, the very 
legitimacy of the EP’s use of social power deprives UKIP of fuel for their fire; they do 
not get the opportunity to turn misuses of social power into resources that strengthen 
the legitimacy of their claim and its consequent mediation as we saw was the case 
with the EFF. Instead of denying Farage a platform, the extraordinary political 
developments in the UK, fulfilling UKIP’s goal of withdrawing Britain from the EU, now 
culminate for Farage with his rightfully earned moment in the limelight as an MEP. 
UKIP are, like the EFF, occasionally upstaged by competing actors who choose to 
engage in the struggle over mediation in an equally entrepreneurial fashion. Yet UKIP 
are less fortunate with respect to these unintended consequences than their South 




disruptions – tickle mainstream media more than even UKIP’s own performances and 
succeed in snatching the media agenda before UKIP’s eyes. One such case in point is 
Farage’s arch enemy Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission. In 
advance of Farage’s post-referendum speech, he anticipates Farage’s intervention. 
Upon meeting Farage for the first time after the EU referendum, he theatrically greets 
him and air kisses him in ‘European’ fashion (see Figure 4.9). Within the chamber, 
Juncker then loudly proclaims, to loud applause, “I am really surprised you are here... 
Why are you here?” (UKIP_live1). Both mainstream media and Twitter enthusiastically 
report on this sarcastic act by Juncker, which steals the headlines and newspaper 
image space (UKIP_news5; UKIP_news6; UKIP_news7; UKIP_news8; UKIP_news9; 
UKIP_news10; UKIP_news11; UKIP_news18).  
In a similar hijacking of visibility, Farage’s provocative speech in February 2017 in the 
EP on Trump’s travel ban is upstaged by the innocuous British Labour MEP Seb Dance. 
As Farage responds to the Chair’s admonition that he will show “institutional respect 
to the truth” (UKIP_live4), not to the Commission, Dance holds up a handwritten sign 
within shot of the camera, saying “He’s lying to you”. Until this point only a handful of 
tweets engage with Farage’s speech, none of them getting more than one retweet. 
This is a non-social media event. Suddenly, however, the Twitter public get excited. 
Within a minute of Dance holding up his sign, images are circulated by journalists (see 
Figure 10.3 at 15:07hrs) and create the first peak in Twitter activity. The event then 
dominates comments from both media organisations and the public on Twitter. 
Practically all peaks in Twitter volume, including the biggest peak related to the event, 
are almost single-handedly caused by journalists and news organisations tweeting the 
picture of Farage and Dance with his sign (UKIP_mediatweet1; UKIP_mediatweet2; 
UKIP_mediatweet3) and members of the public retweeting them.  
While Dance’s intervention in and of itself no doubt generates increased activity levels 
on Twitter, it also sparks a Twitter ‘Moments’ (Twitter’s own news service) report on 
the event (UKIP_media1), which is further circulated by the public. In this case, Twitter 
as a media institution – rather than as technology or imaginary – intervenes and 
encourages virality. Legacy media also entirely focus on Dance’s sign, which dominates 
all headlines and images in articles on Farage’s speech (see Figure 4.10) (UKIP_news12; 




refers to the restrictions on intervention within the EP as a justification for his act: 
“When debates are time-limited it is impossible to challenge what he’s saying, so I 
protested in the only way I knew how at that point”. That was via mediation. While the 
institutional restrictions in some cases limit possibilities for both disruption and 
mediation, they also in others encourage them as the only possible means of 
communication. This means that engineering symbolic action to attract visibility by 
creating conflict frames to the media’s liking is not the prerogative of populist parties; 


































































































































































































































































































Total # of tweets+retweets per minute about
Farage's EP speech
15:04: Farage starts speech 
on Trump travel ban 
14:04: Start of EP 
plenary 
15:06: Dance holds 
up sign "He's lying to 
15:07-:11: @Sean__Clare and 
@mrotaetxe tweet picture of 




15:26: @ThePoke cheers 
Dance; @WestmonsterUK 
questions EP's respect for 
democracy 
16:21: @Channel4News 
tweets pic of Farage and 
Dance's sign 
15:29: @BBCDanielS 
tweets pic of Farage and 
16:52: @BBCNews 
tweets pic of Farage 
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10.4 CONSTRUCTING AUTHENTICITY THROUGH HYBRID MEDIATION 
UKIP’s and the EFF’s approaches to hybrid mediation serve an additional purpose. In 
chapter eight I explored populist disruptive performance as a vehicle of spontaneity, 
intimacy and consistency that together generate authentic self-representation. I now 
consider the ways in which the parties augment these performances of authenticity 
through hybrid mediation. I argue that social media in many respects have comparable 
qualities to disruption in terms of the performance of authenticity. Further, given 
these parallels, the hybrid mediation of disruption and social media posts generate 
consistency between these mediated performances, which further enhances the 
impression of authenticity. Moreover, I look at the special case of the EFF where their 
self-representation as truth-tellers takes the form of performatively usurping the role 
of impartial broadcaster of events. That is, they do not only aim to get their 
performance mediated; they perform the role of mediators. 
10.4.1 THE MEDIATION OF AUTHENTICITY 
Like disruption, social media, and Twitter in particular, are famed for their 
spontaneous quality whereby short impromptu tweets can be sent instantaneously 
and on-the-go, often mediating backstage behavioural traits that would be kept better 
guarded in other media. Both disruptions and tweets are often pre-planned and 
carefully crafted. Yet the affordances of tweets carry the symbolic value of spontaneity 
in and of themselves and give the impression that the audience is getting a glimpse of 
the ‘real’ persona rather than the carefully staged front delivered in a broadcast 
interview through rehearsed soundbites. Both parties reinforce this impression by 
using emotive and informal language in their tweets and apparently reacting 
spontaneously to news and events as they unfold. Farage, for instance, reacts with an 
emotional outburst to the news that the EU have asked the UK for a £500 billion 
‘divorce bill’ by calling Guy Verhofstadt “a lunatic” (UKIP_tweet16). Malema simply 
tweets “Hahahahahahahah” (EFF_tweet39) when Zuma a few days after the SONA 
delivers his response in parliament to the events that occurred. 
The intimacy brought by both parties’ claims to resemble the people they represent is 
also reinforced by such performances of mediation. Both the affordances of social 




with its discourse invite intimacy. Malema often demonstrates his resemblance to the 
people by conforming to Twitter’s informal style. He is an avid user of emoticons, 
popular memes and Twitter-specific vocabulary, such as “Throwback Thursday”39 
(EFF_tweet40), as well as general slang not normally associated with formal political 
communication: “Take a chill pill. Don’t be tjatjarag40” (EFF_tweet41). Farage likewise 
establishes intimacy via Twitter by using informal language and using content that 
enhances his symbolic use of affordances and style, for instance interspersing his 
political comments with updates on his lunch venue: “Just had a wonderful lunch at 
@warwickpimlico… Great London pub” (UKIP_tweet17). Such tweets by Farage also 
tend to be among his most popular on Twitter. However, Farage and UKIP more often 
than not address their audience of legacy media directly, rather than their 
constituents: “Here is the resolution that the @EFDgroup will be putting forward in the 
European Parliament #Brexit debate” (UKIP_tweet9). Given the nature of their events 
and Twitter audience discussed above, UKIP are less able to establish authenticity 
directly through this form of mediation than are the EFF. 
For the EFF especially, the informality of Twitter’s style lends itself to the mediation of 
backstage behaviour, achieving a similar sense of intimacy and spontaneity as through 
disruptive performance. As I noted in the preceding chapter, consistency between 
offline and online performance is an essential requirement for authentic self-
representation on social media (Grow and Ward, 2013; Marwick, 2005, p. 2). In hybrid 
mediation in particular, such consistency is essential as the offline and online 
components work in symbiosis. In this respect, UKIP’s and the EFF’s hybrid mediation 
allow them to stylistically distinguish themselves from the elite. At the same time, they 
can identify with the people in a manner that is at once consistent with their ideology 
and with the affordances and norms of use of social media. Moreover, within the 
hybrid mediation of their performances, their mediated offline disruptive behaviour is 
consistent with their authenticity on social media. It is consistency all round.  
                                                     
39
 #ThrowbackThursday and the abbreviation #TBT are popular hashtags on social media where users 
post nostalgic pictures of their past. 
40
 The Urban Dictionary defines ‘tjatjarag’ as being “over-eager and excitable in an annoying manner” 




10.4.2 IMPLICATIONS OF MEDIATED AUTHENTICITY: REDEFINING TRUTH 
In the preceding chapters we have seen how UKIP’s and the EFF’s representative 
claims undermine the position of the political elite as truthful providers of the 
information necessary for democratic decision-making. They portray elites and experts 
as devious, deceiving the people and hollowing out democracy. In this portrayal, 
ideology no longer matters. A different cleavage emerges in the ideological spectrum 
whereby all politicians appear to be the same. We have also seen that the two parties 
portray the media as biased and unobjective, unable to fulfil their democratic function 
in society. Thompson (2005, p. 39) argues that, 
the media had the capacity to make visible arenas of action that were 
previously hidden from view, and since they created a complex field of 
images and information flows that were very difficult to control, they 
could also give rise to new kinds of mediated events which had the 
potential to disrupt and undermine the carefully calculated self-
presentations of political leaders and others. 
By discrediting the media’s ability to faithfully portray social and political reality, the 
populist parties construct a gap in the market for truth-telling. Moreover, they take on 
this function of the media themselves described by Thompson by virtue of their 
authenticity. As visibility entrepreneurs and the only moral and sincere representatives 
of the people, they now expose and mediate the inauthenticity of elites. And, as we 
have seen, their own authenticity equates to truth. 
We saw above that the nature of the SONA as a media event gives the EFF the 
opportunity to live-tweet during the event. They are thereby able to contest the 
government’s attempts to control mediation with their use of Twitter in a way that 
UKIP cannot. When the ANC ban the public broadcaster from showing the ruckus in 
parliament, the EFF take up the fight over mediated reality on Twitter: “SABC has been 
instructed not to show EFF MPs” (EFF_tweet30). They proceed to live-tweet reports of 
events during the SONA every few minutes and convey in graphic and visual detail all 
the to-do not shown by the SABC to a rapt national audience. Twitter is a well-
established tool of live news transmission (Bruns and Burgess, 2012; Larsson, 2015). 




denotes Twitter’s broadcasting function (2015). In doing so, they effectively usurp the 
role of the public broadcaster. Representing themselves as mediators of the truth, the 
EFF succeed in performatively constructing a reality where they are the sole remaining 
conveyors of truth, the government the unsuccessful authoritarian censors. 
In their acquired role as mediators, the EFF's tweets relate events within the chamber 
as they unfold. They adopt a descriptive mode with constant updates. Yet their tweets 
do not live up to media industry standards of impartial, objective reporting. Rather, 
they combine Twitter’s broadcasting mode with interpretive and evaluative functions 
that clearly defines Us and Them in the essentialist terms of populist ideology. One 
update, for instance, constructs a binary between EFF MPs as ‘proper representatives’ 
and “ANC thugs”: “MPs chanting ‘Bring Back the Signal’ and ANC thugs chanting ‘ANC’” 
(EFF_tweet42). Their broadcasting style of tweeting is a claim to the objectivity and 
truth that the media usually perform. However, in stepping into the media’s shoes and 
mimicking this style as a symbolic form of self-representation through mediation, the 
EFF’s tweets do not merely serve an impartial function of news reporting. They also 
construct reality according to populism’s ideological division between Us and Them.  
10.5 DISCUSSION 
The investigation in this chapter of UKIP and the EFF’s approaches to the demands of 
the new media environment for visibility, authenticity and efficacy suggests an 
effective and nuanced adoption of hybrid modes of mediation by the two parties. Both 
parties are able to improve the visibility of their disruptive performances and enhance 
their authenticity by integrating them into assemblages of hybrid mediated 
performances directed at different audiences. They appear acutely aware of their 
intended audience – whether constituents or legacy media and other elites – and their 
needs and interests in a given mode of mediation. Moreover, they utilise the hybridity 
itself through cross-platform communications that demonstrate constituency support 
to legacy media in order to justify further mediation. The different nature of the types 
of events they participate in and of their audiences result in different forms of hybrid 
mediation for the two parties. Let us first briefly consider these differences before 
returning to conclude on what the forms of hybrid mediation tell us about populists’ 




The two parties operate in very different media systems. The ANC’s attempts to 
control mediation through old-school authoritarian means push the EFF to adopt 
alternative routes and integrate their disruptions with mediation on Twitter. Their 
resultant hybrid mediation has three key outcomes. It renders the government’s 
censorship ineffective. It increases the EFF’s legitimacy as they turn the government’s 
abuse of social power into yet another performative resource. And it enables them to 
usurp the role of the main broadcaster via Twitter and to define reality – in populist 
terms – to the large social media audience. South Africa faces the challenge of 
transitioning to a more open political culture as behaviour and habits from the 
authoritarian past are hard to leave behind, including corruption and attempts to 
control the media environment. In this respect, the flexibility of transitional institutions 
and norms in combination with the new media environment in fact allow for more 
oppositional agency in holding power-holders to account than does the rigid 
institutional structures of the European Parliament. The EFF’s ability to adapt and 
respond to their antagonists’ attempts at control actively demonstrates the 
possibilities for such action through hybrid modes of mediation. 
In this respect, the EFF’s mediated demonstration of their own political agency under 
conditions that are truly challenging to opposition parties rightfully inspires efficacy. 
The EFF’s mediated performances are able to be spectacularly disruptive in the fragile 
institutional environment of a transitional democracy and to expose and mediate 
repressive behaviour by the government under conditions that make the performance 
of opposition near-impossible. However, consequences of the EFF’s disruptions are 
potentially correspondingly severe, to the extent that democracy risks being 
destabilised through the performance of a largely liberal democratic claim. Moreover, 
the EFF’s ability to control mediation and pose threats to the government’s visibility 
engenders actual authoritarian behaviour and breaches of the Constitution as the 
struggle over mediation escalates. Overall, these effects change the premises of 
political debate and demonstrate how populist hybrid mediation has the potential to 
change politicians’ chosen responses to issues of visibility management. While 
populists in their claims condemn the elite’s visibility management practices, their own 
forms of hybrid mediation aimed at controlling visibility only serve to escalate this 




make previously hidden practices visible, but they also refocus politics even more 
firmly on the performance of visibility and mediation. 
In the comparatively serene and controlled environment of the European Parliament, 
populist threats to elite visibility are more subdued, as are the elite’s responses; but 
the struggle over mediation still bubbles under the surface. In UKIP’s case, the nature 
of their Twitter audience and of the mediated events in the EP mean that Twitter 
serves a different and more limited role in their assemblage of hybrid mediations. For 
UKIP, Twitter is not a means of usurping the role of mainstream media but rather of 
addressing it. The struggle over mediation therefore becomes a battle of who can walk 
the tightrope of legitimacy and norm-breaking in the most creative way to attract the 
attention of legacy media. UKIP then use social media to enhance the impression of 
spectacle by making their norm-breaking more explicit in a mediation setting where 
such behaviour is more acceptable.  
The respective contexts of UKIP and the EFF’s mediation result in different forms of 
hybridity. Yet both parties appeal to media logics and make use of the material 
affordances of technology and the symbolic resources of social imaginaries associated 
with social media. It is clear from their use of affordances that these serve not only a 
pragmatic purpose – such as Twitter’s ability to circumvent the gatekeepers of legacy 
media – but also a symbolic one. Indeed, the audience often are the gatekeepers. This 
interrelation between form and content in the two parties’ approach to constructing 
meaning through mediation in fact responds to gatekeepers’ demands for visibility, 
authenticity and efficacy. The two populist parties can generate and demonstrate 
these very qualities by performing mediation. Their symbolic uses of media showcase 
efficacy by demonstrating constituency uptake. They perform authenticity by 
symbolically enacting intimacy, spontaneity and consistency through their media use. 
And they thereby enhance visibility both virally and through their legacy media 
audience. These performances of hybrid mediation demonstrate the inseparability of 
form and content and the advantages of a communication perspective that can explain 
this. They also highlight the benefits of comparative and cross-platform research and 
an approach to mediation that is not restricted to a focus on institutionalism and 




media logics explain how populist communication harmonises with the demands on 







Since I started my doctoral studies in October 2013, populism has spread across the 
world and exploded on both the academic and political scenes. Populist parties’ 
pervasiveness and strength have allowed the academic debate to take great leaps 
forward and have disproven the previously dominant argument in the scholarship that 
they are short-lived, also in power. It seems as though this journey of coming to terms 
with populism is one that representative democracy and I have undertaken together. 
We have witnessed populists’ engagement with the evolving hybrid media landscape, 
the growing importance of performing authenticity, and the shifting epistemological 
foundations of politics. We have lived through the end of Jacob Zuma’s reign as 
president of South Africa and the denouement of UKIP’s campaign to extract the 
United Kingdom from the European Union. There have been spectacle, provocation, 
humour and violence along the way. Through this journey I have come to feel concern 
about the communicative craftiness and polarising influence of populist performers 
and to admire their creativity, flexibility and ability to tap into the concerns of a large 
part of the electorate that feels left behind.  
But of course this journey is not just a personal one. It has implications for democratic 
politics that are important and which I discuss in this conclusion. I start out, however, 
by making a set of methodological recommendations for future studies of populist 
communication. I then address the research questions of this study: 
1) How can populism be understood and explained from a communication 
perspective? 
2) How is populist ideology constructed through communicative processes? 
3) How does disruptive performance communicatively manifest a populist mode 
of representation? 
4) How does populist communication harmonise with the demands on mediated 
representation in the new media environment? 
5) How does the comparison across different democratic contexts add to our 




As I respond to each of the research questions, I focus on the respective key concept – 
ideology, performance and mediation – and draw out the contributions of this study. I 
also reflect on the similarities and differences between the two cases. In the final part 
of the conclusion I turn to the implications of populism for democratic politics 
suggested by a communication perspective. I briefly acknowledge populism’s 
favourable aspects in the different democratic contexts I have explored. I then engage 
with one more problematic issue in particular that emerged as a central theme of my 
study: populists’ redefinition of truth as a basis for an alternative mode of 
representation. 
11.2 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 
In this study I sought to develop a method that meets a number of requirements. I 
wanted to strike a balance between allowing the data to speak through inductive 
analysis and being informed by theory. I aimed to take advantage of the explorative 
potential and depth made possible by the interpretive analysis of populist 
communicative processes but also of the contextualising function offered by 
quantitative study of their reception and interaction with the media ecology. I required 
a method that can accommodate mixed forms of data. And I sought to tailor it to the 
nature of populist communication. The methodological approach that I developed on 
this basis at first appeared complex. That is because the world is messy, and we need 
to allow it to be so. However, I followed some simple, general principles that have 
proved fruitful for the study of populist communication and that I summarise below as 
recommendations for its future study: 
Comparative study across regions and across host ideologies 
The lack of comparative studies of populist communication has contributed to not only 
a delay in resolving conceptual difficulties in the field but to actually creating them too. 
As more and more studies are rooted in specific regional and host ideological contexts, 
an already contested concept becomes unhelpfully tied to values, practices, and 
dependencies that in fact say less about populism than about the values, systems and 
cultures it attaches itself to. A comparative approach allowed me to isolate populism 
from its host ideology and cultural context; to tease out the nuances and influences on 




generalise on this basis; and to empirically establish the central role of context in 
populist meaning-making processes. Future studies may benefit from also comparing 
across party position (opposition versus governing parties). 
Situating populist communication within the media ecology 
The hybrid media system and its inherent complexity, flexibility and 
interconnectedness mean that political communication not only travels an 
unpredictable path through the system; it is itself of a hybrid nature. Studies of 
political communication confined to a single platform or communication form miss this 
feature, as well as how it is shaped by the intricacies of a given media system. The 
notion of hybrid mediated performance that I have suggested here is only in its 
infancy. However, the nuances and dependencies that have emerged in the present 
research suggest cross-platform studies of political performance as a fruitful avenue 
for further exploration of populism as well as of political communication more 
generally.  
An inductive approach 
While my analysis confirmed the relevance of my sensitising concepts – ideology, 
performance and mediation – to populist communicative processes, it also revealed 
new themes and concepts that emerged as fundamental to a populist mode of 
representation. Two such concepts were authenticity and truth, which were intimately 
connected in the data. The finding that the two populist parties equate them with each 
other would not have come about through a less inductive method. The surprising 
reconceptualisation of truth revealed how two such different populist parties 
reconstituted the epistemological foundations for representative democracy. It starts 
to explain the shocking result of the EU referendum in the UK and the polarising 
effects on the electorate where the two halves appear to look at each other with 
incredulity and say, “how can you believe such obvious lies?” It also highlights the role 
that populism may play in democratic transitions halted by deadlock and corruption, 





The use of sensitising concepts 
Despite prioritising an inductive approach, the nature of populist communication calls 
for a certain amount of preceding conceptualisation, which informed my approach to 
coding and analysis. I noted previously that my data contained few direct mentions of 
the people. An exclusively inductive thematic analysis would have entirely missed the 
constitutive nature of the performance of populist ideology had I not been on the look-
out for this. In this case, proceeding on the basis of theoretical reflections on the 
nature of the relationship between ideology, performance and context in relation to 
populism proved essential to capture this fundamental aspect of populist 
communication. 
Multimodal analysis 
I also proceeded on the basis of a predetermined notion of the multimodality of 
performance, which guided me in where to look rather than what to look for. The 
empirical analysis in this research has demonstrated that the nature of populist 
communication is highly symbolic and, as such, often occurs through multimodal forms 
of communication. An entirely text-based approach to populism would miss the 
essence of how it connects to the people. 
All of these methodological characteristics are born out of a communication approach 
to populism. 
11.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this section I summarise the preceding analysis and answer the five research 
questions that formed the focus of this study. While I start by addressing the main 
research question, my answer to it develops more depth as I devote myself to each of 
the subquestions following it. 
11.3.1 POPULISM IN COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE 
A vast number of people in representative democracies around the globe are today 
not feeling represented. From this arises the term ‘the silent majority’ to describe 
those who are unable or unwilling to speak up and those who feel that they are simply 




representative democracy. As such it highlights a very real problem. It responds to and 
voices discontent with current modes of representation that are, for one reason or 
another, not accountable or responsive to the people. Yet I also posit that the 
constitutive function of populist communication enhances and constructs the very 
same grievances that it claims to merely channel. In addressing the main research 
question – how can populism be understood and explained from a communication 
perspective? – I take these two dimensions of populist communication as my starting 
point: its socially constructed nature and its constitutive function. These dimensions 
explain how populism comes across as coherent, legitimate and even democratically 
necessary to a sizeable audience, and they help us understand the implications of 
populist communication for representative democracy. 
I have approached populist communication through the lenses of three interrelated 
and partially overlapping theoretical concepts: ideology, performance and mediation. 
In relation to ideology, I agree with extant literature that the content of populist 
ideology is relational. However, I go one step further and establish a connection 
between populist ideology and its mode of representation. I posit that populist 
ideology dictates the nature of relations between the populist representative, the 
people and the elite and that it establishes these communicatively. As a mass ideology, 
populism moreover insists that the people be the focal point of these relationships. 
Populist ideology is therefore ultimately about democratic communication, what this 
looks like and ought to look like. However, from a communication perspective on 
populism I also approach these claims as communications in and of themselves. This 
requires us to interrogate populist ideology through the lens of performance and 
consider its constructed nature and its constitutive function. By responding to a given 
set of public grievances, populism suggests a particular mode of representation 
through the performance of the relations between people and representatives. I 
therefore posit that populist ideology manifests itself in political performance and 
most emblematically so in disruptive performance.  
The ways in which populist ideology and performance interact is founded on a 
perspective on meaning-making that breaks down the binaries between form and 
content, ideology and performance, communicative representation and political 




beyond low-level definitions and through the grounding of integrated communicative 
processes in in-depth empirical analysis. In contrast to most of the literature on 
populist communication, and on political communication more broadly, I argue that 
populist communication develops its meaning through an interaction between form, 
content and the context that populism is situated in. The consolidation of form and 
content in processes of meaning-making – through practices of representation as well 
as processes of mediation – corresponds to the integration of populist ideology and 
performance through communication. The process is the same. This approach opens 
up the understanding that populism is a process. The conception of populism as 
process in turn enables the comparison of very different types of populism. The 
problems with political representation vary in different democratic contexts, and these 
variations result in different forms and contents of populism. Yet their processes of 
communication enact the relationship between citizens and representatives in similar 
ways. A communication perspective therefore also enables us to consider the role that 
populist communication plays in larger socio-political processes and transformations. 
This occurs through the process of mediation. The nature of the metamorphosis of 
ideological content into performative form in populist communication is one that 
appeals to the demands of the new media environment upon mediated 
representation. It attracts, channels and directs visibility, performs authenticity and 
inspires efficacy. It does so by utilising the interrelationship between form and content 
in mediated processes of meaning-making as well as in the performance of populist 
ideology. I argue that populists take advantage of the most suitable imaginaries and 
affordances of a given medium by not only mediating their performances but by 
performing mediation. Within assemblages of hybrid mediated performances, the act 
of mediation assumes a symbolic significance that expresses populist ideology and 
reinforces and legitimates its mode of representation in a given context. It is this 
performance that enables populism’s harmonious relationship with processes of 
mediation. 
11.3.2 POPULIST IDEOLOGY IN COMMUNICATIVE TERMS 
I have argued that approaching populism from a communication perspective does not 
preclude a classification of populism as an ideology. Instead I suggest that populist 




exclusively focusing on the content of populist ideology and the architecture of its core 
concepts – sovereignty, the people, the elite and the populist representative – to an 
integration with the form it takes through processes of communication. This shift in 
perspective involves consideration of how populist ideological content interacts with 
the world around it through its form. In answering the second research question – 
How is populist ideology constructed through communicative processes? – I 
therefore depart from mainstream scholarship on populism and approach the concept 
of ideology as a process rather than as a structure, focusing on its social construction 
and on its constitutive properties.  
When I explored the many differences between UKIP and the EFF, it became clear that 
conceiving of populism simply as a political value system makes its definition nigh-
impossible. Each case is a separate model of populism. It is shaped by its given host 
ideology and specific local context to the extent that its core ideas are so variable as to 
not have much in common at all. This demonstrates that populism needs unpacking 
and that our common minimal definitions of populism do not reflect the diversity of its 
empirical manifestations on the ground. My approach to this issue has been to 
conceptualise populism as a mass ideology that bases its content on public 
perceptions of the core concepts of its ideology: a given instance of populism 
decontests sovereignty according to common myths and socially shared beliefs in a 
given democratic context; it defines the people according to prevalent cultural and 
socio-political concerns; it blames the elite for the commonly perceived problems in 
society; and the populist assumes the role of a representative who is able to alleviate 
ordinary people of their particular grievances.  
This explains populism’s diversity. It recognises the highly situational character of 
populist ideology and the central role of communication in how it plays out. In fact, I 
suggest that populism’s communicative properties form the basis of its content and 
structure. This, I contend, solves many of the conceptual problems in the populism 
literature. It is a process whereby the content of populist ideology is intersubjectively 
determined through the representative relationship between populist and people; and 
it claims to be so. Conceiving of populist ideology in communicative terms therefore 




Yet populist ideology is not only socially constructed on the basis of constituents’ 
existing concerns, grievances and beliefs; it also constitutes them. This is also a 
communicative process, for language constitutes the world and effects consequences 
upon it. The particular nature of populism’s relational structure – such as its opposition 
between the people and the elite and equation of the populist with the people – 
results in a constitutive function that reflects public perceptions back upon 
constituents as polarised, homogenous totalities. In populism, this polarisation is taken 
to the extreme and given moral properties. This construction takes the form of an 
essentialist ideological cleavage that cuts across left and right in the political spectrum 
and that is shared by different types of populism. While conceiving of populist ideology 
in communicative terms highlights its grounding in people’s real concerns, it also calls 
attention to its polarising and homogenising effects. 
11.3.3 DISRUPTIVE PERFORMANCE AND POPULIST REPRESENTATION 
I have conceived of the ways in which these effects come about as performance. 
Disruptive performance more specifically has emerged as a multi-faceted concept that 
is both theoretically and analytically useful in the study of populist communication 
(although it is only one of many possible manifestations of populism). I now address 
the question, how does disruptive performance communicatively manifest a populist 
mode of representation? The work of representation that populist disruption 
undertakes involves both a challenge to, and a reconstitution of, existing democratic 
norms and conditions. It undertakes this work through the construction of new 
meaning in a way that is reassuringly grounded in existing myths and popular 
conceptions of democracy. It is in this tension between the old and the new – between 
the socially constructed and the constitutive dimensions of populist communication – 
that the social and political implications of populist ideology come to life. I posit that 
the essentialist binary structures and chains of equivalence within populist ideology 
manifest themselves most explicitly, effectively and engagingly in disruptive 
performances by populists embodying the people. The analytical and theoretical 
concept of disruptive performance deepens our understanding of the communicative 
properties of populism, its adaptation to different contexts, and the consequences it 




The preceding empirical investigation has provided the basis for a typology of populist 
disruptive performance. The forms and functions it encompasses are not exclusive to 
populist actors but are a particularly evocative and paradigmatic expression of populist 
ideology. While the categories in the typology are not mutually exclusive, the typology 
aims at descriptive comprehensiveness to clarify and do justice to the diversity of the 
forms and functions of disruptive performance in the communication of populist 
ideology in institutional settings. 
Forms of populist disruptive performance41: 
1) Breach of conventions of political speech: forms of speech that breach the 
norms of formal political language both in terms of style – such as the use of 
slang, swearing, dialect, informal enunciation, a high key (for instance, when 
shouting), eschewing the designated official language (such as English in the 
South African parliament) – and content – such as offensive and disrespectful 
language, hate speech, sarcasm, overly direct accusations, blame attribution 
and not taking responsibility for own actions, gloating, the use of anecdotes 
and personal experiences as evidence. 
2) Breach of conventions of appearance in institutional contexts: types of dress, 
make-up and hair styles not typically associated with formal institutional 
environments. 
3) Breach of conventions of accepted political behaviour: non-adherence to, or 
outright obstruction of, established patterns of institutional performance such 
as standard procedures, norms and rituals; disruption of the performances of 
other political actors as individuals or as a group; disregarding hierarchy and 
overstepping the boundaries of one’s role; using body language that is overtly 
expressive; expressing strong emotion. 
Ideological functions of populist disruptive performance: 
1) Expose elite behaviour: through contrasting speech, appearance and behaviour, 
portray elite performance as false, inauthentic, illegitimate and not in the 
people’s interests and thereby undermine their representation of reality; 
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performatively provoke reactions from the elite that legitimise populist 
ideology and disruptive performance. 
2) Identify with the people and self-represent as a political outsider: speak, appear 
and behave in an ordinary manner that contrasts with the speech, appearance 
and behaviour of formal institutionalised politics. 
3) Establish Manichaean relationship between the people and the elite: antagonise 
the elite and, by virtue of identification with the people and a claim to speak on 
their behalf and in their interest, portray them in dichotomous terms with the 
elite.  
4) Constitute the people, the elite and the populists themselves: through 
identification and antagonistic contrast portray the values, behaviour and 
morality of the people, the elite and the populist actors; while identifying with 
the people also portray own identity as extraordinary in its ability to lead 
disruptive action. 
5) Portray populists as truth-tellers: through exposure of elite performance as 
deceptive, represent the populist disrupter as objective, principled and the only 
voice of truth in politics. 
6) Simultaneously address two different audiences: media and constituency: 
attract media attention through spectacle and the unexpected and 
demonstrate ability to speak for constituents; catch the attention and interest 
of disaffected publics. 
As I have argued throughout this study, meaning is created through the interaction 
between form and content. The above forms of disruptive performance embody key 
populist ideas and simultaneously shape the meaning of the projected performance. 
The forms of disruptive performance are relative to the norms and conventions of a 
given institutional and cultural context. They are also relative to a given mode of 
mediation where the affordances, institutional values, norms, practices and 
imaginaries of a given medium or platform dictate acceptable behaviour. While this 
explains many of the differences between the two populist parties I have studied, it is 
also remarkable that such different instances of populism perform disruption in ways 
that practically echo across the continents: both UKIP and the EFF engage in the 




ceremony; both describe the ceremony as “nonsense”; and both use the term 
“hollow” as their chief means of describing the inauthentic performances of elites.  
While the forms of disruptive performance manifest, shape and create meaning 
through symbolic expression, the functions cover the relational and constitutive 
qualities of populist ideology. Through these functions disruptive performances 
project a populist mode of representation through a claim to disintermediation that 
aims to make the route between the people and their representatives as direct as 
possible. They achieve this by identifying with the people through symbolic 
embodiment, for if populists are not standing in for the people but are the people, the 
people’s path to power is as direct as can be. Self-representation as truth tellers is a 
second form of disintermediation as they claim to channel the truth without distortion 
or mediation. When this truth is mediated through modes of mediation known for 
their directness, populists then address as many aspects as possible in the 
communicative process in their claims to disintermediation.  
The populist mode of representation ultimately refocuses representative politics on 
the value of authenticity as the central one in the relationship between people and 
their representatives. Populists’ authentic appearance in contrast to the ‘spun’ and 
scripted performances of mainstream politicians makes visible the latter’s discrepancy 
between front- and backstage behaviour (Goffman, 1959). Populists appear able to 
merge these into one coherent identity through forms of disruptive performance. In 
doing so, the populist mode of representation oversteps, reinvents and removes the 
boundary between citizens and their (populist) representatives whilst simultaneously 
feeding into processes of mediation that desire and reward this combination of 
authentic and disruptive performance. As such, disruption is a key means of 
manifesting the communicative processes of populist ideology in a mode of 
representation that simultaneously garners attention across the media ecology. 
Through its forms and functions, disruptive performance thereby proves itself a multi-
faceted and significant concept that should be made more explicitly involved in future 
research on populism and populist communication.  




The journey – and sometimes origin – of populist performance within processes of 
mediation is part of the process of meaning-making of populist communication. I now 
address the question, how does populist communication harmonise with the 
demands on mediated representation in the new media environment? Both UKIP and 
the EFF knit together live, virtual and other modes of mediation in nuanced 
assemblages that are adapted to their given democratic and mediation context. In 
doing so, they utilise different aspects of various modes of mediation – media 
technologies, imaginaries and institutional logics – to gain visibility, perform 
authenticity and inspire efficacy. Disruptive performances, for example, rely on 
spectacle and conflict to defy gatekeeper intervention in the process of mediation, 
while tweets establish intimacy, directness and (at least appear to) avoid gatekeepers 
altogether. Within hybrid assemblages of mediation, differently mediated elements of 
a performance complement each other in a larger process of meaning-making. 
Ultimately I suggest that populists’ relationship with the media is characterised by 
ambiguities enacted through hybrid mediation. 
I have argued that one such ambiguity lies in the dual audience that UKIP’s and the 
EFF’s mediated performances target. On the one hand, the parties use modes of 
mediation that signal a direct connection between themselves and the people to 
address constituents with claims of disintermediation. They achieve this by employing 
media affordances for symbolic purposes by associating them with established 
imaginaries. We can therefore conceive of their approach to mediation as a means of 
performing the populist mode of representation. In other words, mediation becomes 
a symbolic act. Yet on the other hand, the claim to disintermediation does not go 
beyond the claim as affordances are chiefly used symbolically. Moreover, these 
mediated performances of disintermediation are simultaneously targeting 
mainstream media for further mediation. I therefore argue that the claim to 
disintermediation is partly made to demonstrate populists’ representativeness so as to 
justify further mediation. 
This in turn suggests a further ambiguity in populists’ relationship to the media. We 
have seen both UKIP and the EFF critique the current state of political communication 
and its detrimental effects upon democratic representation. The reasons, they claim, 




communicative relationship with the people, while the media themselves are partial 
and prejudiced against populists. Both media and elite impose a false consciousness 
upon the people, with the result that the public’s feelings of efficacy are based on lies. 
In performing this claim, the populist parties themselves acquire control of their own 
and the elite’s visibility, come across as authentic and inspire efficacy. As visibility, 
authenticity and efficacy are the very demands placed upon mediated representation 
by the new media environment (Coleman, 2011), populists thereby smooth the 
process of mediating their anti-media representative claims. 
I posit that hybrid mediation enables the populist parties to appeal to the media 
through performances of anti-media populism. Spectacular disruptive performances 
speak to the media’s news values. Social media is a means of demonstrating 
constituency uptake and representativeness. While both these forms of performance 
signal disintermediation and thereby dismiss media interference in their mode of 
representation, they also speak directly to the requirements of the new media 
environment. From the media’s perspective, the latter provides a social and 
democratic justification for the former commercial indulgence. Despite the ambiguity 
of populist mediation, the performance appears consistent; not from the perspective 
of traditional value systems and a fact-based notion of truth but according to the 
populist cleavage. 
That is because the populist hybrid performance is authentic in its consistency 
between performances within different modes of mediation. The relative nature of 
disruptive performance means that live disruption in an institutional environment is 
not necessarily perceived as such on social media, where affordances and imaginaries 
rather support such acts of empowerment from below. Populists can therefore use 
social media to build up, gather public support for, and legitimise emergent (and 
disruptive) forms of visibility and authenticity. At the same time, most forms of 
disruption (speech, appearance, behaviour) harmonise with social media 
communication and thereby take advantage of the norms, practices and imaginaries 
associated with a given platform or technology. While hybrid mediated performances 
draw on the affordances and imaginaries of social media, they are therefore also able 
to retain consistency between online and offline disruptive performances. Populists in 




and use affordances for symbolic purposes in ways consistent with disruptive 
performance. This allows them to construct hybrid mediated performances that are 
inherently consistent, intimate and spontaneous and therefore authentic. 
11.3.5 POPULIST COMMUNICATION IN CONTEXT 
I now address the final research question, how does the comparison across different 
democratic contexts add to our understanding of populist communication? In the 
preceding pages of this conclusion I have chiefly focused on the commonalities 
between the two case studies. The empirical comparison between very different cases 
of populism has led to the discovery of shared processes of meaning-making, modes of 
political representation and approaches to mediation. These similarities in two such 
different contexts demonstrate that a communication perspective on populism 
resolves many of the comparative issues encountered in the literature. To address 
the research question I pinpoint the two key processes I have established as central to 
a communication perspective on populism: populist communication as constructed on 
the basis of a given context and the constitutive nature of populist communication, 
which constructs this context anew. It is through these processes that populism 
interacts with its context in a mutually constitutive relationship. 
I have argued that these processes of representation are communicative as well as 
aesthetic-political. Moreover, I suggest that this mutually constitutive process between 
populist communication and its context lies at the heart of all the political processes of 
meaning-making that I have enquired into in this study. First, populist ideology is 
constructed on the basis of mass perceptions of representative politics and in turn 
constitutes the people on whose perceptions it is based. Second, the political 
performances through which populist ideology manifests itself respond to and are 
bounded by conditions of social power and draw on contextual background symbolic 
resources, yet performatively constitute reality and have effects upon their context. 
Third, hybrid mediated performances rely on and are shaped by their contexts of 
materiality, imaginaries and logics and co-construct these in the process of mediation. 
I conceive of these processes of social construction and constitution as central to all 
aspects of meaning-making in populist communication and signify the importance of 




The similarity of these processes across two such different contexts as the UK and 
South Africa suggests that established and transitional democracies are living through 
parallel processes of socio-political transformation. The comparative perspective on 
populist communication as process has therefore enabled me to identify the essence 
of populist claims, practices and their interrelation. We have seen, for instance, that 
populism as a mass ideology builds on common public perceptions of representation, 
democracy and sovereignty. It adopts social power as the subject of its symbolic action 
and thereby turns it into a resource that underscores its democratic legitimacy. It relies 
heavily on common myths and symbols to naturalise its ideology. And it utilises hybrid 
processes of mediation symbolically as part of its claim. These characteristics form 
populism’s constructed dimension. Its constitutive dimension involves the evocation 
of the people as a homogenous totality that prioritises unity (within the community 
designated as ‘the people’) above pluralism. It also undertakes the construction of a 
context for the interpretation of meaning that establishes an essentialist ideological 
cleavage and redefines truth. 
Yet the differences between the cases are equally important. While both the UK and 
South Africa are facing issues in their representative democracies that are in many 
ways comparable, they also face very different challenges in their current modes of 
representation. These differences are reflected in the claims put forward by the two 
populist parties and mean that their responses do not play the same role in 
transitional and established democracies. In some respects, UKIP and the EFF perform 
the opposite of what they claim: the EFF claim they are not disrupting but are 
destabilising the government; UKIP claim they are very disruptive but engage in 
relatively subdued performances where each individual performance does not have 
any significant structural impact on their institutional environment. This and the many 
other differences that have emerged in this study suggest that populism’s flexibility 
and adaptability in responding to its given context and utilising its resources is also 
an essential characteristic of populism. These differences, moreover, mean that 
populism has different implications for the trajectory of representative democracy in 
different contexts. Because populism is constructed as oppositional to a given 
dominant form of representative democracy, it assumes an accountability function in 




where it portrays itself in contrast to more lawful regimes. As a result, in established 
democracies, its claim to speak for the people is not backed up by such an 
accountability function. I now turn to address this and other implications of a 
comparative communication perspective on populism. 
11.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF POPULIST COMMUNICATION FOR 
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 
Throughout this study I have raised a number of implications of populist 
communication that I now consider in more detail. While I have mainly been critical of 
populism in my analysis so far – and to a large extent remain so – I also find it 
important to raise its favourable aspects and to pinpoint where these are useful and 
where they transgress into counterproductive effects upon liberal representative 
democracy. Although I argue that they differ in established and transitional democratic 
contexts, the positive implications of populist communication correspond roughly to 
its socially constructed dimension, that is, to populism’s basis in and ability to channel 
existing grievances, public perceptions of democracy and current problems in 
representative democracy. The negative implications of populist communication 
approximately correspond to its constitutive dimension, for instance in the form of 
enhancing such grievances and problems through polarisation and anti-pluralist 
evocations of the people. In this final section I briefly acknowledge the positive 
implications but then move on to engage in more depth with one particularly 
problematic aspect of populist communication that emerged as central in my analysis: 
populism’s reconceptualisation of truth as authenticity. 
11.4.1 POPULIST COMMUNICATION AS SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED: SHINING A LIGHT 
UPON THE PROBLEMS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Populist parties highlight a number of issues in representative democracy. Some of 
these cut across transitional and established democracies while others are specific to a 
given context. Both UKIP and the EFF bring to light how the media and the elite often 
lose sight of the substance of representation: in their obsession over image and 
commercial interests, they forget the people they both claim to serve. This critique is 




and the people’s consequent lack of voice in processes of political representation. 
Because the moral dimension has gone out of politics, political representatives engage 
in “hollow rhetoric” to win votes but do not tell the electorate the truth, give them a 
basis for making a real choice (because all politicians play the same game of deceit), or 
hear their views. This critique of political communication in modern representative 
democracy is highly relevant and ought to be heeded. Today a preoccupation with 
communication governs policy decisions and leadership choices. Yet these concerns 
with communication are not with genuinely open listening, dialogic communication or 
deliberation aimed at improving representative processes but rather with quantitative 
measures of public opinion and attempts to control visibility and media coverage for 
the purpose of garnering votes.  
On this basis, both of the two populist parties demonstrate that adherence to norms 
and procedures do not bring about the outcomes in society desired by the electorate. 
In fact, both UKIP and the EFF found their representative claims on a wish for a more 
substantive politics, a politics in which representatives have the people’s true interests 
at heart rather than simply going through the motions of the procedures of liberal 
democracy, like garnering votes and winning elections. The current trend of focusing 
on democratic procedure creates a vacuum of meaning: it is concerned with formal 
processes, not meaning. Populists highlight how the current focus on procedure leaves 
behind a large proportion of the electorate. In doing so, they fill this vacuum with 
definite meaning, represented as truth, in a world dominated by uncertainty and 
change. It is in this constitutive function that populism itself becomes more 
problematic, as I discuss shortly. 
The construction of populism as a mass ideology brings to light the views and voices of 
a large part of the electorate that feels left out of the representative process. In doing 
so, it highlights the dysfunctionalities of both liberal democracy and processes of 
transition to it. This function is characteristic of both the EFF and UKIP and can be seen 
as a feature of populism that cuts across different types of representative democracy; 
however, there are important nuances in the implications for the two different 
contexts. The EFF play an important role in relation to South Africa’s transitional 




represented by the current mode of representation, and they hold the government to 
account where other democratic institutions have failed.  
First, the EFF represent people’s interpretations of the values and practices of 
democracy as equally important to – or more so than – dominant elite liberal 
conceptions of democracy based purely on the supply mechanisms of democracy (for 
example institutional structures and procedures) (see also Whitehead, 2002, on a 
social constructivist approach to democracy). In doing so, the EFF bring an existing 
fault line in the transitional democracy of South Africa and its mode of representation 
into view. Their populist function is to give voice to an otherwise unheard citizen 
perspective on what democracy ought to look like. While the EFF’s mode of 
representation is illiberal, it is grounded in mass perceptions of democracy and reflects 
the priorities of many citizens. Moreover, the EFF perform their claim to 
representation in a way that no other party in South Africa has been able to do; indeed 
no other opposition parties in South Africa have managed to gain a voice against the 
ANC’s dominance since the end of Apartheid in 1994. The disruptive strategy that 
effectively gives them a voice is supported by a justification of its legitimacy in the 
form of their second function: they serve an important accountability function in a 
transitional democracy that has long been stuck in its path to consolidation. Despite 
heavy corruption, the ANC’s dominance has stalled the transition process. Populist 
disruptive performance shakes South Africa loose from its moorings in response to 
citizen priorities. 
Like the EFF’s, UKIP’s claim also brings to light an existing fault line in established 
representative democracy that has been bubbling under the surface, but it plays out 
differently in this context. Their performances expose a cultural schism in British 
society, which is laid bare by the EU referendum. The resultant very visible cleavage in 
the political spectrum has in turn shaken the institutional structure of the European 
Union to the core and severed Britain’s link to it. This cleavage is not only the populist 
Us-Them construction of the people versus the elite, although UKIP have also brought 
this to light. It is also a cleavage that shows who exactly feels left behind by the 
representative process. UKIP channel the voices of those who have felt silenced and 
unheard. However, they also give a platform to those elites who feel too restrained by 




tactics from within the platform of the official Vote Leave campaign. UKIP’s function in 
the democratic process differs from the EFF’s in its lack of establishing accountability. 
Their disruption serves not to ensure accountability under difficult conditions and to 
hold an authoritarian elite in check but to undermine democratic procedures and 
promote illiberalism. 
The fault line that both UKIP and the EFF bring to light is one whereby elite 
representation focuses on implementing and formally adhering to the procedures of 
democracy without involving citizens in conversation in any substantive way. As a 
result, any tension there may exist between competing conceptions of democracy and 
interpretations of the role of democratic institutions within a society are ignored. Such 
tension must be presumed to be a recurrent feature in transitional democracies that 
are struggling to import a Western normative model of democracy into a context very 
different from whence it came (Voltmer, 2013). Yet the British EU referendum has 
demonstrated that the same is the case in established democracies. Different 
conceptions of democracy within the population at large have kept underlying tensions 
simmering until they were brought to the surface by UKIP, the Leave.eu campaign and 
the opportunity to voice them. UKIP’s populism, as a mass ideology based on ordinary 
people’s conceptions of democracy, has brought this schism to light; but it has done so 
by widening it rather than seeking to reconcile its two sides. Populism’s function of 
representing the voice of the unrepresented then simultaneously opens the door for 
anti-democrats and triggers a rethinking of liberal democracy as it introduces the basic 
idea of a more bottom-up form of representation. I now turn to consider the more 
problematic constitutive dimension of populist communication that this predicament 
points to. 
11.4.2 THE CONSTITUTIVE FUNCTION OF POPULIST COMMUNICATION: SHIFTING 
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL GROUND OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
The constitutive function of populist ideology intuitively has a manipulative feel to it. 
By evoking an alternative reality, it lies. However, I have argued that the constitution 
of (an alternative) reality is a necessary and ubiquitous quality of ideology and of 
processes of representation in general. Yet I also posit that the nature of populist 




sovereignty, democracy and representation by ascribing them new meaning through 
the constitution of morally informed and essentialist binaries. This is the ugly side of 
populism, which constitutes the people as a totality through strategies of blame 
attribution and othering. While populism can throw into relief the fault lines of 
representative democracy and inspire rethinking, it also encourages such breaking 
lines to develop. Populism’s suggested solution to the problems in representative 
democracy that it brings to light is a mode of representation that has 
disintermediation at its heart. I argue that this is normatively undesirable and 
potentially damaging to democratic progression from the problems highlighted by 
populism’s social constructivist dimension. Populist performances of disintermediation 
take three forms, and I will engage with the last of these in most detail: 
First, populists’ identification with the people through embodiment suggests that the 
populist representative is not an intermediary who constitutes a problematic barrier to 
the direct transmission of the people’s wishes. While this form of disintermediation 
symbolises a directness that encourages feelings of efficacy, it is achieved through 
polarisation and homogenisation of the people. In the EFF’s case, this takes the form of 
constituting the people as a totality that is entirely black and where ‘whiteness’ – both 
as skin colour and as a type of behaviour – is denoted immoral. It undermines the 
national unity that was encapsulated in the vision of the ‘rainbow nation’ and that 
ensured internal stability, harmony and post-transition peace in South Africa. In UKIP’s 
case, the constitution of unity through the representation of the people as a totality 
created a Remain/Leave cleavage that is in fact far from unifying and that clearly 
demonstrates that the 48 percent of Remain voters do not feel, or desire to be, 
included in the supposed totality of the people. Rather, it has divided the electorate in 
half, across existing party lines, and this is likely to have significant consequences for 
the structure of the British party system and other institutions of representative 
democracy for many years to come.  
Second, as I argued above, populists perform disintermediation by using the process of 
mediation as a form of symbolic action in hybrid mediated performances. Efficacy, 
rather than agency, appears to be the populist parties’ concern as they employ 
Twitter’s imaginaries in a powerful way but only use its affordances to disguise less 




a similar conclusion on Latin American populists’ use of Twitter as a tool of control). A 
key further area of study, which the present research has indicated could be fruitful 
and urgent, is therefore how populist parties’ uses of digitally mediated symbolic 
action draws on social media imaginaries versus the actual affordances that have 
inspired them and that enable public agency. This in turn has implications for the 
effects of populism on democracy in transitional as well as established democracies. 
A third and final form of disintermediation I have uncovered in this study grows out of 
the populist claim that the reality portrayed by the elite is false. As Alexander also 
argues (2012, p. 286), politicians’ statements may look like constatives but, in fact, 
they serve a performative function of evoking an alternative reality. To populists this is 
not a necessary function of ideology, as I suggest it is, but is immoral and separates the 
people from the substance of the representative process. Disruptive performance 
functions as an explosive act of exposure that enables the misguided people to see 
through the lies of the elite. Populist disruption therefore also represents populists 
themselves as truth tellers. Their self-representation portrays them as occupying an 
extraordinary and privileged position where only they can see the truth and impart it 
unimpaired to the people: populists themselves serve an embodied function of 
disintermediation. This has been a recurring and strong theme in my empirical 
analysis, and so I engage with its implications in a final and more substantial argument.  
Truth is the relation between utterance and situation. When UKIP and the EFF apply 
the criterion of truth to elite performances, however, they redefine truth as 
authenticity. In other words, they evaluate whether elite actors display consistency 
between belief and performance, rather than consistency between utterance and 
situation. They are unconcerned with the factuality of elites’ performances. Their 
notion of truth thereby differs from that often normatively discussed in the context of 
the crisis of public communication (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; Van Aelst et al., 
2017). It is not a conception of truth that is based on scientific, empirical evidence, 
objectivity and fact and that forms a basis for citizens’ rational deliberation and 
informed choice amongst political candidates. The hollow rhetoric of the elite is not 
untrue because it is incorrect but because it is inauthentic. In this reconceptualisation 





The essentialism inherent in a moral call for authenticity allows no acknowledgement 
of politicians’ need to concern themselves with image, style or differentiated 
audiences in the modern political communication environment. To populist eyes, all 
such inconsistencies are signs of what Meyrowitz characterises as “unscrupulous 
politicians who have no true commitment to their own performances” (1986, p. 279). 
As a result, in the populist claim the only morally acceptable way for public 
representatives to meet the challenges of the new media environment is to perform a 
politics of morality. It is a circular argument that replaces political value systems with 
morality and authenticity as guiding lines in democratic practice.  
The redefinition of truth explains why the elite are on the wrong side of the dividing 
line between Us and Them. Populists’ equation of truth with authenticity therefore 
constitutes an epistemological shift in representative democracy, both in terms of the 
basis of the relationship between the people and those who represent them and of the 
foundation for citizens’ democratic choice of representatives. It changes what we need 
to know to participate democratically as appropriately informed citizens: honesty and 
character become not only more important than ideologically informed opinion, policy 
or evidence-based decision making; they become the only things that matter. The 
relationship between representatives and represented becomes based not on political 
values, information provision and listening but on trust. 
Honesty, character and trust are no doubt lacking in the representative relationship 
between elites and people in many established as well as transitional democracies 
around the globe today. Populists do have a point, as I noted above. However, UKIP 
and the EFF’s redefinition of truth involves the representation of opinion as fact, which 
is the very accusation they levy against the elite. This leaves the populist claim 
potentially disconnected from factual reality. This form of relativism, argue Van Aelst 
et al (2017, p. 14), 
…is problematic insofar as democracies depend on both citizens and political 
actors relying on factual information to generate empirical beliefs or 
knowledge that can guide their decision-making. Facts are, as Delli Carpini and 




from becoming disconnected from the material conditions they attempt to 
address’. 
When populists undermine the objectivity and impartiality of the media and of 
institutions of democracy, they further aid this epistemological shift. The media’s 
representation of social and political reality is what we rely on as our key source of 
knowledge about the world. Populists’ redefinition of truth then potentially 
undermines citizens’ ability to deliberate and bases the representative relationship 
entirely on trust, which in turn leaves agency to the representatives.  
Moreover, when authenticity is the only moral necessity, as it is in the populist claim, 
spontaneity and sincerity trump social and political norms and legitimise the breaking 
of norms through disruptive behaviour. A strong theoretical argument is emerging 
(Azari and Smith, 2012), supported by empirical indications in the wake of Trump’s 
presidency (Nyhan, 2017), that political norms are essential for a more substantive 
form of democracy. More problematic aspects of norm breaking can legitimise the 
“ugly extremes of social exclusivism, such as nationalism, racism, and sexism” (Enli, 
2015, p. 11). These indeed often accompany populism. Populists may call for increased 
substantiveness in democracy, as I noted above. However, their deprioritisation of 
norms has a potential to lead to reliance only on procedure and institutionalised rules 
and legal frameworks in practice. This in turn reduces substantiveness, which erodes 
the populist promise of responsiveness. 
What the populist representative claim does, then, is to call for increased 
substantiveness in the form of morality and authenticity as fundamental dimensions of 
representative politics. This call comes at the potential expense of evidence-based 
fact, democratic norms and pluralism. For populists’ self-representation as impartial 
truth-tellers implies a path of anti-pluralism, not only within the public (whom they 
evoke as a homogenous totality) but also within the party system. Following the logic 
of the populist argument, if populists represent the truth, there is no need for political 
competition or opposition. Neither is there a need for political intermediation in the 
form of democratic institutions that hold a governing populist party to account. The 
potential erosion of institutional and procedural frameworks in the wake of populists 




(Arditi, 2003, p. 20), for substantiveness becomes entirely subjective and relativist in 
populism’s portrayal of opinion as truth. 
Yet let us not forget that the populist call for substantiveness is not without 
foundation. Anti-populism thus also appears to be a reactionary and not a progressive 
response to populism. Simply meeting antagonism with antagonism neglects to 
address the social and political fault lines that give rise to populism in the first place 
and to acknowledge in a substantive way citizens’ very valid reasons for voting for 
populists. One of these reasons indeed appears to reside in feelings of inefficacy based 
on the lack of authentic representation by elite representatives. Factual truth alone is 
not a sufficient basis for democratic representation and the appropriate response 
therefore seems to be to look for common ground, to acknowledge the need for the 
coexistence of both moral and factual truth in the democratic representative 
relationship. I suggest that one of these two types of truth at the expense of the other 
poses a danger to liberal democracy. We need evidence-based information as well as 
politics that does not shy away from normative and moral questions. This necessitates 
a consideration of the roles played by democratic listening and genuinely open 
conversation as ongoing processes of responsiveness and participation beyond 
elections. In an improved communicative relationship between citizens and 
representatives (Blumler and Coleman, 2015), listening to those aspects of the populist 
claim that genuinely reflect unheard voices is also necessary. 
11.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As populism disrupts the ritual of democracy, it highlights its communicative fault line. 
Throughout time and space, populism has served and continues to serve this function 
in representative democracy. In this thesis I have developed a perspective, grounded 
firmly in empirical analysis, that conceives of populism as a communicative process. 
This has produced insights into the conceptual nature of populism and enabled 
comparative study. A communication perspective recognises populism as an organic 
animal that evolves in response to the people it claims to represent. It gains and 
reinforces its own meaning through its enactment. I have demonstrated that the 
exemplary manifestation of populist ideology in disruptive performance challenges the 




the silent majority through a process that harmonises with the new media 
environment.  
A communication perspective on populism thereby allows us to acknowledge its 
construction on the basis of people’s grievances and perceptions of politics. But it also 
brings into relief populism’s constitutive function, which has illiberal consequences and 
ultimately deprives the people of the agency that it promises. For in the populist mode 
of representation, the populist representative eliminates their competitors, opens the 
door for erosion of democratic institutions and norms and only notionally places 
decision-making in the hands of the people. As it breaks down and reinvents the 
foundations of representative democracy, it dismisses truth at the expense of 
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